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CHAPTER I
THE RISE OF THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT
The image of Ireland as the disaffected and rebellious child of the British Empire had been grounded in a
lengthy and strong tradition.

The Irish question played

havoc with British politics and politicians and all attempts
to evolve a successful relationship

failed~

Not content with

colonial status, the Irish, utilizing both constitutional
and revolutionary means, long had harassed Westminster with
demands for more political freedom, agrarian change and an
acknowledgment of their cultural uniqueness.

The years

between the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th
Century saw the various strands of nationalism begin to
coalesce into a loosely knit movement from which would
emerge the pattern of national independence.
The bitter and divisive fall of Parnell in the 1890's
disillusioned the Irish people somewhat with respect to
parlia~entary

nationalism.

The Irish Parliamentary Party,

under the leadership of Charles Stewart

Pa~nell,

the imagination and allegiance of the people.

had captured

Parnell had

created an efficient political machine and by skillfully
exploiting Parliamentary custom and procedure made the I.P.P.
a force which could not be ignored.
1.

He entered into an

--2

alliance with Gladstone and the Whigs, promising Irish
support in return for Home Rule.

However, Parnell's

involvement in a divorce scandal, his subsequent condemnation by the British and then the Irish church and his own
refusal to resign the leadership of the I.P.P., split the
party into two warring, hostile camps.

Parnell himself

died in 1891 and subsequent negotiations between the two
factions resulted in reunification in 1900 under John

....

Redmond.

However, as one historian noted: "The divorce

scandal, followed by the party split, disillusioned some
nationalists and made others cynical about politics.

After

party unity was restored, these people were psychologically
incapable of transferring to Redmond the emotional commitment they had once given to Parnell."l

The Irish then turned

their energy and attention away from parliamentary politics
to the cultivation of cultural expressions of nationality.
The Irish literary Renaissance became the most
polished expression of the new cultural nationalism.

Yeats,

Synge, A.E. and Lady Gregory wrote and produced plays in the
Abbey Theater which they felt would enhance the intellectual
and spiritual growth of the country.

They were a significant

force in awakening and stimulating the national consciousness.

Other creative forces were also at work.

In 1884,

Michael Cusak started the Gaelic Athletic Association to
lLawrence J. McCaffrey, The Irish Question (Lexington,
Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 1968), p.l34.
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encourage participation in native Irish games rather than
foreign imports,

Douglas Hyde and Eoin MacNeill, nurturing

their own vision of nationality, jointly founded the Gaelic
League in 1893, dedicated to reinvigorating and re-establishing the endangered Irish language.

The Gaelic League quickly

became a meeting ground for nationalists.

Although it was

theoretically outside the realm of politics, by 1915, the
more radical elements had gained control and gave the League
a definitely political~character.2
Labour, too, was in a state of ferment.

James Larkin,

labour organizer, syndicalist and leader of the Irish Transport and Workers Union, led his men in a series of successful
strikes, culminating the great lockout of 1913.

The

Union was beaten, if not broken, in this encounter and Larkin
himself departed for

A~erica

in 1914.

James Connolly, who

then assumed the leadership of the labor movement, blended
socialist theories with nationalist feelings.
establish an Irish Socialist Republic.

He wanted to

In pursuit of this

aim and in order to defend his men from the police during
the lockout, he created the small but skilled Citizen Army
to fight for political and economic freedom.

Connolly's

belief in the need for and the desirability of both
political and economic action would eventually lead him to
2Kevin B. Nowlan, "Torn Clarke, MacDermott and the
I.R.B., '' in Leaders and r1en of the Easter Rising: Dublin
1916, ed. f.X~Martin (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University
Press, 1967} p.ll8.
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join other nationalists in the ?ost Office in 1916.
Arthur Griffith contributed to the intellectual
vitality of the period through his writings and the founding
of the Sinn Fein movement.

Griffith preached the doctrine

of separation through passive resistance and emphasized the
uniqueness of Irish nationality in all its expressions language, literature, history and the arts.

He exhorted his

countrymen to develop a state which, through the development
of its home industries, would be economically self-sufficient,
politically independent with its own parliament and governing bodies and culturally free of the alien influence of
the English.

Griffith's Sinn Fein began as a small almost

obscure party which, however, provided the embryo which
would grow and develop into an all encompassing and successful nationalist movement.
The Irish Republican Brotherhood (the Fenians),
which began in 1858 and became the bulwark of revolutionary
nationalism, revitalized and regenerated, linked arms with
all these groups and demanded an independent Irish republic.
Stagnating through inactivity and eclipsed by the predominance of the Irish Parliamentary Party, the Brotherhood
had been in a state of decay.

However, the release from

prison of Tom Clarke, an uncompromising and determined
revolutionary, and his return to Ireland in 1907, together
with the influx of young and ambitious men like Sean
MacDermott, Bulmer Hobson and Denis McCullough, reinvigorated the Brotherhood.

They assumed the leadership of the

,

5

organization and shed the passive, cautious, demoralized
cloak which the Supreme Council had previously been content
to wear.

Although small in numbers, the I.R.B. managed

to infiltrate and assume positions of authority in every
major nationalist organization.
Turn of the century.Ireland was a time of awakening
and a time of cultural and intellectual revolution creating
the climate which sparked the Rising of 1916.

While

cultural nationalism fashioned the backdrop necessary for the
events of Easter Week, renewed political activity acted as
the immediate catalyst.

Once again the Irish Parliamentary

Party focused the attention of the nation on Home Rule.

The

overwhelming Liberal victory of 1906 was followed by close
elections in January and December, 1910, which gave the
Irish party the balance of power at Westminster.

However,

while Prime Minister Herbert Asquith and his party had
recognized their dependence on the I.P.P., they had not
foreseen the degree to which Home Rule would be resisted by
the Ulster Protestants.

Similarly the Liberals did not

realize the "treasonous" depths to which their Conservative
opponents would sink in pursuit of power.

Abetted and

buoyed up by the Tories in England, the men of the North,
under the leadership of Sir Edward Carson and Sir James
Craig, prepared to resist the advent of Home Rule.

They

organized and armed the Ulster Volunteers to uphold their
covenant of defiance.

Against this display of determination,

the weakness of Asquith and his Cabinet colleagues was

6

apparent and their pledge to Redmond and his follo'<vers
became more and more qualified.

A suggestion was made of

special treatment for Ulster or part of Ulster.
partition of

Ireland~

Talk of

an idea repugnant to Redmond and his

party and to the nationalists, was beginning to be heard.
However, the example of Carson and the Ulster Volunteers had an important effect on nationalists in the South.
Deliberate flaunting of legality, Orange drilling and arming.
of men, and talk of treason was succeeding with the English
Government while their own adherence to constitutional
procedure was not enhancing prospects of Home Rule for a
united Ireland.

According to Bulmer Hobson and Eoin

MacNeill, the events in the North shook the rest of Ireland
out of its legal lethargy and eventually led the way to
rebellion.

Hobson wrote:

The Carsonite movement in Ulster shattered this futile
reliance on legal agitation and on the manoeuvring of
an Irish Party in the English Parliament; it rudely
broke up the political make-believe on which the
majority of the Irish people had subsisted for years
and compelled them to face reality.3
MacNeill claimed that it was Carson who "transformed the
whole situation in Ireland and opened the way for the
3 Bulmer Hobson, "The Foundation and Growth of the
Irish Volunteers," in The Irish Volunteers, ed. F.X. Martin
(Dublin: James Duffy and Co., Ltd., 1963), p.l7.
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overthrow of the English regime."4

While these men perhaps

overstated the importance of Carson and neglected to account
for other factors, the fact remains that the Irish Volunteers were founded as a direct result of the arming of the
North.

MacNeill himself sounded the clarion call to arms

on 1 November 1913 1 in An· Clardheanch Soluis, the official
organ of the Gaelic League.

In an article entitled "The

North Began,u the author suggested that the rest of Ireland
follow the example of Ulster and create their own Volunteer
force.

There were no barriers to the creation of such a

group as " .•• it appears that the British Army cannot now be
used to prevent the enrollment, drilling and reviewing of
Volunteers in Ireland.

There is nothing to prevent the

other 28 counties from calling into existence citizen forces
to hold Ireland 'for the Empire.t"S

MacNeill's suggestion

was greeted favorably, especially by members of the Irish
Republican Brotherhood who had been drilling secretly in
preparation for the formation of some type of open, respectable military association.

Bulmer Hobson, an I.R.B. member,

and The O'Rahilly, an ardent nationalist, approached MacNeill
and as a result of a series of discussions, the Irish
4Eoin 14acNeill, "How the Volunteers Began," in The
Irish Volunteers, ed. F.X. Martin (Dublin: James Duffy and
co., Ltd., 1963), pp.74~7s.
SEoin MacNeill, "The North Began,u in The Irish
Volunteers, ed F.X. Martin (Dublin: James Duffy and Co.,
Ltd., 1963), p.6.
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volunteers were founded on 25 November 1913, at the
Rotunda Rink in Dublin,

The response was

overwhelmin~ ~

an estimated 3,.500 men enlisted! planting the seed that
would grow to become the Iri.sh Republican Army and eventually the National Defence Forces of Ireland.
From its inception, the Irish Volunteers considered
themselves to be a defensive, protective force, "founded
expressly in response to a popular urge.
army."6

It was a people's

The Irish Volunteers' objectives were succinctly

stated in their Constitution:

1.

To secure and maintain

the rights and liberties common to all the people of
Ireland; 2.

To train, discipline and equip for this purpose

an Irish Volunteer Force which will render service to an
Irish National Government when such is established; 3.

To

unite in the service of Ireland, Irishmen of every creed
and of every party and class. 7

Thus it was to be a volun-

tary, democratic, national and non-sectarian permanent force.
The formation of the volunteers altered the balance of
power in Ireland.

The island now had a military group

dedicated to insuring Home Rule, as well as one opposed to
this measure.

However, the men of the South did not intend

to be in opposition to the Ulster force.

Their leaders

envisioned a time when the two groups would stand together.
6F. X. Hartin, Introduction to The Irish Volunt·eers
ed. ;F.X. Hartin (Dublin: James Duffy and Co. Ltd., 1963),
p.IX.
7 The Irish Volunteers, Constitution (1914), art. 1,
sec. 1-3.
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MacNeill expressed this sentiment very clearly when he said:
The more genuine and successful the local Volunteer
movement in Ulster becomes, the more completely does
it establish the principle that Irishmen have the right
to decide and govern their own national affairs. We
have nothing to fear from the existing Volunteers in
Ulster nor they from us. We gladly acknowledge the
evident truth that they have opened the way for a
National Volunteer movement, and we trust that the day
is near when their own services· to the cause of an
Irish Nation will become as· memorable as the success
of their forefath~rs.8
The Irish Volunteers were, from the beginning,

infi~

trated by the I.R.B., becoming almost a public front for the
underground militant wing of the Brotherhood.

As a military

organization, the Brotherhood was in a position to act as the
core of the Volunteer movement.

I.R.B. members trained Vol-

unteer recruits and moved into key positions within the new
organization.

Th~

I.R.B. refrained, however, from making

public the degree of control it had attained.

In fact, some

of the more well known Republicans deliberately refused
positions of prominence in order to avoid associating the
Volunteers with any particular philosophy.

MacNeill,

himself, thought to be a Redmonite, believed that all shades
of opinion should be reflected on the governing Committee ..
Despite this attempt at political neutrality, the I.R.B.
covertly shaped the early Volunteers to suit their own
purpose, rebellion.
The creation and development of the Volunteer
8F.X. l-1artin, ed., The Irish Volunteers (Dublin:
James Duffy and Co., Ltd., 1963), pp.ll2-ll3.
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movement had begun independently of the Irish Parlimentary
Party.

Its growth was impressive, numbering 75,000 by May,

1914 and increasing to 180,000 by September, 1914.9
could not afford to ignore such a force.

Redmond

He had at first

viewed the Volunteers as a threat to his party.

However, in

his effort to steer a Home Rule bill through Parliament and
to strengthen Asquith•s resolve vis~~-vis a united Ireland,
he realized the strategic value of being able to speak with
the force of the Volunteers behind him, a la Carson.

In

June of 1914, Redmond publicly demanded that twenty-five
men, nominated by his party, be added to the Provisional
Committee of the Volunteers, or he threatened to create a
rival body.

He rejected the board's suggestion to hold

general elections in each of the counties to achieve broad
sectional representation and preserve the elective spirit of
the organization.

In order to avoid a split in the movement,

the Volunteer Executive acquiesced to Redmond's demand,
though not without grave dissension and dissatisfaction,
especially among I.R.B. members.
lived.

The agreement was short-

The unity which MacNeill and his followers sought to

preserve in June was shattered by September by the outbreak
of World War I.
Redmond's initial support for the war was limited
to pledging the Irish Volunteers to defend Ireland, leaving
the British troops stationed there free to fight in France.
9F.X. Martini ed., "Eoin MacNeill on the 1916 Rising,"
Irish Historical Studies 12 (March, 1961) :227.
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However, he soon had a change of heart.

:Perhaps he believed

that Irish participation on the side of the British would
diminish the possibility of partition when Home Rule came
into effect after the war.

Perhaps it was "due to his

personal involvement in the war, ••• or a chivalrous reaction
to the placing of Home Rule on the Statute book, or .•• was
inspired by Carsonts appeal to the Ulster Volunteers to
enlist for service overseas ••• nlO

Regardless of motivation,

in a speech at Woodenbridge on 20 September 1914, the Irish
leader called on the Volunteers to enlist and fight as members of the British forces, an idea totally alien to their
spirit and purpose.

The original leadership immediately

repudiated Redmond's statement, thus dividing the infant
organization into two camps.

Most of the men followed

Redmond. They became known as the National Volunteers and
went to fight for the British.

The rest, some 11,000 men,

the bulk of these from the Dublin area, remained loyal to
MacNeill.

They retained their original name.

The Irish

Volunteers made a strenuous effort to recruit men into
this truncated body.

Organizers were sent throughout the

country to whip up enthusiasm and increase enrollment.
October, 1914, they could claim 13,500 members.

By

By April,

1916, the Volunteers numbered approximately 16,000 for the
lOF.S.L. Lyons, John Dillon (London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1968), p.359.

pat
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whole country, with 2f500 men located .in the Dublin a:~;ea.ll
The war itself caused
policy of the Volunteers.

~

further shift in the

intern~l

Fear of a British attempt to

disarm them led the officers- to contemplate and prepare for
actual hostilities,

The governing body of the Volunteers

announced it would resist any attempts of suppression.
Training and organizing were intensified and due to the
successful gunrunning at Howth in July, 1914, some arms and
ammunition were available.

Among the members of the I.R.B.

the advent of the war caused great excitement.

Following

the old maxim, England's difficulty is Ireland's opportunity, the revolutionary body sought to take advantage of
England's involvement in the war and proclaim an independent
Irish republic.

Political developments in Britain could

only have strengthened their determination and further
convinced them of the righteousness of their cause.

Bonar

Law, F.E. Smith and Carson, leading conspirators in the
Ulster rebellion, were now members of the reshuffled
English coalition governrnent.l2

As early as 1915, the

Supreme Council of the Brotherhood established a military
committee to plan, organize and execute a general rising of
the Volunteers throughout the country.

The Military

llF.X. Martin, ed,, "Eoin MacNeill on the 1916
Rising,'' Irish Historical Studies, 12 (March, 1961): 24 3
ff.lS.
1 2John Redmond, also, had been offered a place in
the Cabinet, but the tradition of an independent Irish
Parliamentary Party dictated that he refuse.
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Council originally consisted of Joseph Mary Plunkett,
Patrick Pearse, Eamon Ceannt, Thomas Clarke, and Sean MacDermott.

Later James Connolly and Thomas MacDonagh were

co-opted.

Pearse, MacDonagh and Plunkett were the poets,

the visionaries of the Rising.

Pearse, especially, was

imbued with the idea of a blood sacrifice which would cleanse
the soul and regenerate the spirit of Ireland.

These men

would be the seven signatories of the Proclamation of the
Republic and the firs·t members of the Provisional Government.

That the I.R.B. could contemplate the staging of a

rebellion without the cooperation of the Chief of Staff,
MacNeill, is an indication of their dominance within the
Volunteers.

Ceannt was Director of Communications, Plunkett,

Director of Military Operations, and Pearse, Director of
Organization.

All the Volunteer commandants appointed in

March, 1915, with the exception of The O'Rahilly

a~d

de

Valera (.who subsequently joined the society for a brief
time} were Brotherhood members who were aware of the plans
for a Rising.l3

Pearse was the chief link between the two

groups as he was in a position to order general manoeuvres
for Easter week-end without arousing suspicion.

The

Military Committee felt that absolute secrecy was the key
to success.

Haunted by the memories of past revolutionary

attempts gone asunder due to informers and spies, the Rising
13Maureen Wall, "The Background to the Rising: from
1914 Until the Issue of the Countermanding Order on Easter
Saturday, 1916," in The Making of 1916, ed. Kevin B. Nowlan
(Dublin: Stationary Office, 1969}, p.l73.

14
leaders kept vital detailed information from their own
members~

While this tactic Preserved security, their fail-

ure. to enlighten sufficient officers throughout the country
that a secret military council existed within the Volunteer
structure and that orders: i'ssued from them were to be obeyed
regardless- of any otlier instructions:, led to the disastrous
breakdown in communications during tfie insurrection.l4
The Military Council selected Easter Sunday, 1916,
as the date of the rising.

While the most elaborate plans

were devised for the Dublin area, the revolutionary strategists did not ignore the provinces.

The entire country

was to participate in the military struggle.

Pearse and

his fellow leaders attempted, primarily through John Devoy
and the Irish American Clan-na-Gael, to acquire arms from
Germany.

Arrangements were made to land the weapons off

the coast of Ireland during Holy Week.
Through a series of mishaps and miscalculations,
the plans of the rebels went awry.

Hobson overheard a dis-

cussion at a Volunteer meeting vis-i-vis a rising and
hurried to consult MacNeill.

The two men then confronted

Pearse, who acknowledged the secret plans.

He persuaded

MacNeill not to alter the military plans by showing him a
bogus "Castle Document," which purported to be of British
plans for the suppression of the Volunteers and the mass
arrests of nationalists.
14Ibid.

Pearse strengthened his argument
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by informing the Chief of Staff of the promise of arms from
Germany.

However, the Aud, the German submarine carrying

the arms, was unable to make contact with the Irish off the
coast of Kerry and the captain was forced to scuttle his
ship when British warships appeared in the waters.

Moreover,

the Royal Irish Constabulary captured Sir Roger Casement,
previously sent to seek German assistance in a rising and to
recruit an Irish brigade from among the prisoners of war in
Germany, almost immediately after he landed in Ireland on
Good Friday.

When MacNeill heard that the cargo from Ger-

many never landed and that Casement himself was captured,
he rescinded his decision and called off the general manoeuvres for Easter week-end.

To insure that all commands

would know of his countermanding order, he inserted a copy
of it in the Sunday Independent.

The Military Com_mittee

was undaunted by either the failure of the arms landing or
MacNeill's refusal to go along with their plans.
Rising was re-scheduled for Easter Monday.

The

Some officers

never received this latest dispatch; and some, having
received contradictory instructions, were so confused that
they did nothing.

The failure of the I.R.B. to establish

a competent chain of communication effectively hindered the
outbreak of insurrection throughout the country.
In Dublin itself, the Rising took place as planned,
but with fewer men than originally expected and with no
other centers of rebellion throughout the country to relieve
the pressure on the main body of rebels,

The Irish Volunteers

16
and the Citizens Army of James Connolly occupied strategic
defensive positions in the city.

At noon, the tri-color was

raised over the General Post Office and Pearse read the
Proclamation of the Republic establishing Ireland as a free
and independent country. 15

The Easter rebels, approximately

1,000 men and women, kept the city paralysed for about a
week.

The British poured in troops and bombarded Sackville

Street from a gunboat brought up the Liffey.

After almost

a week long struggle, the Irish were forced to surrender.
The civilian population, of course, was unprepared for this
event and reacted with surprise and contempt.

They did not

come out "with knives and forks" to join the Volunteers.
Rather their general attitude was distinctly hostile.

Many

of them had sons, husbands or fathers fighting for the
British; many were swept up in war fever and war profits.
The reaction of the British to the events of Easter
Week, however, guaranteed its success.

General Maxwell,

hence called "Bloody Maxwell" by the Irish, summarily executed the leaders of the Rising, after the charade of a courtmartial, stretching out the procedure by shooting only two
a day.

In particular the execution of Willie Pearse, killed

simply because he was the brother of Patrick, and James
Connolly, shot while strapped to a chair, made a deep
15The tri-color, green for the Catholics, orange
for the Protestants and white for the bond of love between
them, became the nation's official flag. Another flag,
green, with a gold harp in the center and proclaiming in
Irish the "Irish Republic" was also raised.

F
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impression on the people of Ireland.
brave conduct of the men.

So did the gallant,

Their last words, their last

poems leaked out and before long, the rebels who had been
hooted and jeered at became the martyrs of 1916.

Militar-

ily they had failed, but as Pearse foresaw they had awakened the dormant spirit of nationalist Ireland.
Coupled with the executions, the British embarked
upon the mass arrests of nationalists.

In the prison camps

of Frognoch and Lewes, the Irish Volunteers started to regroup and reorganize.
and leaders emerged.

Converts were made; beliefs deepened;
Eamon de Valera, spared a death sen-

tence perhaps because of his American citizenship, or perhaps
because the British authorities felt that continuing the
executions would be a mistake, was the natural choice as
heir apparent to the movement.

Released from internment,

the veterans of 1916 were greeted with cheers and adulation.
As Sinn Fein political candidates they were now gaining
support among the people as the results of some key byelections of 1917 amply demonstrated.

In North Roscommon

in January, 1917, George Noble, Count Plunkett, father of
the Easter martyr, Joseph Plunkett, was elected.

In South

Longford, Joseph McGuiness, still a prisoner in Lewes jail,
was victorious.

In East Clare, in the summer of 1917, de

Valera, declaring his adherence to the Proclamation of the
Republic trounced his Irish Parliamentary Party opponent.
De Valera's victory was an endorsement of 1916, a vote which
showed "beyond a shadow of a doubt that the old party could

18
no longer claim to speak for Nationalist Ireland as a
whole."l6
The leaders of this new-movement were plagued with
disunity and divergence of aims and ideals.
dubbed 1916 the Sinn Fein rebellion.

The English had

Unfortunately, no such

consensus was present among the nationalists.

Three main

groups existed to compete with the ·Irish Parliamentary Party
for the allegiance of the people: Sinn Fein, the Irish Volunteers and the Irish Repuolican Brotherhood.

In the fall

of 1917, the Sinn Fein and Volunteer Conventions took a major
step towards uniting these diverse elements.

At the Sinn

Fein Ard-Fheis, a compromise formula was worked out that all
groups could adhere to.

Sinn Fein would work to secure the

international recognition of Ireland as an independent
Republic.

Having achieved that, Sinn Fein left to the

people the right to choose their own form of government.
To further harmonize relations, Griffith stepped down, and
Eamon de Valera was elected President of Sinn Fein.

The

Convention achieved the tenuous unity so vital to the young
movement.

The vague formula of 1917 was an umbrella under

which all nationalists could take shelter.

After the storm

when it was necessary to translate ideals into specfic realistic terms, discord and dissension would break through.
The Volunteer Convention followed the example of
16F. S. L. Lyons, Ireland Since· the Famine (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971}, p.383.
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Sinn Fein and elected de Valera its

President~

In addition,

six of the twenty members elected to the National Executive
were also members of the Sinn ~ein governing body. 17

Thus

a certain degree of cooperation between the two groups was
assured, even though the Volunteers remained an autonomous
body, entirely independent of Sinn Fein.

The inter-relation-

ship of political and military personnel set a pattern which
would endure through the establishment of the Irish Free
State.

According to Richard Mulcahy, "the work done at the

two Conventions of 1917 provided the basis of the GovernmentArmy relationship which came so instantaneously and automatically into operation on the establishment of the Dail
and endured so effectively."l8
Just as the pre-1916 Volunteers had been infiltrated
by the I.R.B., so too was the post-rising organization.

The

Brotherhood was forced to reorganize following the decemation
of their leadership and the reduction of their rank and file
during Easter Week.

Men like Michael Collins and Richard

Mulcahy were determined that the old secret society should
again provide the leadership to guide and direct the liberation movement.

A new constitution was drawn up and a new

17The six members were: De Valera, Cathal Brugha,
Michael Collins, Austin Stack,. Diarmuid Lynch and Sean McEntee.
18 General Richard Mulcahy, "The Irish Volunteer Convention 27 October 1917", The Capuchin Annual, p.409.
Richard Mulcahy was the first Minister for Defence in the
Irish Free State and Commander-.in-Chief following the death
of Michael Collins~ He was previously deputy Chief of Staff
of the Volunteers, Chief of Staff and assistant Minister for
Defence in first Irish Governments.
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Supreme Council formed.

Sean McGarry became President;

Michael Collins, Secretary; and Diarmui~ Lynch, Treasurer.
On the Volunteer Staff, Collins \'las the Director of Organization; Lynch, Director of Communications; Sean McGarry,
General Secretary; and Richard Mulcahy, Deputy Chief of
Staff.

However, two powerful offices remained outside the

I.R.B.•s control and hostile to it.

Both de Valera, Pres-

ident, and Cathal Brugha, Chief of Staff, were former members of the Organisation and were now opposed to its revitalization.

They thought it unnecessary to continue a secret

society, condemned by the Catholic Church, when an open and
popular movement existed in Ireland.

But their antagonism

to the I.R.B. was not all-consuming and they managed to
cooperate with their former comrades.

Thus while all three

groups managed to paper over their differences with vague
formulas and inter-locking leadership, sizeable obstacles
remained which would eventually have to be overcome.
In 1917, however, the British conveniently provided
enough external stress to solidify the Irish.

Faced with a

growing shortage of manpmver, Lloyd George and his colleagues
toyed seriously with the idea of extending conscription to
Ireland.

Southern Irish opinion reacted violently against

this threat.

Irish Parliamentary Party leaders, Sinn

Feiners 1 and the Catholic clergy shared the same platforms at
mass rallies to resist conscription,

As if they themselves

were trying to intensify the problem, the English Cabinet
revised the old policy of coercion, arresting most of the

p
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Sinn Fein leaders on the very dubious evidence of a German
plot.

Michael Collins was one of the few leaders to escape

arrest, a costly error for the British.

Now in a position

of dominance both in the Volunteers and in the I.R.B., he
began to gather around him the men who would destroy Dublin
castle, the heart of British rule in Ireland.
British activity gave the Irish an impetus and a
direction which they had previously lacked.

As Piaras

Beaslai, a prominent Sinn Feiner, Volunteer, and I.R.B. man
wrote:
The English Government's proclamation, arrests, and
other forms of coercion were of great assistance to
Sinn Fein. They helped to strengthen popular sympathy
and to create a united front in the face of the enemy.
They also helped to save Sinn Fein from the embarrassments of framing and putting into execution a practical
constructive policy.l9
The ranks of the Volunteers swelled to approximately
100,000 men in October, 1918, as the issue of conscription
drove men into their arms.

To shape raw recruits into

anything like a professional army was an exceedingly difficult
task.

Training took place without weapons, officers were

part-time, and there were few instructors and fewer manuals.
General Headquarters was unable to do more than issue overall
directives on policy and organization.

Control was left in

the hands of local leaders who, to a large extent, determined
19piaras Beaslai, Michael Collins and the Makin of a
New Ireland, 2 Vols. (N.Y.: arper an Brot ers, n.d. 1:180.
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The Irish Volunteers

the shape of the Volunteer movement.20

had the men and the spirit with ttlhich to begin an anny.

The

threat of conscription gave them something to fight against.
This sense of purpose "gave cohesion to the nationalist
effort, and it was this also which inevitably brought nearer the possibility of an armed conflict betwen the volunteers and the military authorities."21
Politically, events were working for the benefit of
Sinn Fein.

The Irish Parliamentary Party had not yet been

able to secure the implementation of the Home Rule Bill,
and despite conferences and negotiations, a unified Ireland
was becoming more and more illusory.

During the war, Home

Rule had been passed but with the provisions that it not
come into effect until after the end of the war and that the
Ulster question be decided by special amending legislation.
In 1917, Prime Minister Lloyd George had offered Redmond
immediate Home Rule for the twenty-six counties, a proposal
which the Irish leader totally rejected.

Lloyd George then,

on Redmond's suggestion, arranged a conference wherein
Unionists and Nationalists could work out a solution to their
differences.

Sinn Fein and organized labour refused to at-

tend the Convention.

The Ulster Unionists remained obdurate

and the Convention 't'l7as a failure.

Redmond himself died in

2

°Florence O'Donoghue, No Other Law (Dublin: Irish
Press, Ltd., 1954), pp.28~3o.
21 F.S.L. Lyonst Ireland Since the Famine (Ne\'T York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971), p.395.
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March of 1918, during the final sputterings of the conference.

Dillon, now leader of the I.P.P., and his colleagues,

were tainted by their identification with the Liberal party,
associated with a policy which the Convention had demonstrated to be futile and plagued by the anger of the Irish peopte
at the British for the execution of the 1916 leaders, the
threat of conscription and the policy of coercion.

The post-

war election of 1918 showed the depth of Irish disillusionment with their traditional leaders and their desire for
change.

It was a bitterly fought contest.

Sinn Fein was an

outlawed party with most of her leaders in prison.

Their

platform was an affirmation of the republican ideal: abstention from Westminster; the promise to drive the English out
of Ireland by whatever means necessary; the creation of a
national assembly; and an appeal to the Peace Conference for
recognition.

Charges of fraud and intimidation abounded.

Moreover, both sides were competing for the affection of the
new electorate created by the Representation of the People
Act of 1918.

The results surpassed even the pessimistic

prediction of John Dillon.

The Irish Parliamentary Party

suffered a defeat from which it never recovered, winning only
six seats, four of which were in border constituencies and
thus not contested.

The Unionists won twenty-six seats.

Sinn Fein won seventy-three seats.

An analysis of the

voting pattern shows the strength of Sinn Fein.

In the 32

counties, Sinn Fein received 47.7 per cent of the vote cast.
However, this figure is misleading as a more thorough

24
examination

reve~ls;

Put in these terms, Sinn Fein strength is undoubtedly
understated since these figures include heavily Unionist
areas in the north.... east which were contested for symbolic rather than expectant reasons ••.• A better estimate
of Sinn Fein strength can be arrived at by calculating
the vote obtained in the contested constituencies in
the •26~County' area of the country. Here Sinn Fein
capture 46.73 per cent of the votes on the register and
64.86 per cent of the votes actually cast.22
The republican-nationalists rose from obscurity to
power in meteor-like fashion.
accredited leaders of Ireland.

They now were the legally
The next step would be to

translate the ideals and rhetoric of revolution into reality.,

2 1Brian Farrell, The Founding of Dail Eireann (Dublin:
Gill and Macmillan, 1971}, p.48.

CHAPTER II
THE ANGLO-IRISH WAR
The victors of the 1918 elections in an attempt to
establish themselves as the de facto as well as the de jure
leaders of Ireland convened An Dail Eireann, a national
assembly, on 21 January 1919.

A small nucleus of Sinn

Feiners, their ranks depleted by arrests,l began the task
of constructing a government.
The first priority of the Dail was to reaffirm the
free and independent Irish republic proclaimed on Easter
Monday, 1916.

The Declaration of Independence asserted that:

••• we, the elected Representatives of the ancient Irish
people in National Parliament assembled, do in the name
of the Irish nation, ratify the establishment of the
Irish Republic and pledge ourselves and our people to
make this declaration effective by means at our command.
We solemnly declare foreign government in Ireland to
be an invasion of our national right which we will never
tolerate and we demand the evacuation of our country by
the English Garrison.2
1 of the 69 representatives elected, 34 were in prison,
5 were on missions abroad, 1 had been deported and 2 were
absent because of illness. Three significant absentees were
Eamon de Valera and Arthur Griffith, who were in prison, and
Michael Collins, who was in England, although his presence
was acknowledged during the roll call to mislead authorities.
2 Ireland, Dail Eireann, Minutes of the Proceedings
of the First Parliament of the Republic of Ireland: 16.
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While both the tone and content of the Declaration
of Independence were resolute and revolutionary, tragically
adhering to the fatal flaw of die-hard Republicanism, the
Constitution which the Dail ratified reflected the political
values of the new leaders.

The Constitution of 1919 demon-

strated a strong commitment to a democratic parliamentary
form of government, fully embracing the concept of popular
sovereignty.
In an attempt to delineate the social and economic
policy of the new State, the Dail adopted the Democratic
Programme, a radical manifesto, not really reflective of
the thinking of most of the representatives.

It said:

We declare in the words of the Irish Republican
Proclamation the right of the people of Ireland to the
ownership of Ireland, and to the unfettered control of
Irish destinies to be indefeasible, ••• we declare that
the Nation's sovereignty extends not only to all men
and women of the Nation, but to all its material possessions, the Nation's soil and all its resources, all
the wealth and all the wealth-producing processes within
the Nation, and ••• we reaffirm that all right to
private property must be subordinated to the public
right and welfare.
It shall be the first duty of the Government of the
Republic to make provision for the physical, mental
and spiritual well-being of the children, to secure
that no child shall suffer hunger or cold from lack of
food, clothing, or shelter, but that all shall be
provided with the means and facilities requisite for
their proper education and training as Citizens of a
Free and Gaelic Ireland.3
The Democratic Programme was a pragmatic political
expedient necessary to strengthen the Irish Labour Party's
claim to full representation at the upcoming international
3Ibid., pp. 22-23.

socialist conference.
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The Dail hoped the conference would

recognize its claim to independence and thus further its
bid for international recognition.4

The adoption of the

Programme reflected the high degree of politicization of
the new leaders, rather than their vision of Irish society.
Many of the political revolutionaries feared that extending
the parameters of the movement in this way to include social
and economic issues would destroy the fragile unity already
achieved and so desperately needed.

The emphasis of the

struggle was to be political; its main concern was to drive
the British out of Ireland, not to create a utopian society.
In general, an examination" •.. of the original Dail Eireann,
of its constitutional documents, its decrees, its priorities
and policies adds to the original impression of an assembly
at least as intent on maintaining the framework of an established society and its associated values as with attempting
to change it."s
To bolster its claim to independence, the Dail sent
a "Message to the Free Nations of the World," outlining the
Irish claim to independence and calling on the international
community to recognize and support her new national status
at the upcoming Peace Congress.

It was an idealistic and

vain hope to assume that the victors of World War I, the
countries which had proclaimed loudly about the right of
4Brian Farrell, The Founding of Dail Eireann (Dublin:
Gill and Macmillan, 1971}, p.60.
5Ibid., p.78.
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small nations to self-determination, would impose this
standard on any but the vanquished.

To President Woodrow

Wilson and the rest of the delegates to Paris, Ireland would
remain an internal British problem.

If freedom were to be

won, only the Irish themselves could achieve it.
Having sketched the theoretical framework of the new
state, the Dail began to deal with the practicabilities of
state-building.

On January 22, 1919, it appointed a

temporary ministry consisting of Cathal Brugha, Prime
Minister; Eoin MacNeill, Minster for

Finance~

Michael

Collins, Minister for Home Affairs; Count Plunkett, Minister
for Foreign Affairs; and Richard Mulcahy,Minister for Defence.

Plagued by arrests and the threat of arrests and

groping its way through the darkness of inexperience and uncertainty, Dail Eireann did not become a serious reality
until April 1, 1919, with the escape and release of some of
its most notable members, " •.. and from the proceedings of
this second session dated what might be called the permanent
constructive work of the Dail."6

Mr. de Valera at that time

became President of the Dail or Priomh-Aire.

He selected for

his Cabinet: Arthur Griffith, Home Affairs and the President's
deputy; Michael Collins, Finance; Cathal Brugha, Defence;
Count Plunkett, Foreign Affairs; Countess Markievicz, Labour,
William Cosgrave, Local Government, Eoin MacNeill, Industry;
and Robert Barton, Agriculture.

The Cabinet, with most of

6F.S.L. Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971), p.403.
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its members on the run, was unable to keep permanent records
and was left very much to its own initiative.

In spite of

the obstacles, some departments achieved striking successes.
For example, the Minister for Finance was able to float a
National Loan, the Ministry of Local Government ultimately
would dominate the local councils, and Dail Eireann Courts
would eventually supercede those of the British.
One area which remained unsettled was the relationship of the Minister for Defence to the autonomous Volunteers.
Catha! Brugha did not exercise direct control over the
"army" nor did the Volunteers ever officially swear allegiance to the Dail.

One difficulty was "

that the armed

forces of the republic had existed before the republic had
actual parliamentary institutions,"? that is, the Volunteers
were organized before the 1918 elections and the convening
of the Dail.

Thus, the army had an independent tradition

outside the realm of civilian control.

The Dail itself did

not accept responsibility for the actions of the Volunteers
until March, 1921, four months prior to the cessation of
hostilities.

This abdication of authority not only encour-

aged independent action but also led to a skeptical and
distrustful attitude on the part of some officers vis-~-vis
the government's ability and wisdom in making decisions
7Kevin B. Nowlan, 11 Dail Eireann and the Army: Unity
and Division," in The Irish Struggle 1916-1926, ed. Desmond
Williams (Toronto: Un1vers1ty of Toronto Press, 1966), p.67
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affect1ng
t h e m1'1'1tary.

8

It established the precedent of

the autonomy of the military which would plague the government through 1924.

In 1919, the question of government con-

trol of the army drifted along without resolve as the actions
of the Volunteers seemed to be pushing Ireland into a state
of war with England.
The first dramatic incident of the upcoming guerilla
war occurred at Soloheadbeg, simultaneously and coincidentally
with the convening of Dail Eireann.

Led by Dan Breen and

Sean Treacy, the Third Tipperary Brigade attacked a Royal
Irish Constabulary guard in order to acquire guns and explosives.

The I.R.C. resisted and two policemen were shot and

killed, thus opening the initial phase of the war.

It was,

in essence, a struggle between the Volunteers and the police.9
Soloheadbeg was condemned by the clergy, the public
and the press.

Even a section of Republican opinion did not

support the men from Tipperary.l 0

The incident was initiated

by local leaders and not sanctioned by General Headquarters.
It grew out of the conditions and frustrations of the Volunteer movement.

The conscription issue had died with the end

of the war; the political activity of the 1918 elections had
8Florence O'Donoghue, No Other Law (Dublin: Irish
Press Ltd., 1954), p.200; Dan Breen, My Fight for Irish
Freedom (Dublin: The Talbot Press, 1944), pp.191-192.
9 F.S.L. Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971), p.410.
lOFlorence O'Donoghue, No Other Law (Dublin: Irish
Press Ltd., 1954), p.41; Dan Breen, My Fight for Irish
Freedom (Dublin: The Talbot Press, 1944), p.34.
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been successfully completed; and the majority of the Dail
seemed content to pin their hopes on the upcoming Peace
conference.

There was no official military policy compre-

hensible to the average Volunteer.

Active, aggressive

leaders like Treacy and Breen of Tipperary and Liam Lynch
of Cork were faced with the problem of declining morale and
the very real threat of disintegration of their Brigades.
They felt they had to go forward or the paralysis of inactivity would destroy the spirit of the movement.

Up until

this point, the policy of the Volunteers had been one of
passive resistance.

The British had been arresting men

throughout the country for drilling or carrying arms and
the Volunteers allowed themselves to be imprisoned without
offering any resistance.
policy was ineffective.
the Volunteers to action.

Some of their leaders felt this
Soloheadbeg was an attempt to spur
Dan Breen explained:

•.. that this business of going to jail and becoming
cheap heroes must stop. We wanted a real army, not a
hollow mockery. Even if such an army numbered a few
score only, it would be far better than the present
organisation. We thought Soloheadbeg would have been
followed by active operations all over the country.ll
Soloheadbeg was not immediately effective in the manner Breen
desired but it was the beginning of growing pressure on G.H.Q.
to authorize and sanction a policy of action and aggressiveness.
General Headquarters was aware of a changing
llDan Breen, My Fight for Irish Freedom (Dublin:
Talbot Press, 1944), pp. 68-69.
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atmosphere and in An tOglach, the official organ of the
Volunteers declared:

Every Volunteer is entitled, morally and legally, when
in the execution of his military duties, to use all
legitimate methods of warfare against the soldiers
and policemen of the English usurper, and to slay them
if it is necessary to do so in order to overcome their
resistance. He is not only entitled but bound to
resist all attempts to disarm him.l2
This attitude was further strengthened at the first meeting
of G.H.Q. after the establishment of Dail Eireann when

Cath~l

Brugha, Chief of Staff and Minister for Defence, stated that.
since Ireland now had a lawfully constituted government,
elected by the people, the Volunteers became the army of that
government and, as such, were entitled morally and legally
to defend the Dail, " .•. to slay the officials and agents
of the foreign invader ... to put to death all spies, informers and all Irishmen who acted as agents of the foreigners
in the warfare against us.nl3

This major change in the

policy of the Volunteers was not universally accepted in
1919; but by 1920 it would reflect both the mentality of
and the reality in most of the country.
The Anglo-Irish War, which grew both in extent and in
intensity from 1919 until the Truce in 1921, developed
because of the exigencies of the time.

As a guerilla war,

a model for future wars of liberation, it was a radical
departure from 1916.

In all previous Irish attempts at

12Quoted in Piaras Beaslai, Michael Collins and the
Making of a New Ireland, 2 Vols. (N.Y.: Harper and Brothers,
n.d.) 1:275.
13Ibid., p.270.
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rebellion, the rebels directly challenged the military
superiority of Britain, committing all their men to the
field at one time.

In 1919, the Volunteers did not have

the men or the arms for another general rising against the
military machine of the victor of World

~var

I.

No foreign

allies were there to help them; no ship load of arms prepared to land on their shares.

However, the Volunteers

could claim legitimacy as the army of a popularly elected
government.

They

11

were fighting within a democratically

•••

established framework and this not only enhanced their own
morale but was in part responsible for the support extended
to them in their rural

1

theatres of war. 1 ~·14

The Volunteers

fought in the only way available to them which gradually
developed into a full scale guerilla war of liberation.
lvlichael Collins said,

11

As

We organized our army and met the

armed patrols and military expeditions which were sent
against us in the only way possible.

We met them by an

organised and bold guerilla warfare."l5
The Volunteers were organized on a territorial basis.
The smallest unit was the section.

Next came the Company,

then the Battalion, and finally the Brigade.
was composed of seven Battalions.

Each Brigade

The number of men per

Company might vary from fifty to a hundred.

The men were

14John A. Murphy, Ireland in the Twentieth Century
(Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1975), p.l4.
15Quoted in G.A. Hayes-McCoy, "The Conduct of the
Anglo-Irish War," in The Irish Struggle, 1916-1926, ed.
Desmond Williams (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966),
p.61.
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part-time soldiers, fighting at night and then returning
to their regular occupations during the day.
irregular.

Training was

Many of the men, for example, never had target

practice because of the lack of ammunition.

In a real sense,

much of their training carne from participation in actual
combat.

As the war progressed, more men joined in full-time

service but their numbers were always limited by the small
quantity of arms available.

The structure of the Volunteers

was elastic, flexible, based on the dernographical and
graphical factors of the region.

geo~

According to Tom Barry, an

officer in Cork, this was all important because "it allowed
for the development of a fighting machine under changing
conditions and growing enemy pressure." 16

The Irish real-

ized that if they were to succeed, they had to adapt their
fight to their unique circumstances and not adhere to traditional military structure. Writing in An tOglach in 1918,
Michael Collins said:
Forget the Company of the regular army. We are not
establishing or attempting to establish a regular force
on the lines of the standing armies of even the small
independent countries of Europe. Our object is to bring
into existence, train and equip as riflemen scouts a body
of men, and to secure that these are capable of acting ·
as a self-contained unit . • . • 17
The activity and aggressiveness of the Volunteers
varied from area to area.

Counties like Cork, Tipperary,

16 Torn Barry, Guerilla Days in Ireland (Dublin:
Irish Press, Ltd., 1949), pp.8-9.
17Quoted in Piaras Beaslai, Michael Collins and
the Making of a New Ireland, 2 Vols. (N.Y.: Harper and
Brothers, n.d.) 1:205-206.
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and Longford were very busy, while the West and Midlands,
for example, generally remained quiet.

The attitude of

the local leaders was often the determining factor in deciding the degree of participation.
officers.

The men elected their own

·Clan loyalties and rivalries played as importan·t

a part as martial skills.
interfere.

General Headquarters did not

They accepted and worked with the men chosen.

Sometimes G.H.Q. found it necessary to exhort them to fight;
sometimes, to proceed with more caution and prudence.

In

fact, General Headquarters exercised little control over
what actually happened throughout the country.
of one historian,

11

•••

In the view

the military policy in 1919-1920 was

left very much to the leaders of the Volunteers," although

11

•••

headquarters' staff kept a reasonably close

grip over the major actions in the provinces, ••• "18

Dublin

was hampered by the lack of a rapid communications system,
a paucity of funds and a scarcity of weapons and ammunition.
Most importantly, the nature of the struggle itself demanded
a great deal of local autonomy.

Clashes with the British

were determined by the movement of enemy forces and the
availability of men and equipment, factors either beyond the
control of Dublin or which of necessity had to be left to
the discretion of local personnel.

Dublin staff officers

were hampered by their unfamiliarity with and their
18Kevin B. Nowlan, "Dail Eireann and the Army: Unity
and Division," in The Irish Struggle 1916-1926, ed. Desmond
Williams (Toronto: Univers1ty of Toronto Press, 1966), p.72.
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inexperience in fighting in the country, a fact not lost on
provincial leaders.

However, General Headquarters did set

guidelines and coordinate policies gleaned from officers
directly engaged in the fighting.

Gradually, G.H.Q. would

assume more control as the army became more structured.
In one important area, G.H.Q. gave invaluable aid
to the Volunteers.

During the course of the war, Michael

Collins organized an Intelligence System which baffled the
British and cracked the walls of Dublin Castle.
recruited men from inside the Castle.

Collins

They provided him with

information on raids, arrests, and troop movements.
established his own Intelligence Staff.

He also

Liam Tobin became

Chief Intelligence Officer, assisted by Tom Cullen and later
Frank Thorton.

Collins' people were everywhere, in post

offices, on the docks, in telegraph offices.

This complex

network supplied the Volunteers with much valuable

infor~

mation.
Collins himself became the very heart of the revelution.

He was not only Minister for Finance but also a

member of the Supreme Council of the I.R.B., Director of
Intelligence and, for a time, Adjutant-General of the

Volun~

teers. Aptly nicknamed the "Big Fellow", he symbolized the
liberation movement.

Collins brought together the loose ends

and synthesized the entire struggle against the British.
Working with him were the officers who would form the nucleus
of the Free State Army: Dick Mulcahy, Chief of Staff; Sean
MacMahon, Quartermaster-General; Gearoid O'Sullivan,

p
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Adjutant-General.
l'lhile G.H.Q. exercised only minimum control over
the army, Dail Eireann had even less authority over the
Volunteers.

Speaking on April 10, 1919, Eamon de Valera,

President of the Dail, said: "The Minister of National
Defence( is of course, in close association with the voluntary military forces . . . • ," 19 thus indicating that at this
stage the army was " .•• associated with rather than subordinate to the Dail Ministry."20
uation.

It was a curious sit-

Theoretically, the Volunteers remained an independ-

ent, autonomous body responsible only to its own Executive;
yet they were commonly referred to as the army of the state.
Dail Eireann regularly voted it funds and the Minister for
Defence reported to the Irish assembly on its activities.
However, the Dail, itself declared an illegal body in 1919,
met less and less frequently and its meetings contained
little discussion of military policy or objectives.

In no

sense did the Dail take an active role in the events of the
war.
In January of 1921, in one of the few major Dail
discussions on war time policy, certain disagreements and
complaints surfaced concerning the way the country had
drifted into war.

A number of Deputies believed that they

1 9 Ireland, Dail Eireann, Minutes of the Proceedings
of the First Parliament of the Republ1c of Ireland: 46-47.
2 °Kevin B. Nowlan, "Dail Eireann and the Army: Unity
and Division," in The Irish Struggle 1916-1926, ed. Desmond
Williams (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966), p.72.

39
had not been kept sufficiently informed, that the Dail had
not been convened frequently enough and "that members in
the country who were outside of the Dublin circle, knew
nothing of what was going on, heard nothing to guide them
and had to rely altogether on their own judgment." 21

Sean

MacEntee, the representative from South Monaghan, claimed
that the "Ministry did not seem to pay any attention to his
arguments and he said they were of the opinion they [the
Government] could continue to govern the country while the
Dail was in a state of hibernation.

He thought if that

policy was continued the results would be disastrous to the
country." 22
Approval of the direction the revolution had taken
was not unanimous.

Some deputies were uneasy with the

military policy of the government.

Roger Sweetman, the

representative from North Wexford, resigned his seat in protest of the growing violence in January of 1921.

He said

that he was "in total disagreement with the policy pursued
for some time back . • . • He thought there was a number of
people outside the Dail who did not see eye to eye with them
on the present policy.

He wanted to see nothing done

which they as moderate men could not stand over in the
main ... "23
Generally, however, the Dail endorsed the status quo,
22rbid.,

pp. 245-246.

23 rbid.,

pp. 243-244.
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rejecting any suggestion of lessening the activities of the
Volunteers or diminishing the struggle.24

In effect, they

as a body abdicated responsibility for the conduct and prosecution of the war.

Due to the nature of the guerilla strug-

gle, the result was that a small clique of dedicated and
zealous men ran the revolution.

A breakdown in the tra-

ditional chain of authority occurred with the local Volunteer
units enjoying a great deal of independence from G.H.Q.,
with the army Executive not legally bound to the government,
and with the Ministry effectively free from Dail control.
The revolution maintained its cohesiveness because its leaders simultaneously occupied co-ordinated positions of authority in the Dail, the government and the army.

Volunteer

officers were elected to Dail Eireann and six members of
G.H.Q. staff became Deputies: Michael Collins, Richard
Mulcahy, Gearoid O'Sullivan, Owen O'Duffy, Piaras Beaslai
and Liam Mellows.

Distinctions between military and civilian

became blurred and muted.
Clearly, the issue of civilian control of the army
was not a paramount concern.

The Dail seemed to have no

fear of the military extending and usurping its rights.

The

discussion of March 11, 1921, on the establishment of a military dictatorship evidenced this.

The House agreed that when

24 De Valera had been in America from June
December 1920 and the discussion on whether the
against the British should be lessened arose on
tion. His critics claimed that this proved how
with the movement he was.

1919 to
struggle
his suggesout of touch
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its membership fell to five, "the Army should take control."25

Unquestionably, the leaders were worried about the

survival of the Republic, the liberation of their country,
the unity of the revolutionary movement; and not ethereal
abstractions concerning the role of the military in society.
That the Army was free from central military and political
control to such a great extent had great importance in 1922.
"The Army did defend the Republic from 1916 to 1922 but it
did so in its own way with little concern about the Government's attitude."26

The question which remained unanswered

was whether Dail Eireann could control the Volunteers if it
ever chose to do so.
An attempt was made to clarify the relationship
between the Dail and the Volunteers in August of 1919.

The

Minister for Defence, Cathal Brugha, proposed that the soldiers swear an oath of allegiance to the Dail.

He said that

he regarded "the Irish Volunteers as a Standing Army and
that as such they should be subject to the

Government.~.

The important thing was that the Irish Volunteers under
their present Constitution owed allegiance to their own
Executive.

Since the Dail had come into existence there

had been no Volunteer Convention, but one would be held as
25

,
,
Ire 1 an d , Da1, 1 E1reann,
M1nutes
or.c t h e p rocee d.1ngs
pf the First Parliament of the Republic of Ireland: 280.
26

Joseph Curran, "Michael Collins and the Irish Free
State" (PhD. dissertation, University of Chicago) p.29.
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soon as possible.
adjusted." 27

It was necessary to have this matter

Not everyone agreed.

Collins feared that the

intrusion of politics and politicians into the war effort
would hamper the drive for independence, an apprehension
shared by other officers.

Those who opposed the oath

questioned the wisdom of removing control from their own
executive.

But Brugha prevailed.

Since a Volunteer Con-

vention would have been too dangerous, it was never held
nor was the Constitution ever changed.

The oath was admin-

istered by individual officers and the Volunteers officially
became the Irish Republican Army, the I.R.A.

This made no

substantive difference because "the soldiers' first loyalty
was to their commanders and the sywbol of the Republic."28
Underlying the issue of Dail control over the army
was the question of the power and influence of the Irish
Republican Brotherhood.

Collins felt that the actual rea-

son for Brugha's insistence on an oath was to break the
allegiance of the men to the I.R.B.

In a sense, the oath

issue was part of the struggle for control of the army.
rift was growing between Brugha and Collins.
was Collins' stronghold of power.

A

The I.R.B.

By breaking its strength,

Brugha would effectively reduce the Minister for Finance's
influence.

Exactly how powerful this secret organization

was, is difficult to judge.

In 1919, the I.R.B. had altered

its Constitution, deleting from it the assertion that its
28Joseph Curran, "The Decline and Fall of the I.R.B,"
Eire Ireland 10 (Spring 1975): 17-18.
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President was also the President of the Irish Republic,
and also giving its approval to the oath of allegiance to
the Dail as the lawfully elected government of Ireland.
These actions were an acknowledgment by the Brotherhood that
their role in Irish society had changed since 1916.

More-

over, in terms of numbers, the I.R.B. was not very potent.
For example, in the counties of Cork, Kerry and Waterford,
while the Army numbered about 31,000 men, the I.R.B. comprised only 1,170.29

One estimate of the strength of the

I.R.B. was that its members did not exceed five per cent of
the total strength of the Army.30

However, the Brotherhood

did have control over positions of authority.

Many officers

were I.R.B. men; and three members of the Supreme Council
were on the staff of G.H.Q.: Collins, O'Sullivan and O'Duffy.
According to one source, the I.R.B. "controlled most of the
administrative machinery of the Army and could direct the
manner of its operation without offending against the disciplinary code."31

Actual meetings of the local circles

diminished as the war intensified, but the myth of the I.R.B.
remained strong and the influence of the Brotherhood in the
Army continued to be questioned through 1924.

To some, the

Brotherhood was an anachronism which had outlived its usefulness and now tended to sap the unity of the revolutionary
2 9 Florence O'Donoghue, No Other Law (Dublin: Irish
Press Ltd., 1954), p.l89.
30Ibid., p.43.
31Ibid., p.l99.
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movement and to divide the allegiance of the men.

To

others, "it had vitality and significance in that it bound
a group of men into a historic and respected brotherhood
which evoked loyalty of a high order without undermining in
any way the Army discipline under which they served." 32
Not until March of 1921 did the Dail define its
relationship, however, inaccurately, with the I.R.A.

At

the suggestion of de Valera, the Dail agreed to take formal
responsibility for the actions of the I.R.A. and publicly
acknowledge that a state of war existed between Ireland and
England.

This declaration would belie enemy claims that the

I.R.A. was an irresponsible force, "a murder gang," and
deny England this advantage in the propaganda war being waged
in the press.

Therefore, in an interview on March 30, 1921,

de Valera stated:
•.. This army is, therefore, a regular state force, under
the civil control of the elected representatives, and
under officers who hold their commissions under warrant
from these representatives. The Government is, therefore, responsible for the actions of this Army. These
actions are not the acts of irresponsible individuals
or groups, therefore, nor is the I.R.A. as the enemy
would have one believe a praetorian guard. It is the
national Army of defence.33
The Dail's acknowledgment in 1921 that a state of
war existed in Ireland was certainly belated (albeit one
which England refused to make) .

Slowly and gradually through

1920 the clashes and skirmishes between the I.R.A. and the
3 2 Ibid.

I

p. 4 3.

33Quoted in Florence O'Donoghue, No Other Law,
(Dublin: Irish Press Ltd., 1954), p.l62.

British grew more numerous.
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The tempo of the war intensified

and its tone grew more savage.

The Royal Irish Constabulary,

ostracized as armed agents of the British and the chief target of the I.R.A. in the first phase of the war, had grown
demoralized and their ranks dwindled.

In the summer of 1920,

the R.I.C. was augmented by the addition of the Auxiliaries,
ex-officers of the British Army and the Black and Tans, exsoldiers of the Crown, recruited for service in Ireland.

The

efforts of the British to quell the rebellion by arresting
more and more suspected I.R.A. men only increased the number
of full-time soldiers.

It became increasingly dangerous to

return to a place of employment after a night's engagement.
Thus, more of the I.R.A. were forced "on the run."
necessitated a tightening of the organization.
instruction increased.

This

Training and

Local Quartermasters developed plans

for feeding and clothing their men.

Communication and coopera-

tion between units were expanded so that, by the spring of
1920, a coordinated operation to burn vacated police barracks
throughout the country could be carried out.

This was part

of a new campaign by the I.R.A. to attack the enemy's stronghold in order to destroy them and thus hopefully to drive
them out of the country.
Terror and counter-terror grew in ferocity and
frequency throughout 1920, a year which witnessed the murder
of Tomas Mac Curtain, Lord Mayor of Cork; the death of his
successor, Terrence Mac Swiney, on a hunger strike in prison;
and the wanton burning of Cork city itself.
year of "Bloody Sunday".

It was also the

On November 21, 1920, Collins'
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squad was responsible for the systematic elimination of
British spies.

Eleven men were killed.

It was a ruthless

action, justifiable in content, if not in style.
revenge was brutal.

British

That same afternoon the soldiers fired

on an innocent crowd attending a Gaelic football match in
Croke Park, killing 12 and wounding 60.

Overall, the death

toll for 1920 was 176 R.I.C. killed, 251 wounded; 54 British
soldiers killed, 118 wounded; and 43 I.R.A. men killed,

In

comparison, between May and December of 1919, 18 policemen
had been killed.34
In November and December of 1920 the I.R.A. developed a new weapon with which to fight the British: the
Flying Column. A group of about thirty men in each Brigade
were recruited to become the elite units of the I.R.A.
These men were given special training in defence tactics,
attacking exercises, musketry, discipline, security measures,
ambushes, town fighting and elementary sign and map reading.
The mission of the Flying Columns was "continually to harass,
kill, capture and destroy the enemy forces; to keep in check
his attempts to rebuild his badly shaken civil adrninistration; to guard and protect the building of their •.• own
State InstitUtions and the people who were establishing and
using them." 35

The establishment of the Flying Columns

34 F.S.L. Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine (New York;
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971), pp. 410-415.
35Tom Barry, Guerilla Days in Ireland (Dublin:
Irish Press, Ltd., 1949), p.23.
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gave the Irish a mobile striking force which allowed them
to expand their activities into more reluctant and apathetic
areas.
The success of the guerilla campaign depended on
the support and sympathy of the people.

The

I.R.A~,

espe-

cially the Flying Columns, needed food, sleeping accomrnodations, medical aid and information from their countrymen.
Initial repugnance to Volunteer violence was considerably
lessened by increased British terror.

While some aided the

I.R.A. out of fear, most of the local people, especially
those in battle ridden areas, took great risks to help the
guerilla forces.

For the most part, aid and succor were

extended" •.• by a people steeped in the tradition of resistance to established authority.

In turn, the courage and

persistence of the ordinary Volunteer derived in large
measure from the knowledge that his cause had popular backing."36

In Tom Barry's view 11

11

The year 1920 closed with

the struggle well-defined between Ireland and her ancient
enemy.

Now there could be no turning back.

All Ireland

had accepted to some degree the challenge of the growing
British terror.n 37
The last six months of the war were characterized
by full scale guerilla conflict.

The I.R.A. had grown into

3 6John A. Murphy, Ireland in the Twentieth Century
(Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1975), p.20.
37Tom Barry, Guerilla Days in Ireland (Dublin: The
Irish Press Ltd., 1949), p.60.
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a more disclipined, better trained army.

Its increased

confidence and efficiency were demonstrated in May of 1921
by the burning of the Customs House in Dublin.

This action

was sanctioned by the government because the destruction
of the files contained there would severely hamper British·
administration throughout the country.

While the I.R.A.

paid dearly in loss of men, 5 killed and 80 captured, in
terms of morale and dramatic effect, it was a success.
An tOglach evaluated the operation euphorically: "The
burning of the Customs House symbolized the final collapse
of English civil administration in the country."38
However, the British military forces refused to
collapse.

Sir Neville Macready, Commander-in-Chief of the

British forces in Ireland, calculated that there were
40,000 soldiers and policemen occupying Ireland by July of
1921.

Other estimates put the figure as high as 50,000

soldiers and several thousand police.
outnumbered.

The Irish were greatly

While its total membership may have been as

high as 15,000 the number of I.R.A. men on active "working"
service only ranged from 3,000 to 5,000 men.39

Its numbers

were consistently limited by the shortage of arms and
ammunition.
effect.

The strain and tension of war was having its

Martial law had been proclaimed in various parts

38

Quoted in Piaras Beaslai, Michael Collins and the
Making of a New Ireland, 2 Vols. (N.Y.: Harper and Brothers,
n.d.) 11:222.
39F.S.L. Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971), pp. 414-415.
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At a conference of officers of the Southern

Brigade, one of their most urgent demands was that the
conflict become "more widespread and truly national in
scope." 40

This would ease the burden on the military and

civilian population in the heart of the war who were being
pushed to the limit of endurance.

In spite of certain

inherent advantages of guerilla warfare, the I.R.A. was
faced with tremendous obstacles and whether they could
ever have truly and unconditionally defeated the British
remains questionable.

As one historian noted: "Terror

and counter-terror had in fact resulted in a stalemate."41
When the British realized that Ireland was not going
to be quickly pacified, they actively began to seek a
political solution.

Prime Minister Lloyd George and his

coalition government was coming under increased pressure
from both English and world opinion to settle the Irish
struggle.

In December of 1920, Lloyd George asked Arch-

Bishop Clune of Perth to act as intermediary between the
two hostile forces.

Both sides agreed that it was neces-

sary to stop the killings, burnings and raids and to create
an atmosphere favorable for peace

negotiations~

serious obstacle existed, however.
that the Irish turn over their arms.

One very

The British insisted
This would have been

4 °Florence O'Donoghue, No Other Law (Dublin: The
Irish Press Ltd., 1954), p.l53.
41John A. Murphy, Ireland in the Twentieth Century
(Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1975), p.22.
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tantamount to surrender for the I.R.A., leaving them at the
mercy of the British at the negotiating table.

During the

next six months, Lloyd George vascillated between talk of
peace and talk of victory.

While distinguished visitors

were being sent to Dublin in search of a formula to end the
conflict, the Prime Minister and the "die-hard" faction in
the Coalition, were claiming they had the rebels on the run,
"had murder by the throat," and were confident of victory
very soon.
A turning point in British policy came on June 22,
1921, with the opening of the Northern Irish Parliament by
Kind George V.

Prior to this, in March of 1920, the British

had passed the Better Government of Ireland Bill (the Partition Act) which created two separate Irish governments:
the Dublin Government, with responsibility for 26 counties;
and the Belfast Government, ruling over the 6 predominately
Protestant counties. 42

The King's speech expressed the

wish that Ireland enter into an era of peace, contentment
and goodwill.

It was a signal that the Coalition Government

was now serious about a truce.

Lloyd George rescinded his

demand for the surrender of weapons and arrangements for a
cessation of hostilities proceeded.
42 The Partition Act curiously defined "better government" as a mixture of the outdated Home Rule idea and the
new and dangerous concept of partition. This Bill had little
relevance in the South, but it was of striking importance
in the North.
It provided the Ulster Protestants with a
strong barricade behind which they could retreat if any
pressure for unification or reconciliation was applied.
They were now masters of their own house.
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On Monday, July 11, 1921, a truce was declared.
war was over, at least for a time.
greeted as victory.

To the Irish, it was

The Truce was partially necessitated

by Ireland's military condition: lack of arms and munitions
and a growing shortage of manpower.

A respite would give

the I.R.A. a chance to regroup its forces.

However,

serious drawbacks to an armistice also existed.

A period

of peace would break the momentum and intensity of the war.
More importantly, the truce would destroy an important and
vital weapon of the I.R.A. - secrecy.

This fact was not

lost on Michael Collins, whose life depended on his anonymity:
Once a truce is agreed and we come out into the open,
it is extermination for us if the truce should fail. •a•
We shall be ... like rabbits coming out from their
holes; and pot-shots for the 'farmers' should the truce
ever fail.43
The terms of the Truce were:

On behalf of the British Army

it is agreed as follows:
1.

No incoming troops, R.I.C., and Auxiliary Police and
Munitions and no movements for military purposes of
troops and munitions, except maintenance drafts.

2.

No provocative display of forces, armed or unarmed.

3.

It is understood that all provisions of this truce
apply to the martial law area equally with the rest of
Ireland.

43Rex Taylor, Michael Collins (London: New English
Library, Ltd., 1970), p.llO.

4.
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No pursuit of Irish officers or men or war material or
military stores.

s.

No secret agents, noting description or movements, and
no interference with the movements of Irish persons,
military or civil, and no attempts to discover the
haunts or habits of Irish officers and men.

6.

No pursuit or observance of lines of communication or
connection.

On behalf of the Irish Army it is agreed that:
a.

Attacks on Crown Forces and civilians to cease.

b.

No provocative displays of force, armed or unarmed.

c.

No interference with Government or private property.

d.

To discountenance and prevent any action likely to
cause disturbance of the peace which might necessitate
military interference.44
If the Truce were terminated, seventy-two hours

notice would be given.

I.R.A. units were granted leave but

were advised to stay in close contact with their commanders
in the event the negotiations broke down.

Upon returning

home, the young freedom fighters were greeted like a victorious army.

Their ranks swelled with ntrucileers," men

who joined the I.R.A. after the fighting had ceased.

It

was a time to bask in glory, to forget the hardships, the
stench of war, and the fear of death, and to try to return
to normalcy, though not to the conditions of ante-bellum
44Quoted in Dorothy Macardle, The Irish Republic
{London: Transworld Publishers, 1968), pp.434-435.
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society.

The years of fighting had altered the normal

sociological development of a large segment of the population.

They had become accustomed to danger and excitement.

They were heroes.

Coupled with and urged on by the brag-

gadocio of the non-combatant trucileers, the "army of the
people" grew disdainful of the non-military population and
began "to domineer over civilians and despise politicians."45

The I.R.A. came to believe that they had actually

won the war with England.
The Truce brought an end to the army's predominance.
The emphasis now shifted from military to diplomatic skirmishes.

A war of letters ensued.

ited Dominion Status.
self-determination.

The British offered lim-

The Irish spoke of independence and
Finally, after two and a half months of

vying for position, both sides agreed to discuss "how the
association of Ireland with the crnnmunity of nations known
as the British Empire may best be reconciled with Irish
national aspirations."
As their plenipotentiaries, the Cabinet selected
Arthur Griffith, Minister for Foreign Affairs, as chairman
of the delegation; Michael Collins, Minister for Finance, as
second-in-co~mand;

and Gavan Duffy, T.D.

(Dail Deputy),

Robert Barton, Minister for Economic Affairs, and Eamon
Duggan, T.D., the latter two having been responsible for
negotiating the truce.
45Ibid., p.492.

Erskine Childers was appointed
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secretary to the delegation.

The selection of the nego-

tiators was surprising since de Valera had seemed the
obvious choice to the Cabinet and the Dail to lead the Irish.
He had headed the preliminary negotiations with Lloyd George
and, in general, was the most experienced diplomatically.
To his colleagues' dismay, however, the President refused
to attend, claiming that his place as head of state was in
Ireland.

He cited the tragedy of President Wilson at Ver-

sailles as precedent.

Moreover, as the symbol of the Re-

public, he wanted to keep himself free from the taint of
compromise in order to rally the people, if necessary, to
resume the fight.

However, de Valera was the one figure who

could unify the different political factions and, as such,
was needed in London.

By not attending the conference, de

Valera jeopardized any potential agreement.
By October of 1921, the beginnings of a serious
split in the Cabinet became apparent.

A significant differ-

ence of opinion existed between the self-styled die-hard
Republicans, like Brugha and Stack, who refused to go to
London, and the more moderate approach of men like Griffit.h.
Cathal Brugha exhibited open personal hostility towards
Collins.

Griffith had opposed the appointment of Childers.

In spite of this, Griffith and Collins were chosen to lead
the delegation and Childers was selected as secretary.

The

internal tensions and strain with its resulting disharmony
worked against any proposed settlement, a difficult task
even in the most congenial atmosphere.

As de Valera noted:
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Their plenipotentiaries would go over to do the best
they could for the Irish nation and· the Irish people.
He again warned them of the fact they were sending men
to do a thing a mighty army and navy could not do.
They had got to face facts no matter how high their
ideals were and to deal with a practical situation as
they found it. The time was come to get to serious work.
The men going over would be going to face a most
difficult task.46
Negotiations began in London on October 11, 1921.
Lloyd George, Lord Birkenhead, Austin Chamberlain and Winston
Churchill constituted the very formidable opposition the
Irish had to face at #10 Downing Street.

The strategy of

the Irish Cabinet was to concentrate on matters of finance,
trade and defense, and to leave the more difficult, more
illusive problems of Ulster and the Crown for last, when
the hostile and strange atmosphere would hopefully have
begun to evaporate.

The advantage of such a battle plan to

begin negotiations in less sensitive areas was that the
Irish would have time to evaluate the determination and
commitment of the British, but there was also a great risk.
If negotiations broke down, it would most probably be over
these two issues and prolonging the period of artificial
peace was creating an unhealthy atmosphere in Ireland, one
neither of war nor peace but a type of limbo.
The second prong of Irish strategy was to ensure
that any break in negotiations would be over Ulster and not
over allegiance to the Crown.

On the question of national

unity, they felt they would retain world sympathy, claiming
46Ireland, Dail Eireann, Private Sessions of the
Second Dail, ( 1921} ; 96.
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that a small minority, the North-East, was blocking a
settlement.

A break over the oath to the King would make

them appear merely obstinate and turn world opinion against
them.
The British were offering Dominion Status, with limitations on defense, finance, and trade.

In effect, they

abrogated the right of the Irish to defend themselves and
made special demands for the use of her ports.

The Irish

argued for neutrality, reasoning that a neutral, free Ireland would be more sympathetic to British interests.

In

the area of trade, the British wanted to guard against the
possibility of tariff barriers.

The Irish delegation main-

tained that their industrial development demanded that they
have the freedom to decide what their tariff structure
should be.

In addition, the Irish demanded complete inter-

nal fiscal autonomy.
The Irish response to Dominion Status was de
Valera's formula of External Association, an idea decades
ahead of the evolution of the Commonwealth.

Its salient

feature was the inclusion of the Irish Republic within the
broad confines of the British Empire as a neutral saversign state, externally associated with the states of the
British Empire for purposes of
peace and war.

con~on

concern-like defence,

Conspicuous by its absence was a direct

oath of allegiance to the King although Ireland would
contribute to his annual tribute.
to this new arrangement.

The British did not agree

To them, the question was simply

p
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would the Irish accept the Crown or not.
The Ulster problem was perhaps the most complex
issue facing the negotiators.

For unity, the Irish would

probably accept the Crown in some manner.

In a statement

to the Dail on August 17, 1921, President de Valera said:
As far as I am concerned, I would be willing to suggest
to the Irish people to give up a good deal in order
to have an Ireland that would look to the future without anticipating distracting internal problems.47
The Irish strategy vis-~-vis Ulster was to guide events so
that Sir James Craig, leader of Northern Ireland, would have
to maintain his position without English support.

The

Irish were convinced that Ulster would join them if the
English removed their backing.

However, the Partition Act

of 1920 presented the Southern Irish with a fait accompli,
a separate government in the six county area with its own
Constitution and Parliament and both Dublin and London had
previously agreed that there would be no coercion of
Ulster.
The question of Dominion Status or External Association was examined in detail.

One of Ireland's strongest

arguments against accepting status equal to the Dominions
was its geographical proximity to England.

The very real

fact of distance insured that the activities of the Irish
would be of infinitely more concern to the residents of
#10 Downing Street than those of a country as far away as
47Ireland, Dail Eireann, Minutes of the Proceedings
of the First Parliament of the Republ1c of Ireland,
(1921): 15.
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canada.

Since the position of the States within the

commonwealth was so ill-defined and dependent on practice
rather than on existing law, the closeness of the two islands strongly indicated that, while the Crown would be
merely a symbol elsewhere, in Ireland it would be a reality.
The British would have effective control over Ireland because the Crown, through its Ministers and Parliament, could
make laws, veto bills, and appoint the Governor-General.
In order to meet this objection, the British gave the Irish
delegation the option of inserting any clause they desired
to insure that the position of the Crown in Ireland would
be no more in practice than it was in Canada or any other
Dominion.

In coming to terms with one of Ireland's main

objections to Dominion Status, the British made a definite
concession.
In the beginning of December, the negotiations
reached a climax.

The British had presented a draft agree-

ment and the Irish Cabinet had rejected it.

On December 4,

1921, Griffith, Duffy and Barton presented their counterproposal of External Association to the English.

The Prime

Minister maintained that, instead of furthering the negotiations, the Irish draft was a step backwards.

They could

not understand the difficulty in accepting a status equal
to that of Canada.

At that, Gavan Duffy blurted out that

their difficulty was coming into the Empire.
excitement immediately swept through the room.

A wave of
The central

problem which the Irish had carefully refrained from
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verbalizing was now out in the open.

This simple statement

revealed the entire rationale behind the concept of
external association.
A crisis atmosphere now surrounded the conference.
On December 5th, the Prime Minister decided to apply maximum pressure and force the Irish to reach a decision,
either to come to terms or face the prospect of terrible
and immediate war.

Lloyd George offered some final conces-

sions, including a modified oath in which the Irish swore
allegiance to their Constitution but pledged themselves to
be loyal to King George in his role as head of the Commonwealth.

The British also relented in their demand for

complete control of Irish defence.

They acknowledged the

right of Ireland to build vessels necessary for the protection of revenue and fisheries.

In addition, a phrase was

included implying that Ireland would undertake a share in
her coastal defence.

The Irish were allowed a restricted

army and the entire defence issue would be reviewed at a
conference in five years.

As a final inducement, Lloyd

George offered fiscal autonomy.
On the problem of Ulster, the British proposed the
establishment of a Boundary Commission composed of one
representative from each of the three sides involved.

By

leaving the inhabitants free to decide their own political
destiny, the Prime Minister strongly suggested that the
Dublin government would save Tyronne and Fermangh, and parts
of Derry, Armagh, and Down.

Assuming the inclusion of these
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areas, the North would be forced economically to join
the South.
The Irish were not totally in favor of the Commission.

They hesitated; and, in that moment of hesitation,

Lloyd George showed himself to be a politician par excellence.

To insure the acceptance of his scheme, the Prime

Minister produced a memorandum which Griffith had signed on
November 12 promising not to publicly repudiate the proposal
of a Boundary Commission as an alternative to an all-Irish
Parliament while the Unionist Conservative Party conference
was going on.

Lloyd George, the "Welsh Wizard", interpreted

this pledge to mean that negotiations would not be broken
over Ulster and Griffith would accept the Boundary Commission if necessary.
honor his word.

He asked the Irishmen if he would

Griffith replied:

I have never let a man

down in my whole life and I never will."48
One man had been won over.

Not satisfied, the

Prime Minister melodramatically declared that all members of
the delegation must sign or bear the responsibility for the
dire consequences which would follow.

He issued an ultima-

tum: the Irish delegates must decide that night whether it
would be peace or war.

They were allowed no time to return

to Dublin to discuss it with their colleagues.
The Irish retired from the conference room and a
heated and passionate debate ensued.

Unfortunately, no one

48 Quoted in F.S.L. Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971), p.435.

thought to telephone de Valera in Dublin.
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Finally, Collins

decided to sign and the rest followed his example.

At 3

o'clock in the morning of December 6th, a tired and troubled team of plenipotentiaries executed the Anglo-Irish
Treaty.
Why did the Irish sign?

For three of the five rep-

resentatives, the answer is fairly obvious.

Duffy, Barton,

and Duggan acquiesced because they would not bear the
responsibility for the war that Lloyd George had prophesized
would follow.
Michael Collins executed the agreement primarily
because he thought that the Treaty was the best Ireland
could obtain from Britain and that the Dominion Status
offered them gave Ireland the basics, the substance of
freedom which would allow Ireland to grow and develop in
peace.

The modified oath eased his conscience while the

Boundary Commission held out at least the promise of unity.
Moreover, as a military man, Collins more than any other
Irish leader, knew the massive onslaught which could be
directed against Ireland if Britain so desired.

He also

knew that it was questionable whether Ireland could withstand it.

He believed that the decision of war or peace

belonged to the Irish people alone.

They should have the

opportunity to decide their fate.
Arthur Griffith was perhaps the most satisfied with
the Treaty.
work.

To him, it was the fulfillment of his life's

It gave Ireland what he felt was necessary for her
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development as a nation - economic and domestic freedom and
control over her own education.

While the memorandum of

November 12th had indeed placed the Chairman in a difficult
situation, nothing in i t could actually have forced him if
he was not at least practically predisposed to sign.

The

promise he had given Lloyd George was limited and dictated by
the Liverpool Convention.

Griffith signed because he was

basically in agreement with the terms of the Treaty and,
like Collins, cognizant of the fact that this was the best
compromise they could attain.
When news of the agreement reached Dublin, it was
received with neither joy nor satisfaction.

On December 8th,

de Valera released a statement to the press urging the
people to reject the Treaty.

He said:

The terms of this Agreement are in violent conflict with
the wishes of the majority of this nation as expressed
freely in successive elections during the past three
years.
I feel it my duty to inform you immediately that
I cannot recommend the acceptance of this Treaty either
to Dail Eireann or the country~ In this attitude I am
supported by the Ministers for Home Affairs and Defence.
The Army as such is of course not affected by the political situation and continues under the same orders and
control. The greatest test of our people has come. Let
us face it worthily, without bitterness and above all
without recriminations. There is a definite constitutional way of resolving our political differences - let
us not depart from it, and let the conduct of the Cabinet
in this matter be an example to the whole nation.49
An open split was now apparent.

Both sides began preparing

for the all important treaty debates in An Dail Eireann.
49 Quoted in Dorothy r1acardle, The Irish Republic
(London; Transworld Publishers, 1968), p.544.

CHAPTER III
THE CIVIL WAR
The Treaty debates began in December of 1921.

Pas-

sion, emotion and personal hostility saturated the proceedings.

The veil of war time unity which had cloaked deep

differences was now lifted to reveal numerous factions and
grave divisions.

The men and women of Dail Eireann who

gathered in the Council Chamber of University College,
Dublin, were very much aware that they were being called
upon to determine the future of

Ireland~

The debates cen-

tered primarily around the oath of allegiance to the Crown,
inclusion in the British Empire, the nature of Dominion
status and the abandonment of the Irish Republic.

Iron-

ically, deputies said very little about the partition of
Northern Ireland.

They were being forced to choose between

the ideal of the liberation struggle and the practical
realities of the political climate.

The weight of the dead,

especially the most recent martyrs, bore heavily on them.
Friendships dissolved.

Former comrades who had trusted each

other with their lives found themselves hurling epithets at
one another.

It was a bitter time, in part, perhaps, because

of the gravity and consequences of the issue, the alternative
to the Free State was resuming the war with Britain.
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choice was simple: vote for or against the Articles of
Agreement between Ireland and Great Britain, vote for or
against the Treaty.
Outside the Dail, a substantial majority of the
people were satisfied with the agreement, a fact which would
become increasingly more evident as the debates progressed.
To them, it was an honorable peace.

The press, the bus-

iness community, the clergy, the County Councils, for the
most part, all urged ratification.

However, a significant

segment of the population viewed the Treaty as a sell-out of
the

revolution~

The negotiators had not brought back a

Republic, and nothing less would be accepted.
was split on the issue of the Treaty·.

The I.R.A.

The majority of

G.H.Q. officers favored acceptance: Richard Mulcahy, Chief
of Staff; Eoin O'Duffy, Deputy Chief of Staff; J.J. O'Connell,
Assistant Chief of Staff; Gearoid O'Sullivan, AdjutantGeneral; Sean MacMahon, Quartermaster-General, Piaras
Beaslai, Director of Publicity; Emmet Dalton Director of
Training; Diarmuid O'Hegarty, Director of Organization; and,
in his role as Director of Intelligence, Michael Collins.
Opposed to the Treaty were: Liam Mellowes, Director of Purchases; Rory O'Connor, Director of Engineering; Seamus
O'Donovan, Director of Chemicals; and Sean Russell, Director
of Munitions.

While those against the Treaty were in a

minority on Headquarters Staff, they had strong backing from
divisional commandants, like Liam Lynch, brigade leaders
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like Oscar Traynor, and their rank and file.l

Vocal dis-

content was especially prominent from the Southern divisions.
Very often, the attitude of the local officers determined
whether his men would accept or reject the Treaty.
The Truce had been a mixed blessing for the army of
the Republic.

They had used the opportunity to reorganize

and revamp their forces.

The process of forming divisions

was extended throughout the country.
orous.

Recruiting was vig-

Some arms and munitions were acquired.

However, the

absence of war time conditions and restrictions also meant
a relaxation in discipline and a breakdown in control.
merous violations of the Truce result·ed.

Nu-

Segments of the

I.R.A. grew belicose, romanticizing and overstating their
struggle of the last two years.

Their disdain of the non-

military increased and "large numbers of them developed a
militaristic spirit, regarding themselves as superior to mere
civilians and politicians."2

A state of lawlessness grew in

the country as "the nominal control of local units exercised
by General Headquarters and the Dail Government during the
war became even less meaningful, while the personalities and
opinions of local commanders assumed even greater

impor~

tance .... The I.R.A. became more and more a law unto itself."3
lcalton Younger, Ireland's Civil War (London:
Fontana Books, 1968), pp. 235-236; J. Bowyer Bell, !he
Invisible Army (London: Sphere Books, Ltd., 1972), p.46.
2Joseph Curran, "Consideration of the Irish Revolution: The Free Staters" University Review V (Spring, 1968):
38-39.
3~. 1 PP• 39r-40 •
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And, according to Liam Lynch, "We have declared for an
Irish Republic and will not live under ~ny other law."4
The underlying question tormenting the Deputies was
whether the army would accept the dictates of the Dail,
regardless of the outcome of the vote on the Treaty.

Having

allowed the I.R.A. freely to chart its own course during the
war, the Dail was unsure whether it could now establish
control.

Because the I.R.A. was not a professional army,

because it was not accustomed either to strict discipline or
complete subservience to civil authority, the possibility of
a rebellion by the army was very real indeed.

In fact, the

I.R.A. had a tradition of independence and political awareness and involvement.

The men of the republican army were

citizen-soldiers, motivated to fight by their ideals and
beliefs, successors to the men of 1916 and guardians of the
Republic.

As Seamus Robinson, Commandant of the Tipperary

Brigade and T.D. for Waterford, said: "If we had no political
outlook, we would not be soldiers at all."S

President de

Valera's statement that the army was not affected by the
Treaty debates was unrealistic, given the history and development of the army.

As one observed noted: "The Army, be-

cause of its spirit and character, because of the very factors
4 Quoted in John Murphy, Ireland in the Twentieth Century (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1975), p.49.
Srreland, Dail Eireann, Debates on the Treaty between
Great Britain and Ireland, (1921-1922): 289-290.
(Hereinafter referred to as Treaty Debates) .
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that had made it an effective weapon of liberation, could
not be insulated against the storms of passion and controversy which began to rage around the question of the Treaty."6
The problem was not that the men of the I.R.A. had their
own opinions on the Treaty, but that some of them might
attempt to dictate to the Dail, to enforce their views with
arms.
Deputies were subjected to intimidation and threatened by soldiers.

For example, a notice was given to the

senior Deputy for Cork City which stated:
To all T.D. 's in Cork No. 1 Area:
(1}
On December lOth the Staff of the First Southern
Division and all Brigade Commandants met and sent
forward to G.H.Q. a unanimous demand for the rejection
of the Treaty proposals.
(2}
You are reminded it is your duty to support this
demand.
(3)
To act otherwise would be treason to the Republic
to which we have sworn allegiance.7
Mr. Fahy of Galway claimed: "I was approached by a member of
the I.R.A. as I came here today and told if I voted for the
Treaty I would be shot."8
violence.

Ev-eryone condemned the threats of

The Minister for Defence gave repeated assurances

that the discipline of the army would be enforced.

President

de Valera declared: "If the army as a national army does not
6 Florence O'Donoghue, No Other Law (Dublin: Irish
Press Ltd., 1954}, p.l96.
Da i 1 ,

7Ireland, Dail Eireann, Private Sessions of Second
( 19 21-19 2 2 ) : 18 2 •
aibid., p.l28.
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obey the Government and until the Dail is dissolved any man

who does not obey the Government, if there is any scrap of
an army left to arrest him, he will be a·rrested. "9

The Chief

of Staff, Richard Mulcahy, affirmed his belief that the
army would remain loyal no matter what occurred.

He explain-

ed that the army leaders were just expressing their opinions
and that any lack of discipline was unintentional and would
be corrected.

With a characteristic insensitivity to the

fears of those not directly involved with the military, a
trait which would later plague him during his tenure as
Minister for Defence, Mulcahy stated: "I don't know what
undercurrent of irritation is troubling people in regard to
the army."lO
Trying to keep the situation in balance, the Minister
for Defence issued instructions that the army, as an army,
was not to interfere in non-military affairs.
a difficult order to follow.

That proved

The presence of officers of

the I.R.A. in the Dail guaranteed that no matter how scrupulously they tried to separate their roles as soldiers and
Deputies, the pressure of the army would be felt during the
debates.

The dilemma of Gearoid O'Sullivan, Adjutant-

General and County Carlow T.D., illustrates this confusion
of roles:

Dail,

9rreland, Dail Eireann, Private Sessions of Second
(1921-1922) : 134.
lOrbid., pp. 132-133.
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When I was summoned to this meeting of the Dail I thought
it my duty to consult the people who elected me to the
Dail and I went on Monday evening to Carlow . • . . I met
the people \vho proposed me, seconded me, and elected
me.
I met the Brigade Commander and he spoke on this
matter and I said, 'I have been discussing this matter
with people I have a right to discuss it with.
I can't
discuss it with you.•ll
Not all I.R.A. Deputies were as particular as the AdjutantGeneral.
Moreover, both sides used the popularity and influence of army leaders to gain support for their positions.
The pro-Treaty leaders selected Commandant Sean McKeon,
famous as the "Blacksmith from Ballinalee" and recognized
hero of the "Troublesn,
tion of the agreement.

to second the motion for ratificaThe anti-Treaty people produced a

statement from well-known and respected officers, Liam Lynch,
Ernie O'Malley, Oscar Traynor and Michael MacCormaic, which
protested ''against the use of our Division of the Army to
influence public opinion and the opinion of members of Dail
Eireann in the direction favourable to the Treaty; and we
desire, secondly, to state that we maintain unimpaired our
allegiance to the Irish Republic and to it alone."12
Like the I.R.A., the Irish Republican Brotherhood
could not keep itself aloof from the debate on the Treaty.
Collins, now President of the organization, tried to place
the prestige and influence of the Brotherhood behind the
llibid., pp.l29-130
12 Treaty Debates, pp.289-290.
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Treaty.

He argued that they could use the Treaty to gain

their ultimate aim of a Republic and that the present military situation made an accommodation advisable.

But unity

could not be secured in the I.R.B. anymore than in the
I.R.A. or in the Dail.

While a meeting of the Supreme Coun-

-

cil on December 10, 1921, endorsed acceptance of the Treaty,
the vote was not unanimous (12-4).

The Council issued the

following order;
The Supreme Council, having due regard to the Constitution of the Organisation, has decided that the present
Peace Treaty between Ireland and Great Britain should
be ratified.
Members of the Organization, however, who have to take
public action as representatives are given freedom of
action in the matter.l3
Throughout the country, various local I.R.B. units rejected
the order to accept the Treaty and the entire South Munster
Division declared against the Treaty.l4

The split certainly

hampered any attempt by Collins to secure support for the
agreement.

Traditional historians have credited the I.R.B.

with being one of the major forces behind the Treaty's
majority in the Dail.

Revisionist interpretation, however,

argues that the role of the Organisation has been over
emphasized, citing the opposition to the Treaty within the
I.R.B. and the freedom given to Brotherhood deputies to vote
13Quoted in Florence O'Donoghue, No Other Law
(Dublin: Irish Press Ltd., 1954), p.l90.
14rbid.
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In the Dail, Arthur Grif·fith moved for the ratification of the Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland.

He

argued that it provided for "an Ireland developing her own
way of existence, and rebuilding the Gaelic civilisation
broken down at the battle of Kinsdale," and that it would
end the bitter conflict which for centuries had poisoned
the relations between the two countries. 16
In response, President de Valera appealed to the
Dail to vote against ratification of the agreement because
it was "absolutely inconsistent with our position; it gives
away Irish independence; it brings us into the British
Empire; it acknowledges the head of the British Empire,
not merely as the head of an association, but as the direct
monarch of Ireland, as the source of executive authority in
Ireland."l7

Thus, the debate continued.

Those who supported the Treaty did so for a variety
of reasons.

Some agreed with Arthur Griffith that it was an

honorable document, justifiable in and of itself.

Others

felt as Michael Collins did that "it gives us freedom, not
the ultimate freedom that all nations desire and develop to,
15see, for example, Joseph Curran, "The Decline and
Fall of the I.R.B.," Eire Ireland X (Spring, 1975): 14-23.
16Treaty Debates, pp. 22-23.
17Ibid., p. 26.

but the freedom to achieve it."l8
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Still others believed with

Richard Mulcahy that although the agreement was a defeat, it
could be utilized for the development of the nation.

He did

not want the Treaty, but felt that while "none of us want the
Treaty ... I see no solid spot of ground upon which the
Irish people can put its political feet but upon the
Treaty."l 9

Many concurred with Gavan Duffy that there was

simply no other alternative to immediate war but acceptance
of the agreement.
President de Valera had tried, in private session,
to provide the Dail with an alternative, Document #2.

In

an effort to secure unity and avoid an open split, the
President tried to modify the agreement so that the Irish
could put forth a unanimous counter-proposal.

As he often

said in the course of the debates, he was trying to find
something, some formula, which everyone could accept.

Bas-

ically, Document #2 was an updated edition of de Valera's
idea of External Association.
an associated Republic.

Ireland would remain a Republic,

All legislative, executive and ju-

dicial authority would derive from the Irish people.

For pur-

poses of common concern,however, she would be associated with
the states of the British CommomV"ealth and "for the purposes
of the Association, Ireland shall recognise His Britannic
1 8 Treaty Debates, p.32.
19Treaty Debates, p.l42.
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reminded the Dail that the British had already rejected
these terms.

They insisted that this was not a viable

alternative but an effort to obfuscate the real issue.
Furthermore, they charged that the difference between the
two documents was not so great that those who were prepared
to accept the one, could not, in principle, accept the other.
Die-hart Republicans also rejected Document #2.
They wanted an isolated republic with no oaths, no ties,
no "association" with the British Empire.
for total and complete sovereignty.

Their demand was

Facing further dissen-

sion, de Valera withdrew his proposal.

As one of his biog-

raphers noted "the President was forced to conclude that if
the deputies themselves did not understand his proposition,
it might be interpreted generally as an unworthy departure
from the old idea of an isolated Republic.

Political in-

stinct made him wary of the taint of compromise." 21
The main objection to the Treaty was one of principle.
These men and especially the women members of the Dail had
sworn an oath to uphold the Republic, had been prepared to
die for Irish freedom and could not in conscience now accept
Dominion Status.

It was a question of honor and there could

20

Dail,

Ireland, Dail Eireann, Private Sessions of Second
(1921-1922), Appendix 18: 321.

21 Mary Bromage, De Valera and the March of a Nation
(London: Hutchinson and Co., Ltd., 1956), p.l52.

be no compromise on such an issue.
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As Liam Mellowes said:

To my mind the Republic does exist.
It is a living
tangible thing, something for which men gave their
lives, for which men were hanged, for which men are
in jail, for which the people suffered, and for which
men are still prepared to give their lives. It was not
a question so far as I am aware, before any of us, or
the people of Ireland, that the Irish heifer was going
to be sold in the fair and that we were asking a high
price so that we would get something less. There was
no question of making a bargain over this thing, over
the honor of Ireland, because I hold that the honour
of Ireland is too scared a thing to make a bargain
over.22
Those who argued for acceptance of the Treaty emphasized that above all else, the agreement gave the Irish the
substance of freedom.

Under the terms of the Treaty, Ireland

would be able to control her own domestic affairs.

She

would be free to develop her own economy and to end the
British exploitation of her resources.

Irishmen, in charge

of their own education, consequently would be able to
nurture and foster a Gaelic society complete with Irish
values, culture and language.

According to Piaras Beaslai,

the Treaty offered them the chance "to realize the visions
of Thomas Davis, of Rooney and Pearse, of a free, happy and
glorious Gaelic state." 23

Under the terms of the Treaty,

moreover, Ireland would finally be rid of the hated British
forces and legally able to raise her own army.
especially important to the I.R.A. Deputies.

This was
That the agree-

ment would bring the evacuation of the British Army was a
22 Treaty Debates, p.l80.
23Treaty Debates, p.23.
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reoccurring theme in their speeches.

As Commandant Sean

McKeon stated:
To me this Treaty gives me what I and my comrades fought
for; it gives us for the first time in 700 years the
evacuation of Britain's armed forces out of Ireland.
It also gives me my hope and dream, our own Army, not
half-equipped but fully equipped, to defend our interests.
If the Treaty were much worse in words than it is
alleged to be, once it gave me these two things, I would
take it and say as long as the armed forces of Britain
are gone and the armed forces of Ireland remain, we can
develop our own nation in our own way.24
In dealing with the question of the Crown and the
oath of allegiance, the pro-Treaty forces attempted to minimize their importance.

They explained that the oath the

Irish would take was different from that of the other Do-.
minions. The Irish would swear true faith and allegiance
solely to the Constitution of the Irish Free State and would
only agree to be faithful to King George and his heirs by
virtue of common citizenship and membership in the British
Commonwealth.

This, they claimed, was not an oath to the

King, but to the Irish Free State.

The anti-Treatyites

argued that this was a distinction without a difference.
They would swear no oath either of allegiance or faithfulness to the British monarch, symbol, to them, of English
oppression and tyranny.
Inextricably coupled with the problem of the oath of
allegiance was the question of inclusion within the British
Commonwealth.

The Republicans rejected the idea of equal

status with the other Dominions.
24 Treaty Debates, p.23.

Those countries were
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former colonies with strong ties to England.

Ireland was a

nation in her own right, herself a mqther country. Moreover,
Ireland did not desire to enter into this particular
community of nations and was being forced, under threat of
war, to join a supposedly voluntary association.

The pro-

Treaty party spoke of entering the Commonwealth with their
heads up.

As one Republican wag noted, it would be more

accurate to say they were going in with their hands up.

In

addition, England was demanding of Ireland what she required
of no other Dominion - the use of Irish ports, a definite
compromise of Irish sovereignty.

The anti-Treaty represent-

atives claimed that this demand of port facilities was indicative of England's real attitude toward Ireland.

Only

sixty miles from the Irish coast, England would never allow
Ireland to attain real freedom and thus possibly sever her
relationship with the Empire.

Occupation of the ports would

provide the British with a convenient base to interfere with
and retard any Irish movement towards complete independence.
The Collins-Griffith group admitted that the geographical proximity of the two countries presented special
problems.

To compensate for that proximity, the plenipo-

tentiaries insisted that the Treaty include the provision
that the relationship between Ireland and England be the
same in law, practice, and constitutional usage as that of
Canada and England.

Any attempt by the British to violate

the rights of the Free State would thus be a threat to all
the Dominions by establishing a dangerous precedent.

Collins
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himself felt that the other Dominions

w~re

"in effect,

introduced as a guarantee of our freedom, which makes us
stronger than if we stood alone."25

Moreover, Dominion status

offered Ireland the international recognition, which she had
long sought in vain, and admission to the League of Nations,
steps towards achieving complete and full partnership in
the family of nations.
The question of the partition of Northern Ireland
received little attention in the Treaty discussions.

As

one of the biographers of de Valera noted: "The most remarkable feature of the debates, including the President's
speeches, was the lack of emphasis on the partition clauses
of the Treaty.

Almost everyone seemed to accept the con-

tention of Griffith and Collins that the boundary commission
clause would mean the ending of partition, by cutting off
so much of the northern area as to make the rest nonviable."26

Those opposed to the settlement could do little

more than to state the obvious fact that the agreement did
not guarantee unity and protest that they were deserting
their Republican comrades in the North.

Short of coercion,

however, a policy previously rejected, they had no alternative to offer.

Moreover, as one pro-Treaty deputy pointed

out, "a Republic would definitely alienate the North-East
25 Treaty Debates, p.34.
26Thornas P. O'Neill and The Earl of Longford, Eamon
De Valera (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1971), p.l79.
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Ulster corner and divide our unfortunate country into
two separate and distinct areas and into t\vo races for all
time." 27
Possible alternatives and their consequences were
debated at length.

A rejection of the Treaty would probably

mean a resumption of war - "terrible and immediate

war~!'

Were the British bluffing and could the Irish afford to
gamble?

The Minister for Defence claimed that the army was

"in a much better position to fight now than when the Truce
started." 28

Some of his officers disagreed.

While the

army had more men, they were still short of arms, despite
the efforts to import guns during the Truce.

Commandant

Sean McKeon reported:
I know perfectly well I have charge of four thousand
men • . . • But of that four thousand I have a rifle for
every fifty.
Now that is the position as far as I am
concerned and I may add that there is about as much
ammunition as would last them about fifty minutes for
that one rifle.29
Those who favored risking a return to war emphasized
the Irish military efforts of the Black and Tan period.

They

felt the I.R.A. could continue the fight effectively enough
to force the British to agree to a Republic.

To these

claims 1 the Chief of Staff 1 Dick .Mulcahy, responded that "we
have not been able to drive the enemy from anything but a

Dail,

28Ireland, Dail Eireann 1 Private Session of Second
(1921-1922): 128.
29Ibid., p.225.
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fairly good-sized police barracks." 30
The two sides also disagreed on whether the people
would support the army if the Dail rejected the Treaty. All
felt that without popular support, any military effort was
doomed to failure.

The pro-Treaty faction argued that the

Irish people alone had the right to determine the question
of war or peace.

They proposed that the Republicans abstain

from voting against the Treaty, thus insuring its ratification by the Dail, and thus allowing the people in a referendum either to accept or reject the agreement.

Collins argued

that:
I would not be one of those to commit the Irish people
to war without the Irish people committing themselves
to war •••. I don't want a lecture from anybody as to
what my principles are to be now •••• I can state for
you a principle which everybody can understand, the
principle of government by the consent of the governed."31
The proponents of the Treaty highlighted the benefits
and blessings of peace which would accrue to the nation
under the Irish Free State.

The Republicans argued that not

peace but chaos and dissension would flow from such a state.
Mary MacSwiney promised to be the "first rebel" of the new
government.3 2

Seamus Robinson asked: "Will the Volunteers

follow this new Government?

I know that I can speak at any

rate for my own brigade and I do not believe they will.
30Treaty Debates, p.l43.
31Treaty Debates, pp.34-35.
32 Ibid., p.lll.
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Many Volunteers will think that this will be ultra vires
and will have no binding, moral, legal or any other weight
with us."3 3

And Liam Mellowes prophesized that the Treaty

would not bring peace because:
..• there will be restless souls in the country who will
not be satisfied under this Free State to make peace
possible.
I use no threats, but you cannot bring peace
by compromise . . • . We stand, some of us, where wealways stood and despite all that has been said in favour
of this Treaty we mean to continue standing where we
stood in the past. Whatever may happen, whatever the
road may be in front of us, we intend with God's help to
travel it.34
After the Dail recessed for Christmas and the Deputies
returned home, they fully recognized the support the Treaty
commanded among the vast majority of the people.

Certainly

this fact weighed heavily on those who were waivering in
their decision.

Some delegates switched their position as

a result of the pressure of public

opinion~

The Christmas

respite gave the Free Staters a definite edge.

To their

repertoire of arguments, they could now add the certainty
that the people were strongly in favor of ratification. The
de Valera party contended that the populace was being st:ampeded into favoring the Treaty especially by the press and the
pulpit, and that they did not truly understand what the
Treaty meant.

If they realized the implications of the

agreement, the people would reject it.

As President

33Ireland, Dail Eireann, Private Sessions of Second
Dail (1921-1922): 239-240.
34Treaty Debates, pp.227-234.
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de Valera explained: "and whenever I want to know what the
Irish people wanted I had only to examine my own heart and
it told me straight off what the Irish people wanted."35
Before the recess, passage of the Treaty was at best
questionable; after the Christmas interlude, it was fairly
certain.

Speechmaking continued through the first week of

January, but it had now degenerated into bitter accusations
and personal recriminations. Cathal Brugha's vicious
denunciation of Michael Collins as a fraud, a war hero only
in the annals of the press, was but one extreme example of
the poisonous atmosphere permeating the Dail.36

Finally,

on January 7, 1922, the Speaker called the roll and Dail
Eireann approved the Articles of Agreement

beb~een

Great

Britain and Ireland, 64 to 57, a margin of merely seven
votes.

Immediately following the vote, the Minister for

Defence said:

"So far as I am concerned I will see, at any

rate, that discipline is kept in the army ... 37
In retrospect, the Treaty proved to be what Collins
had claimed it was, a stepping stone to a Republic, albeit
a 26 county Republic.

Dominion status was the most far

reaching offer the British ever made to the

Irish~

Given

their imperialistic attitude, it was unrealistic to expect
them to forgo the trappings of monarchy and Empire .in 1922.
35Treaty Debates, p.274.
36Treaty Debates, pp.326-334.
37Ibid. p.347.
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The most unsatisfactory aspect of the Treaty proved to be
the sections dealing with Northern Ireland.

In a grevious

error of judgment, the Irish delegates trusted the promises,
interpretation and implication given them by Lloyd George,
without receiving any firm guarantees.
The ratification of the Treaty ushered in a period
of confusion and chaos.

While an armed conflict may not

have been inevitable, 38 from January to June, the country
drifted inexorably into civil war despite the numerous
attempts to restore unity and harmony.

The solidarity and

friendship of the past two years were soon replaced by
enmity and discord and finally by a war of brother against
brother.
On January 9th, Arthur Griffith succeeded de Valera
as President of the Dail.
only two votes.

De Valera lost re-election by

Reluctantly, the deputies realized that if

the Treaty were to be implemented, de Valera's continuation
in office would be impossible.

Republicans stomped out of

the Dail in protest of the election of a President whose aim
was to dismantle the Republic.

A period of governmental

confusion and ambiguity followed.

The Republicans returned

to the assembly and Griffith formed his Dail ministry.

In

addition, according to the terms of the Treaty, a transitional Provisional Government was to be established to
supervise the transfer of power.

On January 14, the

38John A. Hurphy, Ireland in the Twentieth Century
(Dublin; Gill and Macmillan, 1975), p.47.
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Parliament of Southern Ireland, established by the Partition
Act of 1920 and ignored in the South until this date, was
convened.

Sixty pro-Treaty deputies and four University

representatives elected the necessary Provisional Government
officials and adjourned.
Chairman.

Michael Collins was selected as

Most of his ministers held duplicate positions

in the Dail Government.

Collins himself was Minister for

Finance in Griffith's Cabinet.
The Republicans made much of the duality of ministerial positions, demanding assurances from each Minister that
they acknowledge the Dail as the

sov~reign

parliament of

the nation and recognize that the authority to act arises
only from that body.
of unreality.

The entire proceedings took on an air

Michael Hayes, Minister for Education in both

the Dail and Provisional Governments, cut through the absurdity of this procedure, when upon being asked what was the
relationship between the Minister for Education of Dail
Eireann and" ... another Minister for Education that we hear
spoken of" replied that the relations were of "an intimate
and cordial character."39
to obstruct and obsfucate.

The policy of the Republicans was
They harassed and hampered the

Government with questions, amendments and constitutional
traps.

Neither side displayed much restraint; and the war

of words, verbal attacks as stinging as bullets, only
39rreland, Dail Eireann, Official Report
{28 February 1922 to 8 June 1922) :93.
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exacerbated the already volatile temper of the country and
the army.
Initially, the anti-Treaty elements in the army,
later known as the Irregulars or Executive Forces, were
appeased by the statement of the new Minister for Defence,
Richard Mulcahy, that 11 the army will remain the army of
the Irish Republic. 1140

They watched and waited as Dublin

castle, symbol of British rule, was handed over to the Irish.
on January 16th.

Two weeks later, the Irish Republican Army

marched into Beggar's Bush Barracks to occupy their new
headquarters.

The British had begun to evacuate military

posts throughout the country.

The Black and Tans were moving

out and the Royal Irish Constabulary was being disbanded.
By April, Mulcahy was able to report to the Dail that the
evacuation of the R.I.C. was practically complete and that
the army had taken over approximately 40 military positions.41
The policy of the army was to allow local I.R.A.
units, regardless of their position on the Treaty, to occupy
abandoned

barracks~

To a great extent, this decision was

necessitated by the fact that the Government did not have
enough loyal troops to occupy all posts throughout the
country, particularly in the South where a majority of the
40Treaty Debates, p.424.
41Ireland, Dail Eireann, Official Report (28 February
1922 to 8 June 1922): 250.

army was anti-Treaty.
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It was also a reflection of the hope

that the I.R.A. would remain loyal and that hostility to the
Treaty would abate once it became obvious that the British
army was leaving Ireland, or at least leaving the 26 counties.
The Minister for Defence assured the government that the
"troops occupying such posts shall not use their power to
interfere with the expression of the people's will at the
pending General Election, and will not turn their arms
against any Government elected by the people at that election."42

This, however, was not a condition imposed on the

I.R.A., 43 but appeared only to be a personal commitment from
Mulcahy, based perhaps on his faith in the army.
A unified Republican army was daily becoming more
difficult to sustain.

The British officials handed over

posts to representatives of the Provisional Government; a
segment of the I.R.A. accepted them on behalf of the Republic.
Moreover, the Minister for Defence and his staff were attempting to create a regular National Army.

Beginning with the

segment of the Dublin I.R.A. which had remained loyal to
G.H.Q. and supported the Treaty, they formed the nucleus of
the Free State Army which was intended to be a paid,
professional force, housed in barracks, subject to strict
army discipline and controlled by the government through the
42 Ireland, Dail Eireann, Official Report (28 February
1922 to 8 June 1922}: 140.
43Florence O'Donoghue, No Other Law (Dublin: Irish
Press Ltd., 1954), pp.203-204.
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Minister for Defence and General Headquarters.
of the Volunteers would be retained on
constituting a reserve force.

a

A portion

part-time basis,

Those I.R.A. men who either

could not or would not accept these new conditions were to
be demobolized.

At first, recruitment was limited to those

who had served in the I.R.A.

This policy was changed, how-

ever, and enlistments increased, helped by the high unemployment in the country and the disbanding of the R.I.C.
That the army accepted men who had not fought in the AngloIrish war hurt the popularity of the Beggar's Bush Force, as
did the fact that certain officers were being excluded from
high posts which, at times, were being given to professional
officers who either had not fought at all or had contributed
little to the struggle. 44
treated badly.

These men felt they were being

As Sean Mayland said:

I am not as quick on the draw as I would like to be but
I am a gunman. During the war, the British enemy called
me the leader of a murder gang. The ~1inister for Defence,
in his report, yesterday called me the leader of a robber
gang.
I am as free from the crime of robbery as I am free
from the crime of murder . . . • We took men away from their
employments ... and got them ready to fight . . . . Those
men have been out of employment, without a smoke, illshod, badly clad and - we are not all Pusseyfooters - in
want of a drink too. That is the fault of the men who
told us that the Truce was a breathing space. We were
guaranteed payment for those men . . . . We did not get it.
I have always seized every opportunity I could get to
try and get comforts for my men . . . . I robbed nineteen
44Desmond Williams, "From the Treaty to the Civil
War," in The Irish Struggle 1916-1922, ed. Desmond l\Tilliams
(Toronto: University Of Toronto Press, 1966), pp.l21-122.
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Post Offices • . . • During the war, my word went in
North Cork.
In spite of any terms that would be
applied to me today, my word goest there yet.45
The problem with accommodating old soldiers to a new army
was not limited to the pre-Civil war army but would also
cause difficulties for Headquarters in 1924.
The anti-Treaty segment of the I.R.A. could not help
but notice that the Republic and the Volunteers were being
effectively, if quietly, dismantled.

To prevent this from

continuing, dissident members of G.H.Q. and divisional
commandants wrote the Minister for Defence on January 11th
demanding an Army Convention to consider these resolutions:
That the Army re-affirm its allegiance to the Irish
Republic.
That it shall be retained as the Army of the Irish
Republic, under an Executive appointed by the Convention.
That the army shall be under the supreme control of
such Executive which shall draft a Constitution for
submission to a subsequent Convention.46
Mulcahy replied that the supreme control of the army is
vested in the Dail, the elected Government of the Irish
Republic, and that "the proposal contained in the resolution
to change the supreme control of the army is entirely outside
the Constitutional powers vested in the Dail Executive by
the Dail." 47
The Republicans' demand for a Convention and an
Executive was theoretically reasonable and not unprecedented.
45Ireland, Dail Eireann, Official Report (28 February 1922 to 8 June 1922): 340.
·
46Ireland, State Paper Office, Dublin (hereinafter
cited as SPOD), Army, Negotiations for Unification, Sl233.
47rhid
.
.......---..-
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The right to hold general army meetings had existed since
the creation of the Volunteers and no change had been officially made in the Constitution to abrogate that right.

A

convention was deemed necessary because of the crisis over
the Treaty.

The Republicans felt such a meeting was the

best way to preserve both the unity of the army and its
democratic and voluntary character.
The proposal for an Executive also echoed the early
Volunteer days, pre-Dail Eireann and pre-Volunteer oath.
Mulcahy's own interpretation of the establishment of an
army executive was:
•.. it reverts the control of the Army back to the days
before the disbandment of the Volunteer Executive. The
object of this is to restore to the Army a control which
shall be expressive of their feelings, and in which the
Army as a whole may expect to have confidence •••• The
setting up of an Executive in this way does not in actual
fact take the Army away from the control of the Dail.
It but secures that just as in the earlier days of the
recent operations, the work of the Army shall be along
lines agreed to, not only by the Dail but by its own
Executive.48
This analysis of the Republican demands was most favorable
and optimistic, arising, one suspects, more out of Mulcahy's
desire for military solidarity than from a realistic
appraisal of the situation; yet he was prepared to
this policy to the Dail.

As

~1inister

reco~nend

for Defence, Mulcahy

was supporting a proposal which, in the context of the Repulican demands, was a definite rejection of civilian control,
an awkward and incongruous position for a government minister.
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Mulcahy, however, was also an army man and knew that the
times were such that doctrinaire adherence to abstract
principles might well cost lives and threaten the very existence of the government in which he served.

Mulcahy was

attempting to act as a bridge between the Government and the
Republicans.

He would recommend the convention to the Dail;

he would also try to delay such a meeting, and, at the proposed Convention, try to induce the army to accept a moderate position.

In the interests of peace and solidarity,

both he and Collins were willing to negotiate and compromise.
The threat of fratricidal strife justified such action.
On January 18, 1922, writing as the Chairman of the
newly formed Acting Military Council of the I.R.A., Rory
O'Connor informed the Chief of Staff, Eoin O'Duffy, that if
the Minister for Defence would not authorize a convention,
the Council would proceed on its own.

He added that, while

the signatories of the demand were anxious to cooperate and
hasten the British evacuation of the country, they would now
only act on orders countersigned by O'Connor.4 9

This was

the beginning of the repudiation of the authority of G.H.Q.
and Dail Eireann.

That same day the General Staff and all

Divisional and Brigade Commandants held a meeting in Dublin
49rreland, SPOD, Army, Negotiations for Unification,
Sl233. The signatories were Rory O'Connor, Liam Mellowes,
Joseph O'Donovan, Sean Russell, all of G.H.Q., and Oscar
Traynor, O.C. Dublin Brigade; A. McDonnell, O.C. Sth Dublin
Brigade; Liam Lynch, O.C. 1st Southern Division; M. McCormack
O.C. 3rd Southern Division; Thomas Maguire, O.C. 2nd Western
Division; William Polkington, o.c. 3rd Western Division;
M. MacGiollarnath, O.C. 4th Western Division.
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to discuss the Republican proposals.

Those favoring a Con-

vention argued that such a meeting was necessary to ascertain
the point of view of the army on the national situation and
that "the action of the majority in the Dail in supporting
the Treaty involving the setting up of an Irish Free State
was a subversion of the Republic and relieved the Army from
its allegiance to the Dail." 50

Mulcahy restated his posi-

tion that the supreme control of the army was vested in the
Dail.

He argued that a Convention at this point would have

a disruptive effect on the army, crystallizing their differences and moving them toward the precipice of an open split.
Mulcahy stalled, hoping that the more time that elapsed
before the Convention, the cooler and more moderate the meeting would be.

He thus suggested that since they had no

definite policy to put before the meeting, they should wait
until the Constitution, which would delineate the relationship of the I.R.A. to the Free State, was drafted.
promise, the first of many, was accepted.

A com-

The participants

set up a "Watching Council of Four" to "guarantee that the
Republican aim shall not be prejudiced."

51

The Council

consisted of two signatories and two Divisional officers.
Any two members could veto a proposal of the Staff.

The

Minister for Defence agreed to hold a Convention in two
months time.

Mulcahy had succeeded in stalling, but the

50 Ibid.
Slrbid.

"I

I
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resulting interlude would ultimately prove dangerous and
divisive to the army.
The Divisions and Brigades were hardening in their
attitude toward the Treaty, either for or against, and
violence was threatening to erupt throughout the country.
In early February, 1922, Ernie O'Malley and the Second
Southern Division openly repudiated the Treaty, the authority of the Dail and G.H.Q.
independent Division.

They claimed they were now an

To acquire arms, they raided an R.I.C.

barracks at Clonmel and captured guns, ammunition and
grenades.

To acquire funds, they imposed a levy on the

people of their district.

Beggar's Bush did not have enough

loyal men in the area to meet this challenge, so the Second
Southern's defiance went unchecked.
Following the example of O'Malleyts Division, the
Mid-Limerick Brigade issued the following proclamation on
February 18th:
The aims of the head of the army and the majority of its
G.H.Q. Staffs are now unquestionably to subvert the
Republic, support the Provisional Government and make
possible the establishment of the Irish Free State. We
declare that we no longer recognise the authority of
the present head of the army, and renew our allegiance
to the existing Irish Republic, confident we will have
the support of all units of the I. R.A.. and of the loyal
citizens of the Irish Republic.52
The British were to begin evacuating that area, which included
Limerick City, on February 23rd.

General Headquarters,

52 Quoted in Dorothy MacCardle, The Irish Republic
(London: Transworld Publishers, 1969}, p.6l2.
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realizing the strategic importance of the Limerick terri t,ory
as a gateway to both the south and west and as a command
point of the river Shannon, ordered Commandant Michael Brennan
of the 1st Western Division to march in and occupy the
barracks with troops loyal to Beggars Bush.

The Republicans

described it as "the invasion of Limerick."

Both sides sent

in reinforcements and established their own posts.

Fighting

was prevented only by the intervention of Liarn Lynch, Oscar
Traynor, Collins, Mulcahy and O'Duffy.

They again worked

out a compromise and defused the impending crisis.
During the Limerick crisis, Griffith had urged his
Cabinet to take action.

He was forestalled by Collins who

heartily endorsed the suggestion of a negotiated settlement.
During the months preceding the actual outbreak of hostilities,
the Cabinet was divided over the best method of dealing with
the Republicans.

Griffith, supported by O'Higgins and

Cosgrave, favored a strong non-compromising stance.

They

felt it imperative to answer the challenge of the Republicans
and uphold the decision of the Dail.

The President and his

allies had very little connection with the army and felt the
situation grave enough to risk the possible outbreak of wide
spread fighting.

collins and Mulcahy, however, were Army men

as well as politicians.

They still retained a deep affection

and affiliation for their old comrades.

Unceasingly, they

tried to avert a split in the I.R.A. and were loathe to
take up arms against men with whom they had fought less than

,
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a year before.

To avoid this, they advocated a policy of

accommodation.
Originally, the Cabinet had sanctioned the calling of
the Convention.

However, the Limerick crisis, coupled with

the growing practice of selecting delegates to the meeting
on a political basis and the rumoured threat that the army
would prevent the upcoming election, caused the Government
to reconsider.

When Mulcahy informed his colleagues that

"he could not guarantee that if this Convention was held
there would not be set up a body regarding itself as a military government not responsible to the people" nor could he
see any hope of passing a resolution disclaiming military
government and pledging the loyalty of the I.R.A. to whatever Government the people elected, the Dail Cabinet rescinded its previous decision and on March 15th, proscribed the
Convention. 53

To increase the impact of this prohibition,

the Cabinet also decided that only officers who remained
loyal and obeyed the orders of the Provisional Government
would receive financial support.S4

This was an extension of

an earlier decree of 27 February, 1922, which stated that
"no funds or other assistance would be given to any unit
which did not guarantee not to interfere with an election
53rreland, SPOD, Army, Negotiations for Unification,

81233.
54

Ibid.
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and that they would support the Government elected." 55
Through the power of the purse, the Cabinet was trying to
exercise and maintain civilian control of the army.
The Republican Military Council defied the Government's ban and summoned its own convention.

On March 23rd,

5 Divisional Commandants and 29 Brigade Commandants from
a total of 14 Division and 71 Brigade Commands, signed the
order.

The decision to ignore the prohibition of the

Cabinet caused a section of the Army openly to break from
the Government.

The Minister for Defence and his Chief of

Staff held another conciliatory meeting with Liam Lynch and
the 1st Southern Division on March 20th.
for unity again eluded them.

The magic formula

While the Republicans agreed

to frame some definite proposals for associating the I.R.A.
with the elected Government, in return they demanded a
convention to be held at a later date, and a halt to recruiting for the Civic Guard, the police force, which the

i
i'

Republicans considered the para-military arm of the Provisional Government.
able.

I

The Cabinet rejected these terms as unaccept-

Consequently, Mulcahy had to instruct his Chief of

Staff to regard any member who attended the Convention as
severing his connection with the I.R.A.
Minister added a softening touch.

However~

the

He informed his staff

that the holding of a "Sectional Convention" while divisive,
55rreland, SPOD, Minutes of the Meetings of the
Provisional Government, Gl/1, Vol.l.

II
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should not destroy the spirit of brotherhood in the army
and cautioned them against antagonizing their recalcitrant
brethren.56

Throughout the various attempts at maintaining

army unity, Mulcahy exhibited a tendency, not to subvert
the Cabinet's intentions, but rather to handle army matters
in his own way.

The endless negotiations among I.R.A.

officers, to the exclusion and, sometimes disapproval of
the politicians, established a precedent as to the manner
in which army affairs would later be conducted.
The Republican Convention was attended by 223 antiTreaty delegates, representing approximately 60 per cent
of the army. 57

There were no surprises.

The delegates

reaffirmed their allegiance to the Republic and elected an
Executive of 16 in whom they vested supreme control of the
army.

The Executive repudiated the authority of the Minister

for Defence and the Chief of Staff.

They discussed establish-

ing a military dictatorship and overthrowing all other governments in Ireland, Dail, Provisional, Northern and British.
Rory O'Connor, one of the leading spokesmen, encouraged
this speculation with his statements that "the holding of
the Convention means we repudiate the Dail"; "We will set up
an Executive which will issue orders to the I.R.A. all over
the country"; and when asked if there were going to be
56calton Younger, Ireland's Civil War (London:
Fontana Books, 1968), p.253.
57Florence O'Donoghue, No Other Law (Dublin: Irish
Press Ltd., 1954), p.335.
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a military dictatorship, O'Connor replied, "You can take it
that way if you like."58

The contradiction inherent in

simultaneously establishing a Republic and a dictatorship
did not seem to bother the Convention delegates.

What was

probably intended was a temporary rule of the army until
"loyal" 'politicians would reestablish a government.
Following the Convention, on April 14th, the Irregulars seized a number of buildings in Dublin, including,
most prominently, the Four Courts.

The occupation of the

law courts building was a blatant challenge to the Government.

It was not met.

The Cabinet was trying to avoid being

manoeuvred into striking first.

Collins was still not

convinced that a peaceful solution was unattainable.

More-

over, the Free State army was not yet ready to fight, especially against fellow Irishmen and former comrades.

To

wage a civil war would require a level of military discipline
not yet present in the Beggars Bush force.
However, the Provisional Government could not allow
the situation to go unchecked much longer.

Violence was

spreading throughout the country, destroying property and
preventing businesses from operating.

Ambushes were numerous.

Dublin itself, quiet since the Truce, now rang with the
sound of gunfire and shook from the force of explosives.
Kilkenny, the conflict between the Irregulars and the
58oorothy Macardle, The Irish Republic (London:
Transworld Publishers, 1968), p.616.
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National Army became so serious that it seemed as if full
scale civil war was imminent.

Once again, the army took the

lead in arranging a compromise.
Arising out of the Kilkenny crisis, ten army
officers59 effected an agreement which they felt, could
restore peace and avoid civil war.

The Army Document of

May 1st proposed:
(1) The acceptance of the fact admitted by all sides,
that the majority of the people of Ireland are
willing to accept the Treaty.
(2) An agreed election with a view to
(3) Forming a Government which will have the confidence
of the whole country.
(4) Army unification on above basis.60
A deputation of officers led by Commandant Sean O'Hegarty
addressed the Dail on May 3rd.

In a moving presentation, he

pleaded with the Dail to act quickly on the Army Document
in order to spare the country the horror of fratricidal
strife:
I conceive that it is the responsibility •.• particularly
the responsibility of political leaders and army leaders
and every member of this House to take a stand now
definitely whether it will be civil war or this thing.
I cannot conceive that there is any other way out nor
can those associated with rne.61
59The officials who drew up the Army Document were
Collins, Mulcahy, O'Duffy, Gearoid O'Sullivan and Sean
Boylan for the government; Torn Hales, Sean O'Hegarty, F.
O'Donoghue, H. Hurphy and Dan Breen for the Irregulars.
60Quoted in Calton Younger, Ireland's Civil War
(London: Fontana Books, 1968), p.277.
61Ireland, Dail Eireann, Official Report (28 February
1922 to 8 June 1922): 359.
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In the previous few months, the Dail had been unable to
deal with the impending disaster.

Since· ratifying the Sinn

Fein Ard-Fheis agreement of February 22nd, wherein de Valera
and Griffith had agreed to postpone the elections on the
Treaty for three months because the state of the country
would make a peaceful election, free from intimidation, impossible, the Dail had done little to ease the tension in
Ireland.

They redebated the Treaty numerous times.

They

quibbled and bickered, accused and denounced one another.
O'Hegarty's plea spurred the nail to action.

Both

sides declared for a truce, to be effective as of May 4th,
and selected a peace committee to negotiate a settlement.
Unfortunately, it failed.

While they all could agree to a

Coalition, the Republicans could not accept even implicit
recognition of the Treaty.

However, on May 20th, Collins

and de Valera were able to conclude a pact which made an
election possible and, temporarily at least, reduced the
threat of warfare.

The two leaders agreed to contest the

election jointly as a Sinn Fein panel, although independent
candidates were free to enter the contest.

They would then

form a Coalition Government with each side keeping the same
number of seats it presently held in the nail.

The Govern-

ment would consist of an elected president, a Minister for
Defence representing the army, and five ministers from the
majority and four from the minority.

While Collins' con-

cessions were substantial, he felt they were necessary if
the Irish were not to lose all that the war of independence
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had won for them.62

Some of his colleagues, especially

Griffith, were not pleased with the pact, but acquiesced
nevertheless.

They felt that the Provisional Government

was having a difficult enough time without succumbing to
internal feuds.
The Government was trying to reconstruct and administer a country ravished by a recently concluded guerilla
struggle and on the verge of entering into a civil war.

The

British were harassing them about their failure to act
against the Irregulars.

Serious violence had broken out in

the North putting Collins in the awkward position of collaborating with the dissident section of the I.R.A. in order
to protect Northern Catholics.

Throughout, the Provisional

Government was attempting to write a Constitution for the
Free State, a Constitution which would be republican enough
to satisfy their opponents but would also comply with the
terms of the Treaty.

Implicit in the negotiations from

January to June was the promise of a republican document
around which all elements could unite.
were adamant.

The British, however,

The Constitution of Sarostat Eireann, while

embracing the concept of popular sovereignty, also embodied
the political theory of the "British constitutional monarchy,
with roots in pre-democratic monarchial theory and reflected
in British Commonwealth symbols - the Crown, a governor62 Piaras Beaslai, Michael Collins and the Making of
a New Ireland, 2 Vols. (N.Y.: Harper and Brothers, n.d.)
II;396-397.
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general, on oath of loyalty, etc. - and the constitutional
fictions connected with 'His Majesty's Government'."63
While Collins and de Valera were arranging a political
settlemen~

and the Constitution was being prepared, the

leading military officers were engaged in talks concerning
Army unification.

For a while, there was hope.

The May 4th

truce had been extended indefinitely, with partial success.
Prisoners were to be released.

The Irregulars consented to

vacate all occupied buildings except the Four Courts and the
Free State promised not to occupy any new posts.

Collins

and Mulcahy accepted the demand for a mixed G.H.Q. Staff,
Irregular and Free State, and acknowledged the right of the
I.R.A. to hold periodic conventions and to elect an Army
Council which would have the authority to approve the choice
for Minister for Defence.

However, over the appointment of

the Chief of Staff, the negotiations broke down.

The Free

State officers demanded this office, at least temporarily,
and offered the Irregulars the two positions of Deputy Chiefs
of Staff.

The Republicans insisted that they nominate the

Chief of Staff and refused to continue the meetings unless
this demand was conceded.

Mulcahy replied that the "respon-

sibility for future negotiations was a matter for the new
Coalition Government and that in the meantime private
63 Basil Chubb, The Government and Politics of Ireland
(London: Oxford University Press, 1974), p.64.
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negotiations would be discountenanced." 64
Inherent in these discussions, and expressly stated
in the Collins-de Valera pact was the assumption that the
Minister for Defence was a representative of the army and
its interests.

During his tenure in that office, Mulcahy

will later be accused of just such a charge, that he was
representing not the government but the army.

Mulcahy's

perception of his function and his role as Defence Minister
must certainly have been influenced by the discussions and
events of this period.
The election was scheduled for June 16th.

On June

14th, Collins, knowing full well the Constitution made his
pact with de Valera impossible, urged the voters to choose
the candidate they thought would best represent them. The
Constitution was published on the morning of the election
but that made little difference.

The Treaty was the only

real issue in the 1922 election and the people endorsed it.
Of 128 seats, the pro-Treaty candidates won 58 seats, the
anti-Treaty panel, 35.

The independent parties, mostly

Treatyites, also collected 35 seats, consisting of Labour, 17;
Farmers, 7; Independents, 7i and Dublin University, 4.

The

Irish had voted for peace, but four days after the results
of the election were announced, they would again be at war.
On June 22nd, Sir Henry Wilson was shot and killed
at his home by two London I.R.A. men.

Wilson had been an

64 Ireland, SPOD, Minutes of the Meetings of the
Provisional Government, P.G.23, Gl/2, Vol. II.
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anathema to the Irish, indelibly marked and identified with
the frustration of Ireland's nationalist ambitions and with
the persecution and murder of Catholics in the North.

No

one knows for sure who ordered his assassination but the
evidence suggests that it was Collins, either alone or as a
member of the Supreme Council of the I.R.B.

The Chairman of

the Provisional Government had been obsessed by the sufferings of his co-religionists in the North.

Wilson's associ-

ation with the pogroms may well have led Collins to issue
such an order.

One explanation offered was that Wilson's

death was the last vestige of the Bloody Sunday mentality. 65
The British blamed o•connor and the Four Courts Irregulars.

They issued a formal request to the Provisional

Government to take action against the Republicans regarding
the "toleration of this rebellious defiance of the principles
of the Treaty as incompatible with its faithful execution."66
Collins is reported to have snapped that Churchill could do
his own dirty work.67

Unfortunately, that would not be the

case.
Four days after Wilson's assassination, in retaliation for the arrest of Leo Henderson, one of their officers,
65 calton Younger, Ireland's Civil War (London:
Fontana Books, 1968), p.314.
66rreland, SPOD, Minutes of the Meetings of the
Provisional Government, P.G.35, Gl/2, Vol.II.
67calton Younger, Ireland's Civil War (London:
Fontana Books, 1968), p.316.

the Irregulars kidnapped General J.J.
Assistant Chief of Staff.
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(Ginger) O'Connell,

The Provisional Government

considered this to be an intolerable action and, at a meeting of June 27th, decided that uNotices should be served on
the armed men in illegal occupation of the Four Courts and
Fowler Hall that night ordering them to evacuate the building, and to surrender up all arms and property and that in
the event of their refusing to do so, the necessary action
would be taken at once.n68

The Irregulars refused to

surrender; and on Wednesday, June 28, 1922, the National
Army began the attack on the Four Courts.
Although the kidnapping of Ginger O'Connell may have
sparked the Cabinet to action, it was only the immediate
cause.

Following the elections which confirmed the peoplers

acceptance of the Treaty and established the Cabinet as the
legitimate Government, the Ministers felt more secure in
issuing an ultimatum to the Four Courts Irregulars.

Griffith

and his faction had urged that the continuing occupation of
the Four Courts guaranteed constant outbreaks of violence.
Wilson's murder, the British demand for action against the
Republicans and 0 'Connell's kidnapping added t.o their conviction that the rebellion, to them a mockery of the principles of democratic government, must be ended.

Collins and

the military, "though convinced of the soundness of the
political argument for implementing the Treaty, needed
68Ireland, SPOD, Minutes of the Meetings of the
Provisional Government, P.G.37 1 Gl/2, Vol.II.
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something to spark their anger, to overcome their reluctance
to open fire on their friends.•• 69

Now, they could not ignore

the kidnapping of one of their highest officers and expect
to continue exercising military or political authority.
The Republicans fought the Civil War to preserve an
ideal and protest against the tyranny of the majority.

The

Provisional Government fought the war to vindicate the
principles of democratic government and majority rule and
to uphold the supremacy of civilian authority over the army.
A section of the army had mutinied against Dail Eireann and
the expressed will of the people to accept the Treaty.

The

Government had to quell this rebellion.
The bombardment of the Four Courts lasted for two days.
Using heavy artillery and equipment borrowed from the British, the National Army repeatedly shelled the Georgian
structure.

To the Irregulars, it was a repeat of Easter,

1916, with only the uniforms changed.

The Four Courts

garrison held out until June 30th before being forced to
accept unconditional surrender.

Rory O'Connor, Liam Mellowes,

Joseph McKelvey and Richard Barrett were among the Irregular
leaders taken as prisoners.
However, the Republicans maintained control of other
buildings and the fighting continued to rage throughout
Dublin, especially in O'Connell Street.

After the surrender

69calton Younger, Ireland's Civil War (London:
Fontana Books, 1968), p.319.
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of the Four Courts, the Government decided that the attack
on the other Irregular strongholds "shorild be vigorously
continued."70

In one engagement, Cathal Brugha, a revolver

blazing in each hand, was killed as he rushed out from a
burning hotel refusing to give himself up.

The battles left

the capital city scarred and deformed, an omen of things to
come.

For approximately one week of fighting, the cost was

estimated at five million pounds.

A higher price was paid

in human life: 64 soldiers and civilians killed, and nearly
300 wounded.71

Civil war had become a horrible reality.

On July 6th, 1922, the Provisional Government
issued a call to arms, appealing to the patriotism and valour
of the men of Ireland to enlist in the National Army.
Mulcahy convinced Collins to take command of the forces as a
symbol around which the army could rally.

Collins assumed

the position of Commander-in-Chief and established a War
Council of three, including himself, Mulcahy as Minister for
Defence and Chief of Staff, and Eoin O'Duffy as General in
Command, South Western Division.

The Government and G.H.Q.

realized that, while they claimed "to have broken the conspiracy to override the will of the nation," 72 a long and
difficult fight lay ahead.

Themselves veterans of a

70Ireland, SPOD, Minutes of the Meetings of the
Provisional Government, P.G.44, Gl/2, Vol.II.
7lcalton Younger, Ireland's Civil War (London:
Fontana Books, 1968), p.342.
72 Ibid., p.343.
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guerilla war, the members of G.H.Q. knew that if the Irregulars
could harass the army and hamper the Government to such a
degree that neither would be able to function effectively,
victory would be theirs.

A protracted struggle would be

required to establish governmental authority in the country.
The army had without question been seriously weakened by the split in its ranks.

In the Southern Division,

it had lost to the Irregulars some of its best and most
experienced fighting troops.

Moreover, some of the I.R.A.

remained neutral, further depriving the army of war-trained
soldiers and officers.

However, in such cases where those

involved sympathized with the Republicans, non-participation
was actually beneficial to the Government.
With an initial nucleus of about 4,000 men,
began to raise, train and equip a professional army.

G.H~Q~

The

Cabinet had authorized, until conditions returned to normal,
a force of 35,000. 73

Collins, Mulcahy and their staff faced

a tremendous challenge.

Even the loyal I.R.A. veterans had

little or no experience in the discipline and conduct of a
regular army.

In an intensive recruiting drive, G.H •. Q. en-

listed masses of the unemployed throughout Ireland including
ex-British soldiers, Irishmen who had fought in the English
army, especially those with professional skills.

At first,

training merely consisted of basic instructions.

Discipline

was uneven and irregular.

New brigades were formed to replace

73 Ireland, SPOD, Minutes of the Meetings of the
Provisional Government, P.G.60, Gl/2, Vol.II.
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those which had gone Irregular.

Each area generally re-

cruited and trained their own men, although G.H.Q. would
eventually establish a training program at the Curragh.
The National Army attempted to compensate for its
dependence on raw recruits with centralized, coordinated
strategy and with the utilization of its superiority in
equipment and armaments.

For example, Emmet Dalton led a

coastal invasion of Cork with troops that, although wellequipped, learned, it is alleged, how to use their rifles
. 74
on t h e voyage f rom Du bl ~n.

Anot h er f actor wh'~c h great 1 y

strengthened the National Army was the policy of deploying
small groups of men from the Dublin Brigade who had remained loyal to Collins to various units throughout the country.
These men were experienced soldiers whose presence bolstered
the recruits, inspiring both confidence and discipline.
The first phase of the Civil War can be loosely
dated from the bombardment of the Four Courts to the death
of Collins in August of 1922.

This period witnessed a

seemingly endless series of victories for the National Army.
Town after town fell, partly due to the policy of the
Irregulars themselves.

They would occupy towns and then

abandon them, leaving the barracks gutted by fire and of no
use to the National forces, then fleeing to the hills and
mountains to resume the old guerilla warfare of the Black
and Tan era, to revert as Oscar Traynor said, "to the tactics
74calton Younger, Ireland's Civil War (London:
Fontana Books, 196g), p.410.
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which made us invincible formerly.n 75

However, the govern-

ment's army soon controlled the Waterford to Limerick line,
securing the East, the North and most of the West.

The

Republicans were forced to retreat into the South, making
their stand in the province of Munster, their stronghold.
In the first few months of the war, a certain
restraint, a certain reluctance to strike down old comrades
was evident.

Although the Republicans had vowed to prevent

the Government from implementing the Treaty and the National
Army was pledged to uphold the decision of the Dail and the
people, both sides avoided the cold-blooded killings and
wanton violence which would later become commonplace.

One

historian characterized this attitude as a "lack of heart"
which resulted in "flights of bullets hurtled through the
air harmlessly as migrating birds." 76

Soon, however, serious

hunting would begin.
While the army was attempting to reconquer the
country, the events of August, 1922, would seriously shake
the stability of the Provisional Government.

On the 12th

of that month, Arthur Griffith died of a cerebral hemorrhage.
Ten days later, on August 22nd, Michael Collins was killed
in an ambush at Beal na Blath, County Cork, his home
territory.

Mulcahy pleaded with the army to remain calm:

7Sibid., p.347.
76Ibid., p.394.

109
Stand by your posts. Bend bravely and undaunted to
your work. Let no cruel act of reprisal blemish your
bright honour. Every dark hour that Michael Collins
met since 1916 seemed but to steel that bright strength
of his and temper his gay bravery. You are left each
inheritors of that strength and of that bravery. To
each of you falls his unfinished work. No darkness in
the hour - no loss of comrades will daunt you at it.
Ireland! The Army serves-strengthened by its sorrow.77
Collins had gone to Cork, the heart of the resistance, ostensibly to inspect the troops and buoy up morale.
However, evidence suggests that he was on a peace mission.
General McEoin felt that the Commander-in-Chief was hoping
to use his powerful ties to the I.R.B. to end the fighting
and also heal the Brotherhood, which had been rent by the
struggle. 78

In his biography, Rex Taylor claims that

Collins expressed his real intentions for making the fatal
journey to Cork when he said: "'I am going to try and bring
the boys around,'

•.. adding,

rough with them.'"7 9

'if not I shall have to get

A quest for peace makes intelligible

an otherwise seemingly foolhardy trip.

The death of Michael

Collins was not only a severe loss to the Government and the
army, but was also an inestimable tragedy for Ireland, especially coming at such a critical juncture in her history.
The ambush at Beal na Blath effectively killed any real hope
for an early peace and reconciliation.

Now, it was to be

77 Ibid., p.439.
78 Ibid., p.431.
79

Rex Taylor, Michael Collins (London: New English
Library, Ltd., 1970), p.l96.
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war with a vengeance.
With Griffith and Collins both dead, de Valera was
the only national figure left.

De Valera had seemingly

abandoned any hope for a constitutional way to settle differences.

He had said that it might be necessary" ... to
80
wade through Irish blood" in order to achieve freedom.
Although he explained that he merely intended it as a warning, the wisdom in making such an inflammatory remark and
lending his name and prestige to the Irregulars must be
seriously questioned.

During this crucial period, the form-

mer President was content to follow and not lead.
take part in the Four Courts convention.

He did not

When war started,

he assumed the office of Adjutant to the Director of Operation, Sean Moylan - certainly not a position in keeping
with his Easter Week record and experience.

On Sept.ember 6,

1922, when he secretly met Mulcahy81 in a futile attempt
to secure agreement, all the former President could say was
that some men were led by faith and some by reason.

While

men of faith, like O'Connor, were taking the stand they
were, he was only a humble soldier following them. 82

De

Valera seemed immobilized by the split, uncertain of his
80 calton Younger, Ireland's Civil War {London:
Fontana Books, 1968), p.250.
81In meeting de Valera, Mulcahy violated a decision
of the Cabinet which emphasized the principle of collective
Cabinet responsibility and eschewed individual peace
negotiations. Ireland, SPOD, Minutes of the Meeting.of the
Provisional Government, P.G.l08 Gl/3, Vol.III.
82calton Younger, Ireland's Civil War (London:
Fontana Books, 1968) 1 p.472.
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position.

In late 1922, he set up a sham Republican minis-

try which the Irregulars recognized as 'the legitimate
government of the Republic.
dominated the movement.

However, the military leaders

Not until very late in the war did

de Valera assert effective control over the Republicans.
Liam Cosgrave, Kevin O'Higgins and Richard Mulcahy
were now the dominant personalities in the Provisional/Free
State Government.

The Dail, prorogued since June 30th,

assembled on September 9, 1922.

With the Republican deputies

obviously not in attendance, the Labour Party, led by
Thomas Johnson, assumed the role of the Loyal Opposition.
Because they had not participated in the previous Republican
assemblies and had remained above the bitterness of the
Treaty debates, Labour provided both a fresh perspective on
the problems facing the nation and a critical analysis of
the solution offered by the Cabinet.

Labour was hampered

by the Government's disciplined majority and, more effectively, by the Civil War itself which provided the Ministers
with an impregnable defence to cover all questionable
practices.

The members of the Government charged treason

when there was legitimate criticism, spoke more to justify
themselves to the renegade half of their own party than to
the assembly, and did not really consult the Dail but rather
used it, in large measure, to endorse and legitimize their
previous actions.
Aware that the Civil War enhanced the already substantial power of the army, Labour attempted to clarify and
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regularize the relationship of the military to the Dail.
The Opposition kept up a constant barrage of questions and
criticisms in an attempt to exercise some control over the
army. They protested against combining the offices of
Minister for Defence and Commander-in-Chief in one man,
arguing that the Minister should be a civilian in order to
insure a certain degree of separation of powers.

Labour

attacked the spirit of militarism which it claimed was prevalent in both the National and Irregular forces. Cathal
O'Shannon summarized the feeling of the Opposition:
We have denounced militarism, and we have told you the
root cause of the militarism in Ireland. The military
spirit is as deep in one section of the Army as it is in
another, and the reason is that both came with prestige
out of the guerrilla warfare against England, and they
have got such swelled heads that the only authority they
have is the authority of the gun.83
In late September of 1922, the debate over the
military was exacerbated by the introduction by the Government of the Army Emergency Powers Bill.

This act establish-

ed military courts with the power to impose the death penalty for such offences as unauthorized possession of weapons
and explosives, arson, looting and destruction of property.
The Cabinet justified this extraordinary measure as necessary to save the life of the nation.

The Army felt it

needed these powers to combat successfully the chaos and
anarchy besetting the country.

General Mulcahy explained:

83Ireland, Dail Eireann, Official Report 1(1922):
830.
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We are asking for these powers that certain steps may
be taken against people who commit murder and burn down
property, people who are aiming at the life of the
country. We are asking for powers to deal with these
things, as there is no civil machinery to deal with
them. The Army is simply standing in the gap, as it
stood in many a gap on many different occasions before
and we are going to stand in the gap, and dealing by
our Army machinery against those who commit these
crimes against the safety of the country, until such
time as this Government is in a position to set up a
different type of machinery to deal with it.84
Labour resolutely opposed the Bill, claiming the
Government was setting up a military dictatorship and abdicating its responsibility to the army.

It charged that

"by handing over all power of Government and all authority
to the Army and to the Army authorities, this Ministry is
overthrowing this Parliament." 85

Moreover, Labour leaders

felt that the army had neither the training nor the discipline to assume such grave responsibilities.

Finally,

they predict that if the Government embarked on a policy
of executions, the sympathy of the people would redound to
the Irregulars.

The Government did agree to delay the im-

plementation of the act and issued an Amnesty Proclamation
which granted pardon to all who would lay down their arms
and cease to take part in the rebellion.

The Cabinet ordered

that the Proclamation be given the fullest publicity, with
copies circulated in all the papers, distributed by airplane,

-

84rbid., cols. 841-842.
85rbid., col. 830.
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sent to all the clergy and displayed at every Post Office.86
However, the Republicans, for ali practical purposes,
beaten in the field by mid-August, refused to give up and
resorted to terrorism.

They destroyed railroads, blew up

buildings, burnt out houses and generally engaged in such
tactics that would make it impossible for the Government to
function either politically or economically.

However, the
I I

guerilla warfare which had been so successful in pre-Truce
days was proving much less so since the Irregulars no longer
commanded popular support from the majority of the people.
As the frustration increased on both sides, so did
the atrocities.

Extreme brutality and wanton violence

characterized the second phase of the civil war.
National and Irregular forces were guilty.

Both the

The death and

the destruction rained on the village of Ballyconnell by the
Irregulars was equaled by the deliberate dynamiting of
prisoners by Free State troops at Ballyseedy.
now without honor, without decency.

The war was

It is estimated that

"Southern Ireland suffered more death and destruction in

,,,,

the Civil War of 1922-1923 than it had in the struggle
against England from 1916 to 1921. "87
The Government was determined ·to win at any cost.
86Ireland, SPOD, Minutes of the Meetings of the
Provisional Government, P.G.28(a), Gl/3, Vol.III.
87Joseph Curran, "Consideration of the Irish
Revolution: The Free Staters," University Review 5 (Spring,
1968): 47.
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Kevin O'Higgins' often quoted phrase, "This is not going to
be a draw with a replay in the autumn."8B

On November 17th,

with the execution of four men charged with possession of
illegal weapons, the Government's policy of execution began.
On November 24th, Erskine Childers, chief propagandist for
the Irregulars, was put to death on a similar charge.

Al-

though a public outcry against the Government ensued, the
Cabinet remained unshaken in its determination.

Before the

war was over, seventy-seven prisoners would be executed.
The Government felt that they were charged with a sacred
trust to implement the will of the people and that they
would honor that commitment regardless of the cost.
On December 6th, the Irish Free State officially
came into existence but its birth was accompanied by such an
outbreak of violence that the government's continued existence was impaired.

Liam Lynch had threatened to deal with

all deputies who had voted for the Emergency Powers Bill and
all active supports of the Free State in the same way the
Cabinet was treating his forces.

On December 7th, Deputy

Sean Hales was assassinated and Deputy Speaker Padraic
O'Maille wounded on their way to the Dail.

The Government

retaliated by executing four of their prisoners, held since
the beginning of the war:

Rory O'Connor, Liam Mellowes,

Joseph McKelvey and Richard Barrett. The "Mountjoy Executions"
88 Terrence de Vere ~vhite, Kevin O'Higgins (London:
Meuthuen and Co., Ltd., 1948), p.lSO~
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had no pretense of legality but were ordered as a calculated
decision by a unanimous Cabinet to strike back against the
rebels and prevent the decimation of the Dail.

Kevin

O'Higgins explained the governmentrs position:
It was at once punitive and deterrent. The members of
the Parliament of Ireland must be kept free and safe
to perform their duties as members of the Parliament of
Ireland. When one strikes at a representative man the
crime is peculiarly horrid ••• one strikes at the people
who gave him his mandate and who invested him with his
representative character; and therein lies the most
criminal aspect of the wretched crime that was committed
yesterday.89
·
Labour was outraged.

To them, it was murder.

Cathal

O'Shannon charged: "You murdered these men - nothing short
of murder were the executions of these men this morning."90
Thomas Johnson characterized it as "most foul, bloody and
unnatural ... almost the first act is utterly to destroy in
the public mind the association of the Government with the
idea of law.

I am almost forced to say you have killed the

new State at its birth."91

. ' . these
The decision of the Government v1s-a-v1s
executions is difficult to evaluate.

No more deputies were

assassinated following the Mountjoy Executions.

The action

itself, however, was totally outside any legal process and
engendered a bitterness and hostili t.y which would polarize
89Ireland, Dail Eireann, Official Report 2 {19221923):67.
90Ibid., col.55.
91Ibid., col.49.
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and dominate Irish politics for years to come.

It is a

measure of the determination of the Government that Kevin
O'Higgins voted for the death sentence for Rory O'Connor,
best man at his wedding earlier that year.
measure of the tragedy of the situation.

It is also a
Perhaps, as one

historian noted, "Cosgrave, O'Higgins and Mulcahy took
harsh measures because they could not afford to be lenient."92
Although the fighting continued for the next six
months, the heart of the resistance had been broken. Liam
Deasey, a member of the Irregular Executive, was captured
in January of 1923.

Having previously become convinced of

the futility of continuing the struggle, Deasey agreed to
sign and send to his fellow officers and his followers a
document urging immediate and unconditional surrender.
refused.

Lynch

De Valera objected to the Government's demand that

the Republicans surrender all their arms.

The Irregular

forces had dwindled to approximately 8,000.
men were prisoners.93

Some 13,000

Then, on April 10, 1923, Liam Lynch,

symbol of the resistance, was killed in a battle in the
Knockmealdown Mountains.

Now, it was just a matter of time.

De Valera tried to negotiate terms.

Using Senators

92Joseph Curran, "Consideration of the Irish
Revolutions: The Free Staters," University Review 5 (Spring,
1968): 48-49.
93 calton Younger, Ireland's Civil War (London:
Fontana Books, 1968), p.500.
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Jameson and Douglas as intermediaries, the former President
argued that the Republicans should be allowed to keep their
arms, or at least store them until after the upcoming election, and insisted there should be no obstacle, i.e. oath,
to prevent any representative from participating in the
political life of the country.

The Government refused,

demanding instead a surrender of arms and the recognition
of and agreement to the principle of majority rule. 94

On

May 24th, de Valera issued a proclamation:
Soldiers of Liberty! Legion of the rearguard! The
Republic can no longer be defended successfully by your
arms. Further sacrifices on your part would now be in
vain, and continuance of the struggle in arms unwise in
the national interest. Military victory must be allowed
to rest for the moment with those who have destroyed the
Republic.95
The Republicans simply hid their weapons.

As the country

had drifted into war, it now drifted into an uneasy peace.
But the scars of the Civil War cut deep, disfiguring the
body politic, and marring the political, social and economic
development of the Irish Free State.

94rreland, SPOD, Cabinet minutes, Cl/97, G2/2,
Vol.II.
95calton Younger, Ireland's Civil War (London:
Fontana Books, 1968), p.509.

CHAPTER IV
ORIGINS OF MUTINY
The Civil War had necessitated the development of a
large military establishment with extraordinary power and
tremendous responsibility.

The survival of the government,

of the Free State itself, had come to depend on the success
of the military.

Even though the army had succeeded in

quelling the rebellion, its rate of progress against the
Irregulars and the consequent lawlessness in parts of the
country gave rise to grave dissatisfaction.

The failure of

the Minister for Defence to keep his colleagues properly
informed on military activities and the alleged association
of the senior officers of the army with a reorganized Irish
Republican Brotherhood exacerbated the discontent with the
military hierarchy.

According to the Attorney-General:

•.. individual ministers have in the course of their
ordinary work, met persons day by day who gave them
unofficial accounts of disquieting happenings and such
accounts made deeper impressions because ministers were
not in possession of authoritative information which to
test and weigh the stories told. Such a state of
affairs could only breed suspicion that all was not
well, that things were being concealed, and necessarily
give rise to a form of great anxiety opening the ear
the more ready to every tale that offered.l
1 Hugh Kennedy, Memorandum, 2 April 1923, Kennedy
Papers, University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
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consequently, the tension in the Cabinet grew as the Cosgrave
government attempted to evolve a satisfactory relationship
between the military and the government.
The chief critic of the army was Kevin O'Higgins,
who as Minister for Home Affairs, received from the Civic
Guards monthly reports on the conditions prevailing in the
country.

On this basis, O'Higgins claimed that 95% of the

crime in the Free State was the responsibility of the army
to control and contain. 2

Mulcahy countered, asserting that

these monthly records were written" .•• in the spirit of
wanting generally to prejudice the position of the Army and
all persons in the Army •.. And that these reports are
provided with a very definite knowledge that they are asked
for, for that reason."3

The conflict between O'Higgins and

Mulcahy would be the leitmotif throughout this entire period.
In January of 1923, O'Higgins prepared a memorandum
for a full Cabinet meeting on the military situation analysing the state of the nation.

The Minister for Home Affairs

concluded that the Government was being threatened on two
levels; overtly, by active Irregulars who were engaged in
acts of violence, and covertly by passive Irregulars participating in lawless activities.

The inability of the

2Mulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry Committee,
Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/42, University College Dublin Archives,
Dublin, Ireland.
3Defence Council Meeting, 3 May 1923, Mulcahy Papers
P7/C/322, University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
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Government to enforce its laws and maintain the orderly
functions of society blatantly encouraged the rebels and
severely retarded the economic and psychological recovery of
the country.

To combat the growing threat of anarchy,

O'Higgins felt it was necessary that " ••• the thirty
thousand armed men, whom the Goverrunent, on behalf of the
Irish people is paying and maintaining, must be asked to
perform many duties which strictly and technically, might
be said to be those of armed police rather than of military."4

To accomplish this, the Minister suggested that a

special mobile force be created to deal especially with
transgressions of the Civil law and that the

a~IDY

cultivate

better relations with the civilian population t.hrough more
courteous conduct, stricter discipline and prompt payment
of accounts and dependents allowances.

Furthermore,

O'Higgins favored executions in every county in order to
increase the psychological impact.

He believed that "local

executions would tend considerably to shorten the struggle."S
On the governmental level, O'Higgins felt that the
Executive Council "must clear our minds of technical terms,
such as 'Government' and 'Army' and of purely artificial
limitations of function."6

They were facing an unorthodox

4o'Higgins, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/23, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
sibid.
6Ibid.
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situation which could only be met in an unorthodox manner.
They should utilise the army, armed servants, to the best
possible advantage in what mattered most, saving the life
of the country.

"It is of no avail that the towns are held

if the country perishes; it is of no avail that the active
Irregulars are gradually killed or imprisoned, if their seed
flourishes and the passive Irregulars continue to enjoy
immunity to the ruin of the idea of .law."7

Mulcahy viewed

this memorandum as a direct criticism of the efficiency and
efficacy of the army.8

To him, the "artificial limitations"

were very much real definitions of responsibility and authority which ought not to be tampered with by outsiders who did
not understand the complexities of the military situation.9
O'Higgins' receipt of the Civic Guard report for
the month of February, 1923, precipitated a Cabinet crisis.
A special meeting of the Executive Council was called for
March 27 to consider the latest police analysis.lO

The

7Ibid.
8conversation among General Mulcahy, Mrs. Mulcahy,
and Doctor Mulcahy, 23 December 1961, Mulcahy Papers,
P7/D/100, University College Dublin Archives, Dublin,
Ireland.
9Mulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/35, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
lOireland, State Paper Office Dublin (hereinafter
cited as SPOD), Cabinet minutes, Cl/74.
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meeting resulted in the resignation of the Army Council:
the Commander-in-Chief, Mulcahy; the Chief of Staff, Sean
MacMahon; the Adjutant-General, Gearoid O'Sullivan; and the
Quartermaster-General, Sean O'Murthuile.

In a letter to

the President the following day, Hulcahy explained that the
Cabinet discussion convinced him that his colleagues felt
that:
1. The progress made by the Army up to the end of
February has not been satisfactory
2. That the control of the Army is aloof from and is
felt to be unresponsive to the Government and
3. That there is some undefined divergence of purpose
on the part of the Army, as from the Government.ll
Although not agreeing with such an analysis, the officers
of the Council felt that considering their grave responsibilities, deciding issues of life and death, they should
not continue to make these decisions in such an atmosphere.l2

Not wishing "to make difficulties" for the

Government, they tendered their resignations as the Anny
Council.l3

The Executive Council, however, rejected this

course of action and, on April 9, ordered the Army Council
to continue to function as it had in the past.l4

If the

llArmy Sequence, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/178,
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
12Mulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/35, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
13Army Sequence, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/178,
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
14Ireland, SPOD, Cabinet minutes, Cl/81.
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resignation of the Army Council had been accepted during
this critical period, there would have been drastic
repercussions.

According to the Attorney-General, Hugh

Kennedy:
a sudden public scrapping by the high command of
the army would be wholly misleading to public opinion
and most unfortunate if not disastrous in its immediate
effects.
It could have but one meaning in the public
mind, namely that things are getting worse (which I
believe to be the reverse of fact) and the consequence
of such a public impression would be to increase the
nm-11 dwindling support of the Irregulars and to
strengthen and enhearten their campaign.lS
Kennedy's analysis of the potential dire effects of
attempted changes on the public mind was bolstered by an
article in the Morning Post newspaper.

Thereafter, major

albeit discreet changes in the Army became impossible.

The

paper reported the dissension in the Cabinet concerning the
army and raised allegations about the influence of the
I.R.B. at General Headquarters.

It also predicted that the

Army Council was to be replaced by a Cabinet Committee of
Defence consisting of the President, Ministers for Home
Affairs, Industry and Commerce and Defence, and the Chief of
Staff.

The Morning Post asserted that " ••• the Cabinet

finally screwed up its courage, or to be more accurate,
Kevin O'Higgins screwed up the rest of the Cabinet's
courage" to move against the senior officers of the army.l6
15 Hugh Kennedy, Memorandum, 2 April, 1923, Kennedy
Papers, University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
16Ireland, Dail Eireann, Official Report 3 (1923):
59-60.
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Although the Executive Council decided that the paper's
report should be officially denied,l7 which Cosgrave emphatically did in the Dail on April 12, 1923,18 in point
of fact, however, the main substance of the article was
accurate.

The Cabinet did assume a more direct role in the

affairs of the army by establishing a Council of Defence.l9
Its members were Cosgrave, O'Higgins, McGrath and Mulcahy,
four of the five officials listed by the Morning Post. The
Chief of Staff was originally selected to serve on the
Council, but later the Cabinet decided against it.
The Council was a compromise solution.

Although

O'Higgins felt that "the results secured justified the
intervention,"20 Mulcahy maintained that it weakened Army
control, interrupted the final operations against the
Irregulars and "

created the psychological position that

certain groups of Army officers were encouraged to go behind
the backs of the Army Authorities to Mr. Joe McGrath and
another group to Mr. O'Higgins."21

Due in part to Mulcahy's

1 7 Ireland, SPOD, Cabinet minutes, Cl/81.
1 8 Ireland, Dail Eireann, Official Report 3 (1923}:
60-62.
19Ireland, SPOD, Cabinet minutes, Cl/85.
20o'Higgins, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/21, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
21Mulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/37, University College Dublin
Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
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resentment at this interference in the affairs of the army
and to the successful conclusion of the Civil War, this
particular Council of Defence was allowed to lapse.
As the violence caused by the Irregulars ended,
the Government found it necessary to define and legalize
the position of the army vis-a-vis the Free State.

During

the Civil War, the armed forces existed, quite simply,
because they had to exist.

As the Attorney-General pointed out,

however, the army had never been "definitely constituted"
but experienced
a kind of natural growth in defence of the Treaty
and the Parliament and the Government of the people.
But its organisation and powers, the direction and
control of its policy, the mode and authority of its
appointments have been assumed by the Army itself they have never been defined~ or:expressly dSlegated
either by the Provisional Government or by the Ard
Chomhairle [Executive Council] or by the Dai1.22
Throughout the latter half of 1923, the Cosgrave
Government sponsored legislation to rectify this omission
and regularize the status of the army.

The Defence Forces

{Temporary Provisions) Bill gave the Executive Council the
authority to raise, maintain and control the armed forces,
delegating the responsibility for organization and adrninistration to the Minister for Defence.

The Ministers and

Secretaries Bill established a new Council of Defence,
consisting of the Minister for Defence, the Chief of Staff,
22Hugh Kennedy, Memorandum, 2 April 1923, Kennedy
Papers, University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
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the Adjutant-General, the Quartermaster-General and one
civil member who could be Parliamentary Secretary.

The

purpose of the Council was to assist the Minister in the
administration of his department.
In response to the growing clamour in the Dail and
the Cabinet, but against the advice of the Attorney-General,
the Government, for all practical purposes, abolished the
position of

Commander~:in:....Chief.

Hugh Kennedy considered

this move "premature and ill-advised" risking the possibility of a "conflict between the purely civil and the purely
military." 2 3

However, the Government did follow his sug-

gestion that the position of Commander-in-Chief not be
abolished altogether but at least "should be retained in
the Executive Council ... whether titular or signifying
actual military command."2 4 Thus the following confusing
picture emerged.

The Minister for Defence was no longer to

have the joint responsibility of Commander-in-Chief, but
rather it was to be vested in the Executive Council. However, its duties were to be exercised by the Defence Minister.

In addition, he would basically assume this role

only when acting as Chairman of the Council of Defence.25
In effect, this re-delegation of authority only meant that
23Ibid.
2 4 Ibid.
25Ireland, Dail Eireann, Official Report 5 (1923):
1838.
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the Army was left without a supreme military head.

More-

over, no members of the armed forces receiving full military
pay were to sit as Deputies in the Dail.

Collectively,

these measures were obvious attempts to strengthen civilian
control of the army and re-emphasize the fact that the
military was responsible to the Executive Council and the
nail.

Both government and parliamentary leaders were

anxious to erase any residual sentiment in favor of an independent or political army.
While the Ministry and Dail were defining and legalizing the position of the armed forces in the Free State,
General Headquarters was engaged in restructuring the army
itself.

In January of 1923, G.H.Q. began a major reorgan-

ization, making plans for a permanent professional establishment and for the inevitable change from a war to peace time
force.

This reorganization included the formation of nine

Brigades based on units rather than territorial area, to
replace the present Command system, the establishment of
three new Commands, Western, Southern and Eastern and the
Curragh Training Camp, with a view to the centralization of
authority in Dublin.

Mulcahy believed that such a reorgan-

ization would lead to a "more effective military machine.
On the whole the Brigade will be an ideal unit in organisation - and it will be a unit of regimental strength with
divisional organisation.

It can be expanded with ease and
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without

diso~ganisation

or without imparing its efficien-

cy. n26
Moreover, G.E.Q. was also tightening its administrative grip on the internal workings of the army.

More

accurate records were demanded as well as a close scrutiny
of the men in the service.

An Officers Training program

was set up at the Curragh camp and the selection of officers
became more formalized.

During the early days of the Civil

war, officers were appointed to posts "mainly and necessarily for getting men of influence, and, as a corollary, men
with good records in the National r.tovement. n 27

Now the

criteria in the designation of officers was expanded to
include not only pre-Truce service but also efficiency and
suitability for the particular post.

Generally, G.H.Q.

attempted to appoint men who were already in positions of
authority in a particular area.

Eventually, however, the

fact that there were a large number of officers who were
surplus to the needs of the establishment became evident. 28
The military establishment had burgeoned in war and would
have to be pared down to meet new peace-oriented budgetary
26Ireland, SPOD, Organisation and Establishment of
the Army, S3442A.
27 costello, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/25, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
28 o•connor, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/l, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
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By the end of the Civil War, the army numbered

52,000 men and 3,000 officers.

By January of 1924, G.H.Q.

wanted to have only 30,000 men and 1,300 officers.
projections were for an army of 18,000 men.

Final

Given the high

rate of unemployment in the Free State and the changing
nature of the army, demobilisation would inevitably prove
to be a difficult and delicate task.

Men who once enjoyed

the adventure and mystique of being "gunmen" were now being
asked either to return to civilian life or to assume less
prestigious positions within the army.
The demobilisation of non-Commissioned officers
and enlisted men began in June of 1923.

Men were discharged

who were found to be undesirable either because they did
not meet the physical standards or because their conduct
records were questionable.

Some voluntarily wanted to leave

the army to return to civilian employment.

Others were

unwilling to accept the lower rates of pay the army was now
offering. 29

In most respects, this phase of the reduction

proceeded smoothly.
Problems arose, however, when G.H.Q. began to discharge officers in September-October, 1923, with the proclamation of Defence Order #28.

According to Mulcahy, three

classes of officers were to be demobilised:
29 Ibid.

r

131
(1) Officers whose work has not been satisfactory
(2) Officers whose service dates from a date subsequent
to July, 1921, and whose services, while satisfactory,
have been such as not to show special merit or indicate
special qualifications.
(3) Officers whose service dates from a date prior to
July, 1921, and who, while having given satisfaction,
are surplus to requirements.30
A demobilisation grant of five pounds was offered to each
officer, in addition to the continuation of his full salary
for two months and half pay for the following two months.
A special grant was given to pre-Truce officers based on the
nature and extent of their service from 1919-1921, the
degree to which their life style had been interrupted and
the service rendered in the National Forces.

A re-settle-

ment branch was also established in the Ministry of Industry
and Commerce to help the demobilized men back into civilian
life. 31
The Council of Defence prepared the first lists
for demobilization.

Approximately 763 officers were dis-

missed, primarily for marked inefficiency or lack of discipline, based on Inspection Reports.

All heads of Depart-

ments, Staffs and Commands were asked for evaluations and
recommendations for their respective officers.

In mid-De-

cember of 1923, a Committee of Investigation or Officers
Board was created to make further recommendation to the
Council of Defence.

This Board consisted of Major-Generals

3°Ireland, Dail Eireann, Official Report 5 (1923):
717-718.
31 Ibid.
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Dan Hogan, Reynolds, McKeon and O'Daly.
116 cases.

It dealt with only

Since a number of officers failed to pass the

medical examination or had voluntarily resigned, the total
number of discharged officers as of the end of January,
1923, was approximately 1,000.

To further whittle down the

Officer Corps, Mulcahy called a meeting in early February
of all the General Officers

Co~manding

and the Council of

Defence to decide on the final list of names to be retained,
to be kept on reserve, or to be dismissed.

The Executive

Council was presented with this list of nominations and
dismissals by the end of February.

The Cabinet removed six

names from the retention list, one from demobilization, and
recommended that ten officers on the reserve list be given
definite positions as soon as possible. 32
Included in the first demobilization group were
officers in the Officers Training Corps at

th~

Ctirragh~

Many of these" ... had been several months at the O.T.C.
that they were for all intents and purposes unemployed
Officers, and that there seemed to be no prospects of their
services being further availed of in, or applied for from,
the Command from which they came."33

The first outbreak of

trouble occurred at the Curragh on November 9, 1923, when
32Mulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P?/C/10, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
33o'Connor, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P?/C/1, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
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seven officers refused to accept their demobilization
papers.

They were placed under arrest, ·charged with dis-

obedience and tried at a General Court Martial.

The muti-

nous officers protested that they were members of the old
I.R.A. and had sworn an oath not to lay down their arms
until Ireland was an independent Republic.

Hence, they

could not quietly accept discharge papers.

Additionally,

another factor which may have influenced them was their fear
that they might be denied pre-Truce Supplementary grants.
These grants had not been officially sanctioned at this
point in time.34

All of the officers were found guilty and

sentenced to dismissal.

However, the solicitor for the

defendants, Mr. Lamphier, appealed the convictions on the
grounds that certain preliminary investigations, required
by the Defence Forces Act, had not been taken.

The Judge

Advocate General upheld the appeal and advised the AdjutantGeneral, the Confirming Officer, not to confirm either the
findings or the sentence. 35

Instead of arranging for a

new trial General Headquarters decided on a policy of leniency, claiming there had been a misunderstanding among the
men, in order to avoid any appearance of harsh action or
34Ibid.
35Davitt, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/24, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
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victimization.36

New demobilization papers were issued to

the officers on November 30th.

The men again refused to

accept them and, consequently, were escorted outside the
confines of the camp.
Meanwhile, the mutiny had begun to spread.

It now

included a number of other officers at the Curragh who, in
sympathy with their comrades and in protest at their arrest,
also refused to accept demobilization papers.

They felt it

was unjust to dismiss old Volunteers from the army while
ex-British officers, Irishmen who had at one time served in
the British army, were being retained.

This second group

was also forced to leave the camp and they were denied
demobilization pay and grants.

The disturbance involved

approximately 60 officers and was confined to the

Curragh~

Subsequently, all but 14 applied for and were granted
demobilization papers.

On March 29, 1924, papers were sent

to the remaining officers and all but one accepted them.37
The mutiny at the Curragh was important as a pre··
lude to the mutiny four months later, the first step in a
series of events which would later culminate in the army
crisis of March, 1924.

The immediate consequence of the

Curragh protest was the institution on November 26, 1923 of
36MacMahon, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/33, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
37o'Connor, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/l, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
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a Cabinet Committee on demobilization to hear the complaints
of pre-Truce officers concerning their dismissals and to
consider the valid complaints against the retention of exBritish officers.

It was further empowered to investigate

the circumstances surrounding the arrest of the men at the
Curragh.3 8

The Committee consisted of the Minister for

Education, Professor MacNeill, the Minister for Finance,
Mr. Blythe and the Minister for Industry and Commerce, Mr.
McGrath.
The Cabinet Committee received applications for reinstatement from 60 men,

most of whom had been involved in

the affair at the Curragh; but, in no case, was an officer
actually reinstated.

In most instances, the Minister for

Defence noted that the officer was simply "surplus to requirement."39

On December 5, 1923, the Minister for In-

dustry and Commerce resigned from the Committee because
''

of the actual demobilisation of some of the Officers

whose cases he claimed should be decided by the Committee"40
He was temporarily replaced by the President.41

However,

38Ireland, SPOD, Cabinet minutes, C2/22.
39r.fulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/37, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
40Mulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/10, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
41Ireland, SPOD, Cabinet minutes. C2/28.
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McGrath reconsidered his decision when he received a
written statement from the President of the objectives and
powers of the Committee, including a guarantee that the
recommendations made by the Committee concerning the retention of pre-Truce officers and dismissal of those "unworthy
to be in the army," that is, ex-British officers, would be
binding on the Army Council.42

The Committee itself

achieved no tangible results although it did provide another opportunity for civilians to inquire into the workings of the army, or as Mulcahy saw it, to interfere in
military business.

The Minister for Defence claimed that

the incident at the Curragh would have ended any threat of
mutiny, "were it not for the encouragement given these men
by politicals."43

Significantly, this incident further

strained the relations between the Minister for Defence and
his colleagues in the Cabinet.
As part of their defence, the officers who mutinied
at the Curragh had claimed to be members of the "old I.R.A."
This organization was begun in January of 1923, coincidentally at the same time that the reorganization of the army
was initiated, by a group of pre-Truce officers who felt they
were not being treated in a manner commensurate with the
42The Irish Independent, 19 May 1924.
43Mulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/37, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
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sacrifices they had made for the liberation movement.

Their

purpose was to influence the policy and character of the
army in order to obtain for themselves more power and responsibility. -The leading figures of the old I. R.A. or
Irish Republican Army Organisation were all former members
of Michael Collins' Intelligence Squad - Liam Tobin,
Charles Dalton, Frank Thorton and Tom Cullen.

Even before

Collins' death, a problem had arisen concerning these men
and their feeling of being "let down";44 and it was only
the intimidating force of the late Commander-in-Chief's
personality which had kept them in line. 45

As the successor

to Collins, Mulcahy did not have the same relationship with
them as his predecessor and consequently, could not discipline them as effectively.46
Through the latter part of 1922, Tobin, Cullen and
Thorton were involved in a series of disputes within the
Intelligence Department over rank, pay and promotions.47
44Russell, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/20, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
45Interview with Col. Dan Bryan, Dublin, Ireland,
18 March 1975; Neligan, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/29, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
46Interview with Col. Dan Bryan, Dublin, Ireland,
18 March, 1975.
47Russell, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/18, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
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They even had engaged in a passive strike in which reports
were not sorted out or rated as to importance or reliability.48

Because these officers had not done a particularly

good job in Intelligence, they were transferred. 49

The

problem was that most of these men, although they had performed well during the Troubles, were not suited, either in
terms of ability or mentality, to the bureaucratic work
necessary in a peace time army.50

Tobin was made A.D.C. to

the Governor-General; Dalton, Adjutant of the Air
and Thornton was to be appointed a Brigade Major.
they were dissatisfied with these changes.

Serv~ce,

However,

For example,

Thorton wanted to be named Director of Intelligence.

Dalton

and Tobin felt they were not given positions with enough
authority or responsibility.

In most respects, the officers

of the old I.R.A. felt they were being ignored by G.H.Q.
and supplanted by men who had done much less for Ireland
than they had.

Professor Hogan, former Director of Iritelli-

gence, explained the nature of their grievances:
48Interview with Col. Dan Bryan, Dublin, Ireland,
18 March, 1975.
49p. Hogan, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/24, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
50Interview with Col. Dan Bryan, Dublin, Ireland,
18 March 1975.
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In the war with the Irregulars a certain number of
officers were rather prominent at the earlier stages,
but as the situation became worse i~ became necessary
to select abler and more energetic officers and the
others fell into the background. To a certain extent
they floated about the country unattached for several
months. Their duties were not clearly defined, •••
while they were dropping behind, other officers were
going to the fore and when peace actually came they
saw that new officers had taken front rank and they
were in the rear rank and they were to a certain extent
dissatisfied with their position.51
Such grievances were exacerbated by territorial
rivalry and possessiveness.

For example, G.H.Q. had found

it necessary during the Civil War to send Dublin officers
to Cork.

The Cork officers resented this, viewing the new

men as interlopers who were intruding themselves into a
situation which could best be handled by the local leaders.
Similiarly, Dublin officers, who had been scattered throughout the country to reinforce other commands, strongly objected to officers from the Northern Divisions taking charge
in Dublin.

They too believed they had the right to command

their home territory.52

Such feelings of resentment could

but add to the sense of frustration and bitterness experienced by many of the officers.
Intelligence reports described the old I.R.A. as a
mixture of several groups, each more or less independent of
51Professor Hogan, Testimony before the Army
Inquiry Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/25, University
College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
52costello, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/25, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
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the other.

There were primarily two sections, the "Dublin

men (gun-men and let down Officers) and Western Officers."53
The first group consisted of "Mick Collins own gunmen.
Bitter.

Fanatical.

Joe McGrath, Bill Tobin, Frank Thornton,

Charlie Dalton etc . . . . The main bunch outside Dublin is the
Western clique - ignorant and fanatical, but lacking courage
or ability."54

The report also listed Colonel J. Ryan as a

member with political ambitions, aspiring to form a center
party in the Dail, whose immediate policy was "to get hold
of T.D.'s and others, who will look after the interests of
the old I.R.A. men, and will keep the Republican ideal
alive.

Sean Gibbon, T.D., is his principal agent."SS

The

report gives support to Mulcahy's claim that politicians
were encouraging his men to engage in irregular and undisciplined conduct.

The Minister for Defence himself

scribed his dissident officers as

the~

de~

.• men who either

deserted their posts in Cork after Collins' death, or had
to be taken out of Cork because of their inability to deal
with the situation there, and of their colloguing with the
Irregulars."56
53rbid.
S4rbid.
ssrbid.
56Tobin Mutiny File, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/195,
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
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The first meetings of the old I.R.A. were held in
January and February of 1923.

Major-Generals Tobin, Dalton,

Cullen and Ennis, Colonels C. O'Malley, P. McCrea,
J. Slattery, F. Thornton, C. Dalton, S. O'Connell and
S. O'Reilly attended.

Liam Tobin was appointed Chairman

and Tom Cullen, Organizer.

The old I.R.A. was to be

structured around the Battalion as the basic unit or club.
Meetings were to be held every two weeks.

Acceptability

for membership was to be decided by the officers' "past
and present outlook from a National point of view" and
those approached "should be warned as to the seriousness of
indiscriminate discussion of the organisation and its
objects."57

Their policy was to expand their membership to

other pre-Truce officers so that they
when strong enough would demand a strong voice in Army
Policy, with a view to securing complete Independence
when a suitable occasion arose. It was also decided
that the members of the new organisation would make
every effort to get control of the vital sections of
the Army and oust those undesirable persons who were
and are holding those positions.58
Those members of the old I.R.A. began to proselytize
and attempted to expand their influence.

The Officers

Training Corps at the Curragh was the natural breeding place
for discontent, or as Col. M.J. Costello of Intelligence
described it, a "hotbed" for the growth of a mutinous
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
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organisation. 59

The reason for this was that the O.T.C.

included a number of men for whom no positions could be
found or who were judged not suitable for command posts.
Old I.R.A. officers utilized the Curragh camp as a recruiting ground, preaching their message of resentment and injustice and exhorting their colleagues to propagate these
ideas throughout the country.

According to Colonel Costello:

The organisation of which Tobin is the visible head had
not a grip on the Army, but it made use of all the
circumstances in an attempt to swing the general body
of Officers with grievances, real or alleged, behind
them.60
On June 6, 1923, the Tobin group sent a letter to
President Cosgrave requesting a meeting with him and the
Commander-in-Chief "to discuss the situation and place our
views before you as Michael Collins' Successor."61

They

claimed to have accepted the Treaty in the same spirit as
Michael Collins had and felt that a "genuine effort must
now be made to keep absolutely to the forefront the ideals
and objects for which the late Commander-in-Chief gave his
life"62
59costello, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/25, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
60Ibid.
61Tobin Mutiny File, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/195,
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
62Tobin Mutiny File, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/195,
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.

143
On June 20, 1923, Mulcahy, Cosgrave and Kennedy,
the Attorney-General, discussed the complaint of the old
I.R.A. that their members were being treated unfairly.

The

President discussed the possibility that these men would
organize themselves and put up candidates for election.
Mulcahy stated that their alleged grievances never materialized into specifics and that the army must proceed with its
work.63

Despite the Minister for Defence's attitude, a

series of meetings ensued, during the summer of 1923, between the members of the old I.R.A. and the Executive Council.

The potential mutineers were allowed to state their

grievances and hopefully vent their frustrations.

Through

these discussions, the Government tried to keep open the
lines of communication and forestall any attempts at direct
action, especially since elections were to be held in August
of that year.

The mutineers failed, however, to effect any

change in army policy.
The first of these discussions occurred on Monday,
June 25, 1923, Cosgrave and Mulcahy met with Tobin, Dalton,
Thornton and O'Malley.

Tobin read an opening statement

which began with a reiteration of their views on the Treaty,
that they had accepted it only as a stepping stone to the
Republic a la Collins.

They claimed that Collins had told

Tobin "that he had taken on Oath of Allegiance to the
63Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/322, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
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Republic and that Oath he would keep, 'Treaty or no Treaty'"
and that this was their position exactly;64

Tobin then

launched into a scathing attack on the army, in particular,
Mulcahy and his staff.

He charged that:

the actions of the present G.H.Q. staff since the
Commander-in-Chief's death, their open and secret
hostility to us, his officers, has convinced us that
they have not the same outlook as he had. We require
a definite 'yes or no' from the present Commander-inChief if this be so.
Does the Commander-in-Chief understand the temper of
the old I.R.A., who are now in the National Army? He
does not. Your Army is not a National Army.
It is
composed roughly of 40% of the old I.R.A., 50% exBritishers and 10% ex-Civilians. The majority of the
Civilians were and are, hostile to the National ideals.
In the Army you have got men who were active British
S.S. men previous to the Truce, and who never yet have
ceased their activities.65
Tobin then demanded that a Committee of Inquiry be
set up to investigate the retention and demobolization of
officers and that the old I.R.A. be granted equal representation on it.

After mentioning specific grievances he wished

to discuss, his statement went on to condemn the reorganization of the I.R.B.

Tobin's group claimed that the

Brotherhood had been revitalized by senior Army officers only
after the old I.R.A. had begun to organize and that it was
a hindrance to progress, "a dishonest and corrupt effort to
destroy any genuine effort to carry on a successful conclusion of Mick 's ideals." 66

While both disclaiming any

64Tobin Mutiny File, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/195,
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
65Ibid.
66rbid.
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intention to cause another split in the army and also pleading for a return to the spirit of 1920-1921, the statement
ended with a direct threat:
It is time this bluff ended. We intend to end it.
Until satisfactory arrangements are come to, we will
expose this treachery and take what steps we consider
necessary to bring about an honest, cleaner, and
genuine effort to secure the Republic.67
The President responded by stating that such a
document was totally unexpected.
friendly discussion of their

He had anticipated a

prbbl·ems~

Mulcahy was incensed

and left the room demanding to know why he should have been
brought before the President to listen to such matters and
refusing to discuss anything in such an atmosphere.68
Mulcahy later claimed that this was the first intimation he had that the officers had grievances of this
kind.69

His attitude toward the representatives of the old

I.R.A. was at this time unambiguous.

He described Tobin as

a "very hard and bitter" man; Thornton as being "talkative
and argumentative"; O'Malley as being in a "very bad aggresive humour:" and Dalton as a person with "nothing to say.n70
67Ibid.
68Tobin Mutiny File, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/195,
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
69Mulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/10, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
70

Tobin Mutiny File, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/195,
university College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
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With respect to the meeting itself, Mulcahy stated:
I do not think that in any country in the world four
officers would come in uniform and sit down in front
of the Commander-in-Chief of that country and read in
his presence that document .•• and that the Commanderin-Chief would sit and listen to them.71
Joe McGrath, however, the self-appointed mediator
between the mutineers and the government, pressured Mulcahy
to meet with the Tobin group again and hear them out.

In

discussing the situation with both the Minister for Defence
and the President, the Minister for Industry and Commerce
defended the dissident officers.

He claimed that they had

been ostracized by the Staff, had been left out of the reorganization of other organizations, and had not been placed
in suitable positions.

McGrath felt that he himself "had

been slighted in a number of matters and that he felt like
making an exposure of the whole business and that he was
not going forward for the Dail at the coming elections."72
Consequently, Mulcahy met with Joe McGarth, Tobin,
Dalton, O'Malley and Sean O'Connell on July 7, 1923.

These

members of the old I.R.A. again complained about the retention of ex-British soldiers in the National Army at the
expense of pre-Truce officers, specifying particular men
and definite objections.

Furthermore, the representatives

protested the appointment of officers from the Northern
71 Mulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/36, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
72Tobin Mutiny File, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/195
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
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Division to Dublin, while they themselves had been carrying
on the fight with the Irregulars throughout the country.
They asked to be given back the Dublin Command.

Thornton

complained that he was the only pre-Truce officer attached
to the Intelligence department and that he had no defined
duties.

He claimed to have received a verbal promise from

the Chief of Staff that he would be appointed Director of
Intelligence but was passed over.

Moreover, the old I.R.A.

men were unhappy that they had not been approached to participate in the reorganized I.R.B.

The essence of their

grievances was crystallized in their feelings about the
overall position of the army:
It could be squared up._
A large percentage of the
officers are gazetted, put into jobs, given a rank
which means nothing, recognized as officers, but what
the officers want is not so much rank as in;fluence
in the Army.73
Mulcahy countered their accusations by pointing out
that he and his Staff were as much aware and appreciative
of the services of the pre-Truce officers as the Tobin group
but that he would not tolerate the idea that a man could
not be in the army because he was an ex-British officere
Mulcahy denied any knowledge of their relations with the
I.R.B. and remarked that if these officers were former memhers of the organization they should certainly know whom to
contact.

The Minister for Defence also declared "that

73Tobin Mutiny File, Mulcahy Papers, P?/B/195,
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
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their interference with the authority of those responsible
for the Army or the assumption by them of any authority
that did not come from their definite positions in the Army
could not be countenanced."74
Mulcahy thought that the dissident officers were
dissatisfied with the results of the meeting.

McGrath,

however, felt that they were mollified since "they have got
off some steam." 75

Intelligence reports indicate that

Mulcahy's analysis was accurate.

At a general assembly of

old I.R.A. officers on July 22, 1923, they appointed a
deputation to inform the Commander-in-Chief of the seriousness of the situation, complaining that in previous discussions they had received no guarantees that anything would
be done to alleviate their grievances.76

The next day,

July 23, 1923, six officers met with Mulcahy to inform him
that they had decided to go their own way and that a clash
was inevitable.
the Minister.

The officers felt that they should warn
They also wanted to inquire if Mulcahy intend-

ded to rigidly adhere to his previous policy statements.

Al-

though they again reiterated their grievances, they further
stated that their intentions were good, asking the Minister
7 4 rbid.
7 5 rbid.
76rbid.
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to regard them as "bona fides anxious to help."77
took this as a cue to begin a rapprochment.

Mulcahy

While pointing

out that their previous conduct belied their present claims,
he was willing to t.ake t.hem at their word arid give them a
chance to prove their alleged good intentions. 78
As a result of this discussion, a somewhat unusual
correspondence ensued between the Minister for Defence and
the old I.R.A.

Within two days, Mulcahy received a letter

from Cullen, Slattery and O'Connell asking the Commander-inChief for a signed statement containing the assurances he
gave them at the last meeting.

According to the officers,

Mulcahy agreed to the following:
1. That we appoint three representatives to deal
directly with you on matters which are considered vital
to the progress of the Army on National lines with
a view to the complete independence of Ireland.
2. That our representatives be accredited with having
absolute honesty of purpose and ideals.
3. We on our part assure you that we are not attached
to any Political Party, nor are we likely to be, but
we cannot too strongly urge upon you that we are in
absolute agreement with you as regards concluding
portion of paragraph No.l.79
Mulcahy gave them the assurances they demanded.
he did add one proviso.

However,

On matters dealing with "the

progress of the Army on national lines with a view to the
77

Tobin Mutiny File, Mulcahy Papers; P?/B/195,
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
78Ibid. Mulcahy's notes on this meeting are rather
incomplete-r:n-view of the letter he received from the old
I.R.A. officers two days later.
79Tobin Mutiny File, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/195,
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
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complete independence of Ireland," it was to be understood
that it was "of necessity, a personal and private arrangement and not indicative of sectionalism of any kind in the
Army."80

Obviously Mulcahy was trying to protect himself

against charges of fostering societies in the army or using
the army for political purposes.

He concluded by reaffirm-

ing his desire to keep open the lines of communication with
the men who had done so much for Ireland, especially having
himself witnessed the disastrous situation brought about
. 1 at1on
.
.
d erstan d'1ng. 81
an d m1sun
b y 1so

In a letter dated

August 7, 1923, which subsequently was acknowledged by
Mulcahy, the old I.R.A. appointed Major-General Tom Cullen,
Colonel Ben Byrne and Comdt. Mick Hehir as their representatives in all future discussion with the Commander-inChief.82

It was alleged by McGrath and the mutineers that

Mulcahy agreed to arrange a meeting between the dissident
officers and the Quartermaster-General, O'Murthuile, a leading figure in the I.R.B., for the purpose of securing representation for them on the governing body of the Brotherhood.

However, the mutineers claimed that the promise was

never carried out.83
80ibid.
81Ibid.
82Ibid.
83The Irish Independent, 19 May 1924; The Truth
About The Army Cris1s, with a Foreword by Major-General Liam
Tobin Issued by the Irish Republicn Army Organisation,
Summerhill, Dublin, p.6. {Hereinafter cited as The Truth
About The Army Crisis.)
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Nothing more was heard from these pre-Truce
officers until October of 1923 when they wrote Mulcahy
requesting that he take action to prevent the demobilization of certain officers. 84
never replied.

The Minister for Defence

He considered this letter both improper

and irregular and open to serious misinterpretation if
read by anyone not familiar-·with the situation., 8 5
Mulcahy viewed any attempt to dictate who should or should
not remain in the National Forces as a major breach of
army discipline.

Since June, Mulcahy's attitude toward

the old I.R.A. had become more and more ambiguous.
Despite his denials,86 he was probably trying to placate
the dissident officers until after the elections in
August.

This would explain his refusal to answer the

letter of October, after the elections, despite his
earlier cordiality.

He was also likely under pressure

from his colleagues, especially McGrath, to reach some
agreement with the old I.R.A. men.

Mulcahy himself claimed

that the interviews were "distasteful to him and that the
84Tobin Mutiny File, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/195,
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
85Mulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/36, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
Co~mittee,
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correspondence with the Tobin group was not profitable in
any way. 87
for time.

Clearly the Minister for Defence was playing
He evaluated the threats of the old I.R.A. as

being "the bluff of children" and did not think them"
capable of organising an organisation that could do any
damage.n88

Consequently, Mulcahy believed that the problem

would work itself out when the reorganisation of the army
was complete, when there would be definite positions with
specific duties for each officer who would also be subject
to strict army discipline.

He felt that "the time was not

opportune to face the problem direct in view of the military, political and financial situation then existing."89
By summer and early fall of 1023, G.H.Q. had ac-·
quired definite and detailed knowledge of the old I.RaA.
Intelligence reports provided information on membership,
arms and objectives.90

Professor James Hogan, Director of

Intelligence in August of 1923 wrote to the Chief of Staff,
General Sean McMahon, warning him that officers were
87 Tobin Mutiny File, Mulcahy Papers, P?/B/195,
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
8 8 Mulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P?/C/36, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
89Ibid.; Tobin Mutiny File, Mulcahy Papers, P?/B/195,
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
90costello, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P?/C/25, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
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organizing throughout the country.

He stated that:

These Officers have been asked to sit in judgment on
the question of Army control and on their brother
Officers. They have constituted themselves a final
Court of Appeal.
I submit that in any Army there can
be but one line of authority, and that any departure
from that leads to insubordination.91
Letters also reached Portobello Barracks, the headquarters
of the army, concerning the attempt of the I.R.A. organisation to suborn officers •.

One such letter stated;

I have just been told that there is a movement being
organised in the army by and among the I.R.A. men,
which was described to me as mutiny against the
replacement of I.R.A. officers by ex-Britishers and
the reduction of the grade of the former.92
Moreover, although the Tobin group did not take
credit for the Curragh Mutiny of November of 1923, those
who had refused demobilization papers did claim to be
members of the old I.R.A.

Furthermore, Colonel Patrick

Madden and Commandant Mullooly, the two officers who appeared as character witnesses on behalf of the rebellious
officers and helped them with their defence were old I.R.A.
men.

According to the Judge Advocate-General, Major-General

Davitt, the Tobin organisation was clearly interested in
the defence of these men.93

After the Curragh Mutiny, with

91Professor Hogan, Testimony before the Army
Inquiry Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/6, University
College Dublin Archives, Dublin~ Ireland.
92Tobin Mutiny File, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/195,
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
93Davitt, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/10, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
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the establishment of the Cabinet Committee on demobilisation,
the leaders of the I.R.A. organisation claimed that they
were given a guarantee by McGrath that their decisions would
be binding on the Army Council.

This is the substance of

the communication that McGrath received from the President
when he temporarily resigned from the Committee. 94

Clearly,

the Tobin group was quite prepared to use the Curragh
incident to their own advantage and took the opportunity to
press their demands on the government through McGrath.
The problem of the old I.R.A. continued to simmer
through January of 1924.

Early in the year,word reached

Portobello Barracks that the organisation intended to take
direct action by seizing a number of barracks and rifles
and issuing terms to the Government.

G.H.Q. quietly took

the necessary precautions, informed the

co~nanding

officers

to prepare for trouble and relocated certain troops.

Al-

though nothing happened,the senior officers of the army
were

beco~ing

concerned.

In a memorandum to President

Cosgrave, concerning the I.R.A. organisation, the Minister
for Defence wrote: "The organisation may not be a very
great danger but in the near future it can possible be a
far greater danger than the Irregular one."95
94The Truth About The Army Crisis, p.7.
9 5 Tobin Mutiny File, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/195,
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin Ireland.
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Mulcahy informed the President that he also was
concerned about the encouragement give·n the old I. R.A. by
a certain Cabinet Minister, i.e. Joe McGrath.

The Minister

for Defence predicted that unless the Minister for Industry
and Commerce disassociated himself from this group and
turned over whatever information he had, the time would
come when these officers would try to dictate unacceptable
terms to the Government, raising the possibility of
another civil war.96

Mulcahy was of the opinion that "this

Cabinet Minister thinks he is, or has, some control, over
the organisation but he is only being made use of and as
soon as his personal opinion conflicts with those in the
Organisation, he will cease to have influence."97

Al-

though the Minister for Defence was critical of McGrath's
handling of the re-settlement board for demobilised men,
he pointed out to President Cosgrave that he, nevertheless,
still supported both the Minister and the Executive and
expected the same support for his department.98

From this

statement, so indicative of Mulcahy's mentality, the Minister for Defence was shown to be very much a party man.
This attitude would later enable him to remain loyal to a
government which would treat him and his senior officers so
96Ibid.
9 7 Ibid.
98Ibid.
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shabbily not two months later.
Analyzing the state of the army, the Minister for
Defence expressed apprehension over the problems of
demobilisation and the maintenace of discipline.

He reaf-

firmed his intention not to retain any officer who was unsuitable or did not have the proper attitude towards the
military code of behavior.

Decisions involving demobiliza-

tion or discipline would be made by the proper army authorities.

Interference by the Executive Council or any par-

ticular Minister, Mulcahy felt, should be made on the basis
of a general principle that would be applicable to all cases,
and could be stated in a memorandum.

The Minister for

Defence envisioned creating an efficient Army machine, subject to the highest standards.

He prophetically foresaw

one potential difficulty still to be overcome, "that these
men must be weaned away from the idea and the use of
arms."99

Moreover, the large number of men that had to be

rewoven into the fabric of normal life and "the fact that
their temper is what it is, increases the desirability for
taking them away from the Army and putting them back into
civil life and increases also the responsibility that lies
on that particular department [Industry and Commerce] to
see that they are placed back into Civil life."lOO
99 Ibid.
lOOibid.
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Consequently, Mulcahy had a discussion with the
President and McGrath on January 26, 1923.

According to

the Minister for Defence, this meeting convinced him "of
the soupdness of my proposals relating to demobilisation
etc. and that there was no element of danger in the situation."lOl

Mulcahy claimed that his proposals for the

army with respect to nominations and dismissals would have
brought "matters to a head and I have no doubt in my mind
that the whole position could then be satisfactorily dealt
with and it would have been but for the interference and
encouragement of certain politicians."l 02

Perhaps Mulcahy

was over-optimistic regarding his ability to control the
old I.R.A.

In any event, the divisiveness in the Cabinet

was clearly a contributory factor.

Although engaging in

conduct unbecoming officers of the Free State Army, the
mutinous organisation could at least hope for a sympathetic
hearing in the Executive Council.

Despite all the meetings

and discussions, trouble was not avoided.

Tobin and Dalton

presented an ultimatum to the Cosgrave Government.
mutiny.

It was

To many, it seemed like an invitation for a second

civil war, an invitation that fortunately was ultimately
declined by all sides.
lOlibid.
102Mulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P/C/36, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
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.CHAPTER V
'l'HE MUTINY
The mutiny officially began on March 6, 1924, when
Liam Tobin and Charles Dalton presented an ultimatum to the
Cosgrave government.

They demanded changes in the army and

expressed their dissatisfaction with the direction the Free
State had taken since the Treaty.

Dressing their demands

in the rhetoric of republicanism, the mutineers declared
that they and the Irish people had accepted the Treaty only
as a stepping stone to a republican form of government and
that the government had betrayed this ideal.

They demanded

a conference with representatives of the government to
discuss their interpretation of the Treaty and set the
follo-vring conditions:
(a) The removal of the Army Council
(b) The immediate suspension of army demobilisation and
reorganisation.!
If the government did not comply with these demands, they
threatened to take appropriate action:
lThe Truth About the Army Crisis, with a Foreword
by Major-General Liam Tobin, Issued by the Irish Republican
Army Organisation, Summerhill, Dublin, p.l2. (Hereinafter
cited as The Truth About the Army Crisis}.
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In the event of your Government rejecting these
proposals we will take such action that will make clear
to the Irish people that we are not ·renegades or
traitors to the ideals that induced them to accept the
Treaty. Our Organisation fully realises the seriousness of the action that we may be compelled to take,
but we can no longer be party to the treachery that
threatens to destroy the aspirations of the nation.2
Tobin's letter was apparently handed to the
President by Mr. McGrath at or about ten o'clock in the
evening on March 6.

The Minister for Defence was not inform-

ed until 10:30 the following morning.3

Officers from

throughout the country supported the mutineers.
them fled with arms and equipment.

Many of

During the crisis, 49

officers resigned from the army in sympathy with the mutineers, including 3 Major Generals, 5 Colonels, 17 Commandants, 12 Captains and 12 Lieutenants. 4

Fifty officers

absconded with war materials which included 11 Lewis guns,
21 Rifles, 1 Grenade Rifle, 35,400 rounds of .303 ammunition, 41 Grenades and 1 Revolver.5
On March 7, 1924, the Executive Council ordered the
2Ibid.
3Tobin Mutiny File, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/196,
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
4MacMahon, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/35, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
5"Intelligence Report," 24 March 1924, Tobin Mutiny
File, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/196, Uni~ersity College Dublin
Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
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A military search party vis-

ited several houses in Dublin, including'the one of Mr.
McGrath; but the two officers eluded capture.

In protest

against the decision of the Executive Council, the Minister
for Industry and Commerce tendered his resignation to the
President.

However, he continued to fulfill his duties

until March 19, 1924.

In an interview with the Irish

Independent newspaper, McGrath explained that he resigned
because he" ••• refused to be a party to starting a blaze
which he believed would have consumed the country.

He said

that "he would not be a party to taking action against a
body of men who were responsible very largely for the birth
of the Free State and for its life since."7

His action, he

claimed, "saved the country from a catastrophe. ••8

McGrath

believed that the impact of his resignation both forced the
government into a more conciliatory position and also had
a moderating effect on the mutineers.
On March 10, 1924, the Minister for Defence
released the following statement to the Press concerning
the Mutiny:
6Ireland, State Paper Office Dublin (Hereinafter
cited as SPOD), Cabinet minutes, C2/60.
?The Irish Independent, 19 May 1924, p.S.

aIbid.
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Two Army officers have attempted to involve the Army
in a challenge to the authority of the Government. This
is an outrageous departure from the spirit of the Army.
It will not be tolerated. Particularly will it not be
tolerated by the officers and men of the Army who cherish
its honour. They will stand over their posts and do
their duty to-day in this new threat of danger in the
same watchful, determined spirit that has always been
the spirit of the Army.9
Apparently, however, the Executive Council was not as
convinced as Mulcahy was that the spirit of the army was to
be trusted.

To handle the crisis, they appointed the Chief

of the Civic Guard, Eoin O'Duffy, formerly a senior officer
in the army, to the position of General

Offi~er

the Defence Forces of Sarostat Eireann.10

Commanding

In effect, they

re-established the position of Commander-in-Chief for
O'Duffy.

In the Dail, President Cosgrave explained the new

appointment as simply a strengthening of the personnel of
the Headquarters Staff, part of the plan to deal with the
threat of mutiny.ll

However, some members of the government

believed it was necessary to appoint O'Duffy in order to
avoid the appearance of a faction fight within the army
itself.

They felt that the leaders of the army had become

tainted by their association with the I.R.B. and could not,
therefore, effectively deal with the mutineers, the old I.R.A.
9The Irish Independent, 19 May, 1924, p.So
lOireland, SPOD, Cabinet minutes, C2/62.
llireland, Dail Eireann, Official Report 6 (1924) :
1896.
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O'Higgins, in particular, advocated this policy. 12 Mulcahy,
on the other hand, resented the appointment of O'Duffy,
characterizing him as an outsider who was out of touch with
the military.l3
In the Dail, the President described the ultimatum
as:
••. a challenge which no Government could ignore without violating the trust conferred on it •••• The attempt,
such as it is, is not against a particular Government,
it is a challenge to the democratic foundations of the
State, to the very basis of Parliamentary representation
and of responsible Government.l4
The President refused to discuss any of the political issues
set forth in the document, viewing any such debate as indefensible.

He claimed that "this Government had never dis-

cussed questions of politics with Army officers."l5

Consid-

ering the series of meetings which took place between the
mutineers and members of the Executive Council, Cosgrave was
obviously employing a very narrow definition of the word
"politics".

At best, the President's statement was mis-

leading; at worst, a deliberate falsehood.
The Minister for Defence outlined for the Dail the
military situation throughout the country.

Incidents of

officers absconding with arms had been reported in Roscommon,
12Ibid., col.2218.
13Ibid., cols.2229-2230.
14Ibid., col.l896
15 Ibid.
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Gormanstown, Baldonnel and Templemore barracks.

A small

number of resignations had been received; especially in
oublin.

Mulcahy's evaldation was that:

There is a certain atmosphere of threat, that a large
number of officers throughout the Army are preparing to
resign if the threat contained in the letter to the
Government is not carried out; that they are prepared
to set themselves up in arms in defiance against the
Government is another threat. There is only one part
of the country in which there are possibly any ramifications of any danger and this is the County Cork.l6
The Chief of Staff was sent to Cork to stabilize that area,
and a new Commanding Officer was appointed there.
The Minister for Industry and Commerce publicly repudiated the government's policy.

Although he disclaimed

any agreement with the Tobin-Dalton document, McGrath announced his resignation to the Dail, charging that the
present crisis was "brought about by absolute muddling, mishandling and incompetency on the part of a Department of
State."l7

A full discussion on these charges was scheduled

in the Dail for the next day.

The military crisis generated

a political crisis and the Government was forced to face
both a potential revolt in the army and also dissension within Cumann na nGaedheal, as a series of party meetings would
later demonstrate.
Cumann na nGaedheal party meetings were held at
16rbid., col.l900.
17rbid., col.l897
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various times throughout the army crisis,l8

with a "rather

well regimented section within the Party giving a certain
qualified support to the Mutineers."l9

Interestingly,

despite their protestations about parliamentary government
and the responsibility of the Executive Council to the Dail,
the Government, practically speaking, treated the army
crisis as an intra-party dispute, giving more information to
and engaging in more discussion with its party members than
with the Dail Deputies.

In fact, Mr. Thomas Johnson, leader

of the Opposition party, was not informed by the Executive
Council immediately upon their receipt of the ultimatum and
was given no information about the crisis until the Dail
convened on March 11.

As he told the Irish Independent: "I

don't know any more about the business than I have read in
the newspapers." 2 0

In the Dail, the Labour Party leader

castigated the Government for its treatment of the Irish
Parliament:
We read of a meeting of the Government Party which lasted
five hours. No doubt matters affecting the State as a
whole and the conduct of the Executive Council were
under review at that party meeting . . • • The Executive
Council is not responsible to the Dail and to the country
18o'Higgins, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/23, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
19Ibid.
20The Irish Independent, 10 March, 1924, p.7.
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for the government of the country, I make the assertion
that much of this trouble has resulted from a failure
to recognise responsibility to the Dail as distinct from
responsibility to the Party.21
On March 11, a party meeting was called specifically
to evaluate the Government's policy towards the mutineers.
It lasted six hours and, from all accounts, McGrath was the
star performer.

Although Mulcahy was also present, he did

not engage in any substantial debate with his colleague.22
McGrath claimed that the mutiny was not a mutiny at all, but
rather a dispute between two rival secret organisations, the
old I.R.A. and the I.R.B.

He charged that the staff at

G.H.Q. had reorganised the Brotherhood and consequently "from
that point of view, they were in exactly the same case as
the mutinous officers, namely Major-General Tobin and Colonel
Dalton, who organised another secret organisation. " 23
McGrath had personally tried to bring the two groups together but had failed.24

A lengthy discussion of the I.R.B.,

the old I.R.A. and the role of secret societies in the army
ensued, which further strengthened the convictions of those
who, like O'Higgins and his ally, Patrick Hogan, the Minister
21Ireland, Dail Eireann, Official Report
1987-1988.

6 (1924}:

22p. Hogan, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/24, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
23Ibid.
24Ibid.
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for Agriculture, already had begun to suspect that some
changes in the army had to be made.
McGrath's position was that the government had misinterpreted the March 6th document.

The mutinous officers

were old friends, former comrades of the members of the
Executive Council.

They could not be expected to adhere to

a strict disciplinary code under these circumstances.
According to the Minister for Industry and Commerce, Tobin
and Dalton wrote "to the friends and colleagues of yesterday, with whom they had consulted and agreed to accept the
Treaty, demanding an interview to discuss what they considered a departure from the real Treaty position."25

McGrath

concluded that the Government over-reacted to the ultimatum
solely out of the fear that the document might at some time
be published.26
McGrath finally prevailed.

The Party members agreed

that the Minister should approach the mutineers and induce
them to accept the following terms:
That the men concerned in the recent trouble in the
Army undertake to undo, so far as they can, the mischief created by their actions, and on their so doing
the incident will be regarded as closed.27
The exact meaning of this statement was later disputed by
25The Irish Independent, 19 May, 1924, p.S.
26 Ibid.
27Ireland, Dail Eireann, Official Report
2367.

6 (1924):
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the party members.

McGrath claimed that he was given to

understand that there would be no "victimisation," that the
officers involved in the crisis would be reinstated once the
terms of the agreement had been fulfilled and the manner of
effecting their return had been arranged.28

Some of his

colleagues in the Cabinet disagreed and denied that any
promises had been made or any "bargain struck" with the
mutineers.29

Instead, they claimed that they had only

agreed to treat the men involved in the crisis in an "extraordinary fashion," that is, not to charge them with mutiny.
Rather, they would provide the mutineers with a way out of
their difficulties by offering them lenient terms and enabling them to retreat from the position of the ultimatum.
Thus, the Cabinet hoped to avoid any further trouble.30
The mutineers stated that the Government and the
Party, through McGrath, had offered them the following
terms, which they had accepted:
(a) The setting up of a Committee of Enquiry into Army
administration.
In the event of this Committee finding
for the removal of the members of the Army Council, they
to be replaced by neutral officers who were not connected with either side.
28Ibid.
29Ibid., col.2407.
30p. Hogan, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/24, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
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(b) The personnel of the Army to be reviewed with the
object of making it an I.R.A. Army. All men with active
service records, even though demobilised, to be placed,
so long as the Army estimates did not exceed 4,000,000
pounds.
(c) Suitable arrangements to be arrived at whereby
all our officers and men would return to their posts
with any arms removed from same, it being distinctly
understood that there would be no victimisation. There
were to be no further raids or arrests, and both sides
were to co-operate in preserving order.31
In fact, on Harch 12, 1924, the Executive council
decided to institute a full enquiry into the administration
of the army.

The Minister for Industry and Commerce was to

be consulted about the manner in which the investigation
would be conducted.

The Cabinet minutes state very clearly

that the proposed enquiry was established because of the
discussion in the Dail the previous day.3 2

Obviously, this

refers to McGrath's charges of muddling, mishandling and
incompetency in the army.
tially true.

More than likely, this is par-

The Government did want to avoid a full scale

discussion in the Dail on the army and the promise of an
inquiry would satisfy and silence McGrath.

However, the

l'.rmy .Inquiry Committee was probably also a result of the
party meeting and the bargain concluded with the mutineers.
Further proof of this can be seen in the decision of the
Executive Council at that same meeting to adopt a moderate
position towards the mutinous officers.

Whether McGrath

misunderstood the intentions of the Government, whether he
31The Truth About the Army Crisis, pp.l3-14.
32rreland, SPOD, Cabinet minutes, C2/64.
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was deliberately misled or whether he pursued an independent
policy is not clear.

In any event, the tabinet decided that

those officers who had absconded with arms, when arrested,
should be afforded the opportunity to restore the stolen
property and, then, be released on parole.

Furthermore, the

cases of those officers who had resigned were to be individually reviewed by the Minister for Defence who would make
recommendations to the Executive Council, who would decide
what action should be taken. 33

This was certainly not., how-

ever, carte blanche reinstatement.
During the afternoon of March 12, Cosgrave announced
to the Dail the government's intention to establish an Army
Inquiry Committee.

This had the desired effect on HcGrath

and he announced that he would make no further statement,
neither elaborating nor corroborating the charges he had
made the previous day against the Ministry of Defence.

When

the Dail resumed later that same evening, the President disclosed that he had received a second document from Tobin and
Dalton rescinding the original ultimatum.

These two officers

stated that they had sent the earlier document "with the
sole object of exposing to the Government and the representatives of the people what we consider to be a serious
menace to the proper administration of the Army."34

The

mutineers went on to profess their loyalty and allegiance
3 3 rbid.
34The Truth About The Army Crisis, p.l4.
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to the state,

~cknowledging

the supremacy of civil author-

ity over the military and deploring the detrimental effects
of sections and organisations within the army which they
realized tended to nsap allegiance from the only and proper
constitutional authority, viz, the Government of the people
which we fully recognise." 35

Tobin and Dalton concluded

that they would be satisfied if their actions resulted in
the army situation being corrected.
Treaty

~-1as

made.

No mention of ,the

The mutineers explained that this second

document was written in return for the government's promises and was delivered to the President "to enable the
Government to explain its change of front to the Dail and
the public."36
Upon receipt of the second Tobin-Dalton letter,
the government's official attitude toward the mutiny underwent a volte face.

No longer was it a serious threat to the

democratic institutions of the Free State.

As of March 12,

it was merely a foolish action, not to be taken at face
value.

The government's position was articulated by Kevin

O'Higgins.

Although acknowledging that the original ulti-

matum constituted "mutiny plus treason," the Minister for
Home Affairs revealed that the Executive Council had determined that this document was merely a reaction against
abuses and irregularities in the army.
35 rbid.
36rbid.

The mutiny had been

r

171
germinating for some time and thus the need for an inquiry.
The investigation into the administration of the army would
decide the validity of the charges McGrath levelled against
Mulcahy and his department.

The other members of the Execu-

tive Council, according to O'Higgins, had been too preoccupied with their own Departments to have had "any intimate
or detailed knowledge of Army administration, sufficient
knowledge, sufficient information, to enable them to form a
definite view as to whether the Minister for Industry and
Commerce would be right in what he would say, or the Minister
for Defence?"37
The Minister further explained that the government
had been wrong in its original evaluation of the ultimatum.
Although Tobin and Dalton might have used the parlence of
mutiny, that was not what they really meant.

He explained:

if the document were taken at its face value it
would be simply the Four Courts situation over again.
It was represented to us that it need not be taken, and
ought not to be taken, at its face value •••• We were
told that these men, while they might have written a
foolish, an almost criminally foolish document, were not
really taking up the position of challenging the fundamental right of the people to decide political issues
here, whether these issues be domestic or international.38
The Vice-President justified the government's new policy on
the basis of enlightened pragmaticism: "It is all opportunism, if you wish, but in the handling of national affairs,
3 7 Ireland, Dail Eireann, Official Report 6 (1924):
2001.
3 8 Ibid., cols.l997-1998.
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and in the handling of very delicate situations, there must
needs be opportunism." 39
doctrinaire.

Sometimes it was best not to be

O'Higgins pointed out that a special relation-

ship existed between the army and the government because
these men could claim responsibility for the birth of the
Free State.

Although this unique situation demanded a less

rigid attitude on the part of the Executive Council, the
Cabinet, without question, would not allow any challenge to
the authority of Parliament and the supremacy of the people
to go unanswered.
The Deputies were not satisfied with the government's explanation.

Serious charges had been levelled

against a Department of State and they wanted further information.

They were not content to wait for the proposed

inquiry, about which they had been given no details.

Further-

more, the Dail deputies demanded to know more specifically
about the government's handling of the mutiny.
the current status of the officers involved?

What was
What action

did the government propose to take against them?

This was

especially important since they were still in possession of
stolen arms and equipment, despite the protestations of
loyalty and good intentions contained in the second letter.
The Government refused to elaborate.

Concerning

the proposed inquiry, the President merely said that the
details had not yet been decided.
39rbid~ col.2000.
~

He did not say whether
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the officers involved in the crisis would be retained in
the army, nor did he offer any idea as to how the Government
intended to deal with these men.

Cosgrave simply ignored

Mr. Johnson's query as to why Tobin and Dalton were still
using their military titles.

All that O'Higgins said,

regarding the cause of the mutiny, was: "Steps were taken
to deal with that situation; immediate steps.

Steps are

still being taken to deal with that situation.• 40

No one

from the Government benches mentioned any kind of negotiations or arrangements made with the mutineers, either
directly or through an intermediary.

O'Higgins did not

disclose who informed the government of the real attitude
of the mutineers, that the ultimatum was not to be taken at
face value.

Moreover, Cosgrave even claimed he did not

know how the second document came into his possession. 41
All the Ministers totally neglected the role of McGrath.
Obviously, one suspects that President Cosgrave received
the second document from McGrath and simply thought it
politic at this point not to involve directly one of his
Ministers of State in the mutiny.

All in all, the actions

of the government were reminiscent of the worst features of
political back-room dealings.
stated:
40rbid., col.l996.
4lrbid., col.2018.

As an editorial in the Irish
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Mutiny is mutiny, and, with all respect for Kevin
O'Higgins, who must have been acutely. uncomfortable
yesterday, twenty-four hours cannot change it into a
merely frank expression of military discontent, not even
twenty-four hours of treatment in the secret alembic of
the Cumann na nGaedheal.42
McGrath's role as the self-appointed mediator between the mutineers and the Government managed to be both
obscure and ubiquitous.

His friendship with the mutineers

dated back to their common association with Collins and his
Squad during the Anglo-Irish war.

He was partially moti-

vated by a sincere desire to help his former comrades attain
suitable positions and to avoid trouble.

While viewing

himself as a peacemaker, he over-estimated the number of
followers of Tobin and Dalton and their influence on the
army. 43

It is also likely that he had personal ambitions

and visions of acceding to power as head of a new party or
as a strong force in a coalition. 44
Although the government elected not to mention
McGrath's role in the army crisis, G.H.Q. was kept fully
informed as to his activities.

Intelligence reports in-

dicated that "the entire situation turns on Joe McGrath.

He

is in complete control of the organisation, through Tobin
etc. and both he and they are of the opinion that he holds
4 2The Irish Times, 13 March 1924, p.6.
43Interview with Lt.-Gen. M.J. Costello, Dublin,
Ireland, 8 September 1975.
44 "Intelligence Report," 1 April 1924, Tobin Mutiny
File, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/196, University College Dublin
Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
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the 'ship hand' in the Government . . . . McGrath says he is
sorry he did not demand more.
man.'" 45

He is hailed as the 'big

Consequently, the Intelligence unit kept a close

watch on the Minister for Industry and Commerce.

It follow-

ed his activities so carefully that when, on March 16, the
army authorities arrested one of the mutineers, Captain
George Ashton, and the possibility of trouble arose, it was
able to report on the Minister's telephone conversation with
the President and the Vice-President.

That evening,

McGrath called Cosgrave, who was ill and unable to come to
the phone.

Then he telephoned O'Higgins and informed him

that Ashton's arrest would create trouble "unless it was
seen to." 46
Mulcahy.

O'Higgins asked him why he did not approach

Eventually McGrath agreed to call the Minister

for Defence.

Obviously, the army was taking the mutiny

much more seriously than the government and was zealously,
perhaps over-zealously, trying to guard against any unforeseen developments.
McGrath was also involved in the government's discussions concerning the terms to be offered the mutineers.
Mulcahy had suggested that, due to the similarity of their
statements, the resignations of officers from various parts
of the country were part of a conspiracy which "did not
45 "Daily Summary of Intelligence," 14 March 1924,
Mutiny Intelligence, Mulcahy Papers, RM 50/13/15, University
College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
46Ibid., 16 March 1924.
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intend to confine itself to resignation alone."47

Therefore,

the President should immediately accept these resignations,
and not give them the opportunity to reconsider.

Further~

more, Mulcahy thought that those officers who had left their
posts or

\'~ere

absent "'i thout leave should be charged with a

suitable offence as part of a conspiracy to mutiny.

Pending

the investigation of a court martial, they would be allowed
out under open arrest.
ed with

a~ms

For those officers who had

abscond~

or taken other definite action, the Minister

believed that they should not only be charged, but also held
under close arrest until they returned the stolen material.
Only then would he consider their being allowed out under
open arrest. 48
However, after the President consulted with UcGrath,
Mulcahy aod O'Duffy, the Executive Council decided on more
lenient terms.

Cosgrave communicated this to McGrath, 49 and

Mulcahy ioformed the senior officers of the
memorandu~

army~

In a

dated March 18, to the Chief of Staff, the Adju-

tant-General, and the Quartermaster-General, the Minister
for Defence informed them that the mutineers were to be
dealt wi to,

11

from the point of view of arrest on the lines

indicated:
4 7 "Memorandum, 11 15 March 1924, Tobin Mutiny File,
Mulcahy Papers, P?/B/196, University College Dublin Archives,
Dublin, rreland.
48 Ibid.
49Ireland, SPOD, Cabinet minutes, C2/67.
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1. By Thursday, the 20th instant at 6 p.m. all arms
and equipment removed from barracks to be returned
to the place or places from which they were taken.
2. Persons concerned in the removal of such material
to surrender at the place from which such material was
taken to the officer now in charge of that place.
3. After such surrender on presenting parole to the
officer in charge such parole will be accepted, and
the persons concerned allowed out under open arrest.
4. Absentees from duty shall also surrender by 6 p.m.
on Thursday, the 20th instant, and on their parole
being presented, it will be accepted. They will be
allowed out under open arrest.
5. Thursday is only mentioned as a convenient date to
allow a certain amount of time, but it is desirable
that no delay should be occasioned in giving effect
to the terms of paragraphs 1,2,3, and 4.50
What the government intended to do with the men who
surrendered is not clear.

The orders from the Adjutant-

General to the G.O.C.'s referred to an investigation of
charges and a trial by court martia1.51

However, McGrath,

while denouncing the government's terms as being ndeliberately framed to make it as bitter as possible for those men
to swallow," claimed that he told the mutineers that nthey
would have to surrender their arms and to go through whatever machinery was necessary to maintain discipline in the
Army and to get back to their positions and to do what they
could in restoring the status quo."52

Thus, McGrath

50 "Memorandum, 11 18 March 1924, Tobin Mutiny File,
Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/196, University College Dublin Archives,
Dublin, Ireland.
51 Tobin Mutiny File, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/196,
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
52Ireland, Dail Eireann, Official Report 6 (1924):
2370.
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interpreted the government's position as being that, although some type of disciplinary action would be brought
against these men, they would be reinstated.

What is clear

is the intention of the Executive Council to have the officers involved in the mutiny turn themselves in voluntarily
as soon as possible and thus avoid any precipitous action on
either side.
Meanwhile, General Eoin O'Duffy had become dissatisfied with his ne,., position as General Officer Commanding the Defence Forces.

O'Duffy was unclear about his exact

status and uncertain as to what was his relation to the
Defence Council and the Executive Council, and whether he
was empowered to form an advisory committee of the G.O.C.'s.
The Cabinet discussed these issues and decided that O'Duffy
could become a member of the Defence Council if he so
desired, that the Minister for Defence would arrange for him
to see the Executive Council when necessary and that, although he was free to consult with any or all of the Cornrnanding Officers, he should not refer to them as a Council.53
On March 14, the Government enlarged O'Duffy's responsibilities by also appointing him Inspector-General of the Defence
Forces.

Cabinet minutes reveal that a lengthy

discus~ion

was held concerning his powers, duties and functions, and
that "it was arranged that a formal statement of these powers
etc. should be prepared by the Attorney-General in
53rreland, SPOD, Cabinet minutes, C2/63.
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consultation with the Minister for Defence and that the
necessary instructions should be issued by the latter to the
Army. ••54
O'Duffy was not satisfied.

In a letter to the

President, he described his position as "obscure," and
claimed he had found he had not sufficient power.

He said

that he understood that it was the Executive Council's intention that he "should be responsible to the Minister for
Defence for the Defence Forces, and ••• should have full
authority and control over every Department and Service of
the Army." 55

Now it appeared to him that he did not have

such authority.

If he was not given the necessary power,

O'Duffy threatened to resign and return to his position as
Commissioner of the Civic Guard.

The Executive Council,

therefore, decided on March 18 that:
A statement prepared by the Attorney General setting out
the functions of the Inspector General was considered
and approved and it was ordered that it be gazetted
immediately.
An outline of the powers and functions of the G.O.C.
of the Defence Forces having been agreed on, it was
arranged that the Minister for Defence and the AttorneyGeneral should prepare a formal statement of these
powers etc. and submit it to the Executive Council at
its Meeting on the follmdng day. 56
General O'Duffy was to be consulted before any final
54Ireland, SPOD, Cabinet minutes, C2/65~
55Tobin Mutiny File, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/195,
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
56rreland, SPOD, Cabinet minutes, C2/67.
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statement was issued.

The exact status of O'Duffy on March

18 is important because it was the cause· of controversy
between the Cabinet and Mulcahy.

During the evening of

March 18, the Minister for Defence approved military action
against the mutineers.

Mulcahy later claimed that he took

this step (subsequently referred to as the Parnell Street
raid,) without consulting O'Duffy because his official
position had not been formalized.5 7

In this confusion, two

things are evident: 1) that it was the intention of the
Government that O'Duffy should handle the crisis, since he
was brought back into the army for that very purpose; and
2) that, technically, whether O'Duffy was a functioning
Commander-in-Chief, especially in view of his threatened
resignation, was questionable.
General Headquarters had been informed that a meeting of mutinous officers was being held at Devlin's Pub in
Parnell Street, an establishment formerly used by Michael
Collins during the Anglo-Irish war.

There is speculation

that the purpose of the gathering·was to stage a coup or
formulate plans to kidnap the entire Cabinet.

58

Mulcahy

himself may have been worried about the unpredictable nature
of these men.59 In any event, a party of nine soldiers was
57 rreland, Dail Eireann, Official Report 6 (1924):
2276-2277.
58 Leon O'Broin, Revolutionary Underground (Totowa,
New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1976), p.212.
59rnterview with Col. Dan Bryan, Dublin, Ireland,
18 March 1975.
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Upon arrival, they ascertained that

a number of armed mutineers were inside.

Since the troops

had no authority to raid the public house, they informed
the officers inside that they would be arrested as soon as
they came out and then telephoned the Adjutant-General,
O'Sullivan, for further instructions.

O'Sullivan ordered

them to enter the pub, preferably without using force.
Reinforcements were sent.

The government troops surrounded

the area, and evacuated the civilians.

Upon entering the

public house, they found that "the 'Mutineers' had barricaded the stairs and were evidently prepared to fight, as
guns were plainly discernible in the dark." 60

Since a fight

was likely, the Adjutant-General was again telephoned. He
gave orders "to force the place" and arrest the entire party.
Meanwhile, a number of the mutinous officers, possibly
including Tobin and Dalton, escaped across the rooftops.
The government forces then proceeded up the stairs where
they found the mutineers concealed between two roofs.

The

mutineers called for the government troops to surrender.
Colonel MacNeill, the officer in charge of the raid, countered with his own demand of unconditional surrender.

After

MacNeill agreed not to fire on the mutineers, they gave
themselves up.

Eleven officers were arrested.

Seven

revolvers, one automatic weapon and fifty rounds of ammu60"Report on Operations-Parnell Street Area 18/19
March," Tobin Mutiny File, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/196,
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
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'

nition were confiscated.

There were no casualties.

Al-

though no documents were found, a large.quantity of paper
had been torn up, indicating to the commanding officer that
had the troops "arrived an hour later a very interesting
'bag' would have been got, as preparations for a meeting
had been made in one of the rooms in Devlin's."61

Accord-

ing to the mutineers, their offi9ers surrendered because
they realized the "seriousness of the situation" and were
"unwilling to be a party to a new outbreak throughout the
country which would have occurred if blood had been
spilled."62
Sometime between the army's arrival at the pub at
approximately 9:30 and the capture of the officers, some
time after midnight, two of the mutineers unsuccessfully
attempted to telephone various members of the government,
excluding the Minister for Defence.

They probably wanted

to inform them of the army's presence and to ask them to
call off the raid.

Meanwhile, McGrath, accompanied by Mr.

Dan McCarthy, T.D., had arrived at Devlin's and immediately
called Eoin McNeill, the Minister for Education, to inform
him of the army's action.

McNeill then telephoned the

Minister for Defence and told his secretary that a raid was
in progress at the pub and that McGrath was there.

The

secretary offered to have Mulcahy, who was not available at
6lrbid.
62The Truth About the Army Crisis, p.l5.
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that moment, call the Minister back; but McNeill declined,
saying he was just passing on the information he had
received.

The secretary commented that it seemed that

McNeill "wanted to wash his hands of the matter."63

Inter-

estingly, McNeill would later claim that the raid was more
serious and more grave than mutiny.64
The prisoners at Devlin's pub were taken inside the
public house.

McGrath vigorously protested the army's

action, claiming it was neither authorised by the government nor entirely legal since the raiding party only had
warrants for the arrest of three of the men.

The command-

ing officer informed the Minister that his instructions
were to arrest the whole party and that a warrant was not
necessary when officers were engaged in conduct prejudicial
to good order and military discipline.

The military report

of the raid described McGrath as being "very disagreeable"
and stated that he himself would have been detained save
for the fact he was a member of the government and "under
the influence of drink."6S

After the arrests had been

completed, the report to G.H.Q. records the following:
63Memorandum, Tobin Mutiny File, Mulcahy Papers,
P7/B/196, University College Dublin Archives, Dublin,
Ireland.
64Ireland, Dail Eireann, Official Report 6 (1924):
2273.
65"Report on Operations-Parnell Street Area 18/19
March," Tobin Mutiny File, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/196,
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
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"Mr. Joseph McGrath ••• asked permission to stand the
prisoners a drink - permission was not refused in the circumstances."66

The Parnell Street raid, for all practical

purposes, ended any real threat of mutiny.

Attention now

shifted away from the mutineers to the Army Council.
The Executive Council met in the morning of 19 March
1924.

President Cosgrave was ill and thus not in attendance.

The activities of the previous evening sparked a general
debate on the army.

The Cabinet concluded that the Parnell

Street raid had violated government policy and, subject to
the approval of the President, decided to ask for the resignation of the Chief of Staff, the Adjutant-General and the
Quartermaster-General from their administrative posts and
to recommend to the President that the Minister for Defence
be removed.

General O'Duffy was to be placed in complete

control of the army. 67

Mulcahy, having left the Cabinet

meeting to allow further discussion and thus unaware of his
colleagues' position concerning his status, resigned in
protest of the decision to dismiss his staff.
Mulcahy contended that the Parnell Street raid had
been conducted in accordance with the Defence Forces Act,
and even the Executive Council could not circumvent the law.
66rbid. It is interesting to note that when O'Higgins
read this report to the Dail, he omitted, on the advice of
Mulcahy, the description of McGrath as under the influence
of drink. McGrath was obviously aware of the contents of
the report and challenged the Minister to read it, claiming
it was untrue.
67rreland, SPOD, Cabinet minutes, C2/68.
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The arrangement made with the mutineers did not have the
effect of law.

Rather, "it simply advised officers of a

possible attitude that might voluntarily be adopted within
the next few days by officers who had committed offences."6 8
Subsequently, the Adjutant-General, speaking in his own
defence before the Inquiry Committee, supported this position.
He said: "I got no order not to arrest persons chargeable
with any offence; I got a memorandum"69
In response to the Cabinet's decision, Generals
O'Murthuile and O'Sullivan resigned both their administrative posts and their commissions.

General MacMahon, who was

in Cork at the time of the raid, refused to acquiesce unless
the reasons for his dismissal were clearly and specifically
stated.

In a letter to Mulcahy, the Chief of Staff wrote:

I respectfully submit, Sir, that I will not resign as I
consider that an apparently voluntary submission of my
resignation would be equivalent to an expression of
acquiescence in a policy that will ultimately involve
the Army in a political crisis •
... I request ... that I be informed of the nature of
my Military offence and afforded the opportunity, to
which I am entitled, of refuting any such charge or
innuendoes.70
Despite his protests, MacMahon's allegiance was never
68Tobin Mutiny File, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/196,
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
69o•sullivan, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/12, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
70Tobin Mutiny File, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/196,
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
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seriously in doubt.
possibility of

G~H~Q.

When one of his officers suggested the
repudiating the government's measures,

the Chief of Staff reprimanded him sharply. 71

However, be-

cause he refused to resign, the Government relieved him of
his administrative post and withdrew his commission.72
MacMahon's letter exemplifies the difficulties that the Army
Council was confronted with.

Although its members were

being slandered by unnamed accusers, vilified by rumour,
sacrificed to gossip and dismissed without explanation,
military discipline prevented them from retaliating.
MacMahon's resignation provides an insight into the
relationship between O'Higgins and Cosgrave.

The President

wrote to the Executive Council requesting to know the exact
circumstances which had made the dismissal of the Chief of
Staff necessary.

He also protested against learning about

such decisions from the newspapers. 73

O'Higgins informed

him of the particulars and added: "We quite agree with you
that where possible major decisions should not be finally
arrived at without some contact or consultation with you."74
This correspondence reveals that Cosgrave was attempting to
7lrnterview with Lt. Gen. M.J. costello, Dubl~n,
Ireland, 8 September 1975.
72rreland, SPOD, Cabinet minutes, C2/71
73rreland, SPOD, Army Mutiny File, S3678A.
74rbid.

187
protect his prerogatives as President and was certainly not
content to be a passive spectator in the crisis.

It tends

to contradict the interpretation that O'Higgins handled the
army crisis and emerged as the strong man of the Cabinet,75
and supports the view that O'Higgins' strength "has been
exaggerated and Cosgrave's under~estimated."76

Seemingly,

no major decisions \'lere made which Cosgrave did not approve
of.

If a power struggle was being waged within the Cabinet,

the President was trying to keep the ambitions of O'Higgins
in check.

This view is further stxengthened by an examina-

tion of a minor yet significant inciden·t involving the President's decision to assume, upon Mulcahy's resignation, the
portfolio of the Minister for Defence.

With Cosgrave still

not in attendance, the Executive Council, subject to the
President's approval, decided that the following statement
should be issued to the Press:
The President has decided, subject to the approval of
Dail Eireann, to take up the duties of the Ministry of
Defence. During the illness of the President~ the VicePresident will act for him in that Ministry.7t
·
After consultation with the President, the statement was
amended to read:
75calton Younger, Ireland~s Civil War {London:
Fontana Books, 1968), p.582.
76 Brian Farrell, Chairman or Chief (Dublin: Gill and
Macmillan, 1971), p.24.
77 Ireland, SPOD, Cabinet minutes, C2/69.
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The President had decided, subject to the approval of
Dail Eireann~ to undertake the duties of the Ministry
of Defence.?~
In the Dail, the Government announced its dismissal
of the Army Council.
enlightening.

The ensuing debate itself was not very

Little or no protest, except for Mulcahy's

speeches, was made over the firing of the three generals or
the resignation of the Minister for Defence.

However, the

mutineers, their raison d'etre, their grievances, and their
future received a great deal of attention.

The men who put

down the mutiny were being treated severely while the men
who actually threatened the State were being petted and pampered.

This anomaly resulted from the need of the Government

and the Dail to assert their control over the leaders of the
army, their fear of the power the army had accumulated
during the civil war and the anti-military spirit which had
developed as a reaction against the horrors, the excesses
and even the very fact of the civil war.

Moreover, the

mutineers had a number of Deputies who were quite prepared
78Ibid. Mrs. Mulcahy relates an interesting incident
about O'Higgins' ambitions. She says that "At the time of
the blow up when Dick resigned and he (O'Higgins) went to
the trouble of telling him he would have had to resign in
any case- he needn't have said that- but at that time •..
Mrs. Cosgrave came to see me and she said 'O'Higgins is
terrible' and more or less sympathised with me about Dick
and then she said, 'he is after Willie, he wants Willie to
resign.'
I never heard any more after that about it. I
think she gave me to understand that he came to see him and
told him to resign and of course we both came to the conclusion that what O'Higgins wanted was to be the head of
everything himself". Conversation between Hays and Mulcahy,
22 Oct. 1964, Mulcahy Papers, P7/D/78, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
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to press their case for them and to convince the Government
and the Dail that the mutiny was merely a foolish reaction
to the injustice and the abuses of the army.
alone..

Mulcahy stood

The promise of an Army Inquiry Committee effectively

precluded the possibility of an informative and detailed
debate.
Kevin O'Higgins once again argued the case for the
government.

He began by reviewing the events of the army

crisis and then stated that the Parnell Street raid, undertaken without the knowledge and consent of O'Duffy, appointed specifically to deal with the crisis, could have resulted
in disaster.

He explained that the Executive Council regard-

ed the raid as:
••. cutting across what was Government intention and
Government policy with regard to an extremely delicate
national position. But I do not want any Deputy nor any
member of the general public to come to the conclusion
that the resignation of certain high Army officers was
demanded by the Government simply and solely as a result
of last night's activities. That is not the situation.
At a discussion which took place the day after this
document was presented, the view was expressed at the
Executive Council that this particular personnel was
not the personnel to deal with a mutinous revolt.79
He justified the resignations as being in the best interests
of the people and cautioned against interpreting the Government's action as a capitulation to the specific demand of
the mutineers that the Army Council be dismissed.

The

Cabinet had reached its decision, in spite of the ultimatum,
79rreland, Dail Eireann, Official Report 6 (1924):
2215-2216.

not because of it.
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Regardless of how valuable their past

services had been to the State, and regardless of the validity of the charges against them, O'Higgins maintained that
the members of the Army Council were no longer useful and
thus had to be dismissed.

He claimed that ''these officers

are no longer efficient in the Public Service, and have not
a useful future before them in these three administrative
posts."80
O'Higgins charged that the state of the army, racked
by secret societies was not good.

He felt that the army was

not properly subject to impersonal discipline and that
something in the nature of a sense of proprietorship had developed among members of the Army Council.

O'Higgins then

levelled a most serious accusation, charging that the Executive Council feared that "the Army was not unequivocably,
unquestionaly, without reserve, simply the instrument of
the people's will."81
Although restrained by the promise of an Inquiry
which he felt would be the proper forum for an examination
of these matters, the ex-Minister for Defence defended himself and his staff.

Mulcahy informed the Dail that he had

resigned because he could not "stand over condoning mutiny
to such an extent as to foster it and to prejudice discipline
in the Army," and because he did not agree with the changes
80rbid., col.2219.
Blrbid., col. 2217.
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in the administration of the army, especially during the
critical period of reorganisation.8 2

With respect to the

Parnell Street raid, he reiterated what he had argued in the
Cabinet, that the

Adjutant~General

had simply been

ing the law and carrying out his responsibilities.

follow~

The

Executive Council had merely made suggestions as to the terms
to be offered the mutineers.

Neither he nor his subordinates

could be so derelict in their obedience to the military code
nor so lax in maintaining discipline so as to "allow officers, either by deserting their posts, or by taking away
material belonging to the Army, or by engaging in a conspiracy that might have had disastrous results, to talk and meet
openly and publicly in the streets or in the country." 83
Mulcahy explained that he failed to consult O'Duffy
because his position had not been formalized.

He added that

the new Commander-in-Chief's attitude had been that he
"could not take up his responsibilities unless his position
was defined, and he could not be expected to take up his
responsibilities or issue orders until this was done."84
His resentment of the appointment of O'Duffy, whom he considered out of touch with the Army, surfaced and he contended
t.hat someone from within the army should have been appointed.
82rbid., col.2225-2226.
83rbid., col.2226.
84rbid., col.2232.
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Mulcahy emphatically denied the charges otHiggins
had made against the army, claiming that the attitude of the
Executive Council was based on nothing but rumors and gossip.
He defended his staff, pointing out that they had scrupulously kept themselves out of politics and had endeavored to
mold a non-political and disciplined army, despite interference from certain members of the Cabinet.

He revealed that

the Adjutant-General and the Quartermaster-General had
previously informed him that they intended to resign (probably because of growing criticism of their work and themselves) but that he had persuaded them to continue to perform their duties.

Now they were being summarily dismissed

without cause or explanation, simply "told to drop their pens
and clear out."85 In response to O'Higgins' accusation that
the army was not an obedient servant of the State, Mulcahy
pointedly reminded the Dail that it was only because the
army was unquestionably obedient to the Government that the
Cabinet dare dismiss the entire Army Council.

He declared:

I say that it is an absolute mis-statement of fact, and
if people were very concerned from that particular point
of view, I suggest to the Dail they would not take the
extraordinary steps that the Executive Council are taking
to-day in removing the three principal officers of the
Army.86
The ex-Minister for Defence then explained that the serious85Ibid., col.2231.
86Ibid., col.2230.
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ness of the situation had forced him to consider appealing
to the Dail over the Party, but his respect for the Executive Council and his reluctance to interfere with their
work prevented him from taking such action.

He might have

added that it was not in his nature to go against his own
Party and its Government, unlike McGrath who seemed to suffer
from none of these inhibitions.
During the course of the debates, the Government's
attitude fluctuated.

A controversy had arisen over the

Cabinet's treatment of the officers arrested during the
Parnell Street raid.

They had been released on parole on

March 21 after agreeing to the terms set forth by the government in the memorandum of March 18.87

The Executive Council

agreed to extend the deadline for the remaining officers to
surrender.

McGrath objected to this policy.

He maintained

that since the action of the army had violated the agreement made with the mutineers, the arrested men should have
been unconditionally released.
agreed.

O'Higgins, however, dis-

He argued that the detention of the prisoners was

not a violation of the agreement even though their arrest
may have been.

He now claimed that "when it was undeniable

that a mutinous revolt seemed imminent and seemed under
Providence inevitable, it would not be a proper thing to
release these prisoners without at least some assurance
being given by them that they would not become leaders in
87rreland, S~OD, Cabinet minutes, C2/72.
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any such mutinous revolt." 88

O'Higgins' position contradict-

ed his own and his colleagues' earlier claims.

If a "muti-

nous revolt seemed imminent," the army certainly would have
been justified in raiding Devlin's pub.

This new attitude

reflected the true feelings of the government.

The Execu-

tive Council had used the Parnell Street raid to rid itself
of the Army Council and the Minister for Defence.

Despite

long standing problems, the raid was the immediate and
forcing issue used to convince the Cabinet and the Dail to
dismiss the senior officers of the army.

The "worse than

mutiny" act, the Parnell Street raid, was now being vindicated by the very people who six days earlier had condemned
it.
McGrath and his supporters argued that the Government should reinstate the mutineers, that in fact, they had
promised this if the officers would make amends.

The muti-

nous officers had already begun to return the stolen arms
and equipment, although to McGrath and not to their

co~mand

ing officers, as proof of their "sincereity and good faith,"89
and then resigning in protest at what they described as the
"dishonesty, lack of faith and fair dealing" of the Government in extracting concessions from their "hostages."90
88 Ireland, Dail Eireann, Official Report 6 (1924) :
2363.
89The Irish Times, 25 March 1924, p.S.
9°The Truth About the Army

Cr~sis,

p.lS.
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The Government in turn was quite prepared to accept their
resignations with a friendly "'Go in peacie, friend, as a
civilian'" attitude.91

McGrath viewed the government's

attitude as a distinct and definite violation of both the
spirit and substance of prior agreements.

Although no one

seemed particularly concerned with the three generals who
had been unceremoniously dismissed, certain of the Deputies
exhibited a great deal of sympathy for the mutineers, regarding them as misguided and mistreated officers.

Such

senti~

ment seems misplaced.

The generals may have technically

violated the spirit of

gonver~ment

policy but only to quell

a rebellion, not foment one.
Although O'Higgins publicly disclaimed any suggestion that the Executive Council in dismissing the Army
Council had acquiesced to the mutineers, the appearance of
surrender was strong, especially since the reorganisation of
the army had been delayed,9 2 partially meeting another of
the mutineers' demands.

As an editorial in the Irish Times

pointed out:
Everybody will agree with Mr. O'Higgins that the establishment of discipline in the Army is a vital necessity;
but most people, \ve think, will have much sympathy with
General Mulcahy's position. Mutiny has been condoned,
and resignation has been the fate of those responsible
persons who refused to condone it. Soldiers are simple
91Ireland, nail Eireann, Official Report 6 (1924):
2365.
92

IbJ.'d., co 1 . 2425 .
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men, but they can put 'two and two together. 1 The 'two
and two' in this case are represented by the facts that
the mutinous ultimatum demanded the removal of the Army
Council and that the Army Council has been removed.93
The mutineers themselves felt that the dismissal of the Army
Council was a justification of their actions. 94

Neverthe-

less, no serious repercussions resulted from the removal of
the Council, no acts of revenge or retaliation by members
of the army loyal to their leaders, a fact which must stand
as a tribute to the work of the Army Council in molding an
obedient and disciplined force.
The Army Mutiny of 1924 was the final echo of the
Civil War.

It represented the last vestige of the Volunteer

mentality, of an independent political army.

The situation

caused by the mutineers precipitated a Cabinet crisis during
which two Ministers resigned and it brought the conflict
between O'Higgins and Mulcahy to a climax.

Their antagonism

had not been personal (O'Higgins had recommended Mulcahy to
succeed Collins as chairman of the Provisional Government)
but rather the result of differences in temperment, technique and personality. Each in his own way had been responsible for their differences and consequently the strain in
the Cabinet.
O'Higgins was obsessed both with his belief that the
army was inefficient and not disciplined, and with the alleged
93The Irish Times, 20 March 1924, p.6.
9 4The Truth About the Army Crisis, p.l5.

r
197
His acquaint-

influence of the I.R.B. on its senior officers.

ance with and knowledge of both were slight and thus he
allowed himself to be affected by complaints and grievances,
most of which were the natural result of massive demobilization and reorganisation.

His fear and distrust of the I.R.B.

stemmed from the fact it was a secret society.

He mis-

interpreted the propaganda of the American wing of the
Brotherhood concerning the necessity and desirability of a
thirty-two county republic for Ireland, believing it representative of the Irish sector. 95

Moreover, he seemed un-

aware both of the very real problems which the army, because
of its origins, had to overcome, and the significant progress
it had actually made.
Mulcahy can be criticized for his insensitivity to
the needs and fears of his civilian colleagues whose experience with the Irregular revolt had made them leary of
the army's power.

His failure to keep his colleagues totally

informed, even though the demands of his office were overwhelming, was not only not politic but also created an atmosphere in which rumor and suspicion could flourish.
Mulcahy resented criticism of and interference with his
department.

The Parnell Street episode exemplified his

attitude of handling army affairs in his own way.

His

resentment of and failure to consult with O'Duffy gives
95Interview with Lt. Gen. M.J. Costello, Dublin,
Ireland, 8 September 1975.
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credence to the view that Mulcahy continued, albeit unconsciously, to act as both the Minister for Defence and the
Commander-in-Chief.9 6
The traditional interpretation of the mutiny has
been that the decisive action of O'Higgins upheld the principle of civilian control of the army. 97

Although the

events of the mutiny certainly reiterated and reinforced the
authority of the government over the military, the policy of
the Executive Council did not support this concept.

Rather,

it was the acquiescence of the Army Council in resigning at
the request of the Cabinet.

The Government's policy had

been one of compromise, vascillation aildinconsistency. Despite the excuses and allegations, the fact remains that the
Cosgrave government was willing to come to terms with men
who had threatened the State.
resigned

fro~

The mutineers voluntarily

the army; they were not court martialed.

Only with respect to the three generals did the Cabinet act
in a determined manner.

By submitting their resignations on

the demand of the government, and by appearing before the
Army Inquiry Committee a few weeks later, the Army Council
adhered to and upheld the principle that the Irish Army was
subordinate to the Irish Government.

If the Army Council had

96Interview with Col. Dan Bryan, 18 March 1975,
Dublin, Ireland.
97 see, for example, F.S.L. Lyons, Ireland Since the
Famine, and John A. Murphy, Ireland in the Twent1eth Century.
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defiantly refused to obey and had publicly argued that it
was being sacrificed to the demands of the mutineers, it
would have moved Ireland to the verge of another civil war,
and raised the specter of a military dictatorship.

The

resignations of Mulcahy, MacMahon, O'Sullivan, and
O'Murthuile were visible proof of their beliefs and set an
important precedent vis-~-vis the role of the army in the
Irish Free State.

Their actions dramatically demonstrated

their adherence to the precepts of democratic rule and to
the right of the people to determine the direction of the
State.

The Civil War was finally over.

CHAPTER VI
THE ARMY INQUIRY COW1ITTEE
To allay criticism and embarrassing questions and
to satisfy the demands of McGrath and the mutineers, the
government established the promised committee to investigate
the recent disturbances in the army.
highly effective device.

It proved to be a

By the time the Committee had

issued its report in June of 1924, both the political and
the military crises had been sufficiently defused to preclude any attempt on the part of Dail Eireann to reignite
them.
The mandate of the Committee was "to enquire into
the facts and matters which have caused or led up to the
indiscipline and mutinous or insubordinate conduct lately
manifested in the Army." 1

The terms of reference were ex-

panded to include an investigation into the state of discipline and an evaluation of the charges of "muddling, mismanagement and incompetency in the administration of the
army."2

Ironically, the events of the mutiny itself were

outside the scope of the Inquiry.

The members of the Com-

lireland, Dail Eireann, Official Report 6 (1924):
2502.
2rbid.:2502-2503.
200

r

201
mittee were: J. Creed Meredith, chairman, a judge who in
the

pre~l916

period had been one of Redmond's nominees to

the Volunteer Executive; Gerald Fitzgibbon, a former deputy
of the Dail; P. McGillian, Minister for Industry and Commerce,
succeeding McGrath, D.J. Gorey, T.D., and Major Bryan Cooper,
T.D., representing three of the major parties in the Dail,
Cumann na nGaedheal, the Farmers Party and the Independents,
respectively.

The Labour Party refused to nominate anyone

because its leadership felt that the inquiry should be a
committee of the Dail, responsible solely to it, with all
the power and stature such status would confer, and not
merely a departmental committee appointed by the Executive
Council.3

The Committee as finally established by the govern-

ment was severely handicapped.

It had no power of subpoena,

nor right to examine witnesses under oath.

Moreover, the

hearings were to be closed to the public.
Mulcahy and the three generals dismissed from the
Army Council were not satisfied with these arrangements.

In

fact, when the government first announced its intention to
hold an inquiry, the three senior officers wrote to Mulcahy
requesting a public investigation:
We, Sir, by cause of our appointment, have had to suffer
in silence the insinuations and innuendos that the Army
has at its head Officers in whom there is not full confidence. We have also had, for the past year or more
3Ibid.:2481-2842.
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to suffer the interference with Army discipline, with
utter disreg~rd of consequences, displayed by certain
Army Officers and others who have now, by threats of
revolution and mutiny, created a situation unprecedented
in the history of regularly governed countries.4
Consequently, they requested an inquiry in order »to be in
a position to establish a case in public and to place the
responsibility for these recent regrettable happenings on
the proper shoulders regardless of what may be thus involved."S

Mulcahy pressed the government for a public in-

vestigation under expanded terms of reference to delve into
the actual events of the mutiny and which would be fully
empowered to compel testimony under oath and assess responsibility.

However, he did not agree to accept the Govern-

ment's limited format in order to "see the nature of the
evidence in black and white, and in order to give myself
and the officers concerned in this inquiry an opportunity
of putting down in black and white what we desire to put
down." 6

Clearly believing that any investigation into the

recent crisis and the charges made against the army would
vindicate the Army Council, he wanted an opportunity to
defend himself and his staff.
Thus, despite their dissatisfaction, Mulcahy and
4Tobin Hutiny File, ~-iulcahy Papers, P?/B/196,
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
5 rbid.
6rreland, Dail Eireann, Official Report 6 (1924):
2825.

203
the th:r:;-ee generals represented by legal counsel, agreed to
appear before the Inquiry~

However, neither McGrath, who

levelled the accusation against the Army Council, nor the
mutineers, who precipitated the crisis, would testify before
the Committee, despite the Presidentts promise that there
would be no victimisation,7 and the Executive Council's
decision that no criminal prosecution or charge ·\-.rould .·result
from any testimony.8

Because it lacked the power to subpoena,

the Inquiry could not compel their testimony.

The

Tobin~

Dalton group claimed that, since the government had broken
previous agreements and had not dealt with them in good
faith, to recognize and attend the Inquiry "after the lesson
we had learned would have been to invite the authorities to
fool us once again and to lend ourselves to the fooling of
the nation."9 McGrath tried to persuade them to participate,
but failed.

Therefore, the ex-Minister himself decided he

could neither appear as their spokesman nor substantiate his
charges against the Army Council without the corroborating
testimony of the mutineers. 10
7Ibid.:2669.
8Ireland, State Paper Office (hereinafter cited as
SPOD), Cabinet minutes, C2/81.
9The Truth About the Army Crisis, with a Foreword
by Major-General Liam Tobin, Issued by the Irish Republican
Army Organisation, Summerhill, Dublin, p.lS. (Hereinafter
cited as The Truth About the Army Crisis.)
lOireland, SPOD, Army Hutiny File, S3678B.
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The Committee held forty-one meetings, and examined
twenty~seven

witnesses.

Itts discussions ranged from the

very serious charges of the Minister for Home Affairs to the
complaint of an officer concerning the amount of S\vearing
that went on in the army.

Generally, the hearings dealt with

four main topics: 1) the origins of the mutiny; 2) demobilization; 3) the role and status of the Irish Republican
Brotherhood; and 4) the general condition of the army.

After

its investigation was completed, the Committee submitted an
official report, subsequently published, to the Executive
Council.

In reality, however, there were two reports.

The

Chairman, Meredith, signed the published report subject to
reservations.

He submitted his reservations in his own

draft report to the Cabinet, which was not published because
it contained portions of the evidence presented to the
Committee, which was not to be made public. 11

Meredith felt

that he could in good faith sign the official report because
it contained no positive statement with which he did not
agree.l 2

However, his unpublished conclusions went beyond

the official findings and strongly criticized Mulcahy and
his handling of the crisis.

Nevertheless, although believ-

ing that Mulcahy may have been guilty of "mismanagement,"
he did not feel that the charges of "muddling or incompetence"
11 Ireland, SPOD, Cabinet minutes, C2/106 and C2/108.
12"Chairman's Draft Report," Mulcahy Papers,
P7/C/41, University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
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could be sustained,l3
With respect to the genesis of the mutiny and the
development of the old I.R.A. organisation, the Committee
confirmed Intelligence reports of the period and the evaluation of General Headquarters on the Tobin-Dalton faction.
The Committee felt that the men involved in the mutiny had
been a problem even before the death of Michael Collins and
that their grievances concerned their loss of power and
position, which were exacerbated by the fact that some, at
least, aspired to positions for which they were not qualified.14

During the course of the hearings, the Committee

learned that many of the officers participating in the mutiny
had been involved in some of the most dangerous assignments
of the Anglo-Irish war.

However, although they may have

been good "gunmen," they had difficulty accepting discipline
and submitting to authority.lS

One witness even claimed that

the strain of their war-time activities had caused them to
suffer a kind of shell shock.l 6 They naturally gravitated to
1 3Ibid.
14 Ireland, Executive Council, Army Inquiry Committee,
Report, 1924, p.6.
15o•sullivan, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/12, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
16Russell, Testimony before the Army Inquiry Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/29, University College Dublin
Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
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one another and formed an organisation based on a common
sense of anger and frustration.

They had looked upon Collins

as their leader, spokesman and protector, and were antagonistic to the new leadership at G.H.Q.l7

In effect, the

mutineers felt let down and left out.
The Committee heard conflicting testimony on the
efficacy of the policy pursued by the Army Council once it
became aware of the serious threat posed by the old 1.R.A.
Sean Hac.r·1ahon, the ex-Chief of Staff, described how G.H.Q.
viewed the potential mutineers:
We •.yere a\vare of the existence of the Tobin Organisation and on January 1st we decided that the information
we had as to their intentions was such that we could
not have anything to do with them in the matter of
parley, that our duty was to see that Army Officers were
reasoned back to their simple Army allegiancei that the
time must come when if it is not possible to do this,
these Officers must be asked to resign from the Army,
that the Army must be our first and last consideration.l 8
Professor Hogan criticized such a policy, maintaining that
the members of the old I.R.A. should have been dealt with as
soon as it became clear that these men were trying to seduce
other officers away from their allegiance to the army and
attempting to foment rebellion. 1 9 Mulcahy, in his defence,
17 Professor Hogan, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/25, University College Dublin
Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
18

.
b e f ore the Army Inqu1.ry
.
.Hac:Ha h on, Test1mony
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/14, University College Dublin
Archives, Dublin, Ireland.

19Professor Hogan, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/25, University College Dublin
Archives, Dublin, Ireland.

207
testified that once the reorganisation scheme had been completed, duties clearly allocated, and a greater opportunity
to retrain officers available, the trouble would have evaporated.

However, interference in the internal workings of

the army and encouragement given by the politicans to the
mutineers prevented this. 20

Such interference and encour-

agement were reoccurring themes throughout Mulcahy's
testimony.
The Inquiry Committee vindicated the attitude of
the Army Council with respect to the mutineers.

It held

that the old I.R.A. was a mutinous organisation bent on
using the army for political purposes and engaged in conduct
contrary to the dictates of military discipline.

Specifi-

cally, the Report stated:
That the organisation of which they were members did not
regard the Army as a non-political servant of the State,
but as an engine to be used if necessary, and to be kept
in a condition to be used, for that purpose or obtaining personal and political objectives. That they contemplated the use of the Army, so controlled for the
purpose of imposing their views upon the Civil Government .
••• They attempted to dictate to G.H.Q. and to the Government upon Army administration, putting forward claims as
a group and relying upon their organised force in support of their contentions.
That their objects, and the methods by which they desired
and attempted to achieve them, were wholly incompatible
with discipline and the obedience which an Army must
render to the Government of any Constitutional State.21
2 0Mulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/10, University College Dublin
Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
2 1Ireland, Executive Council, Army Inquiry Committee,
Report, 1924, p.6.
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However, Chairman Meredith strongly criticised
Mulcahy's attitude in his dealings with the mutineers during
the summer of 1923.

Overall, the Chairman believed that

Mulcahy did not handle the problems of the old I.R.A. officers "in a direct and straightforward manner."22

He felt

that Mulcahy should have been more sympathetic to the grievances of the members of the old I.R.A. and that his behaviour toward them was inconsistent and misleading.
Meredith claimed that the written assurance which Mulcahy
gave the mutineers 23 created the impression that he "was
willing, at least in his private capacity, to go behind the
back of the Cabinet and join hands with an [mutinous and
political] organisation

and assist the organisation in

getting control of the Army for a particular purpose."24
Furthermore, Mulcahy's subsequent failure to answer the
specific demands of the old I.R.A. led them to believe they
had been "tricked", caused them to feel "exasperated," and
intensified their sense of grievance. 25

Meredith also de-

rided Mulcahy for not being sufficiently appreciative of the
serious problem posed by the mutineers and for not antic22"chairman's Draft Report," Hulcahy Papers,
P/7/C41, University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
23see Correspondence of 25 July 1923, Chapter 4,
pp.l49-150.
24"Chairman's Draft Report," Mulcahy Papers,
P/7/C41, University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
25Ibid.

r

209
ipating

trouble~

Although believing that, once the old

I.R.A. came into existence, mutiny was basically inevitable
Meredith felt that Nulcahy's handling of the situation "in
his own way" was not calculated to reduce the threat but
rather to increase it.

He charged that, given all the cir-

cumstances, "it is impossible to exonerate General Mulcahy
from all blame in respect of his handling of the admittedly
difficult problem of dealing with the I.R.A. Organisation
and the group that promoted it.

There was mismanagement on

his part."26
Meredith's criticism of Mulcahy is only partially
valid.

The attitude of the ex-Minister for Defence toward

the potential mutineers was ambiguous, and to a degree,
inconsistent.

With two months hindsight, Meredith had no

trouble arguing that a different course would have been
wiser.

However, Meredith's analysis and judgment of Mulcahy's

action, displays a distinct lack of understanding of the
climate of the times and the history from which the army
emerged.
Mulcahy's dealings with the old I.R.A. paralleled,
to a large extent, Collins' meetings with the Irregulars
prior to the Civil War, both men entering into negotiations
to preserve army unity.

Mulcahy himself alluded to the

tragedy of the Civil War when he told the representatives of
the mutineers that he wished to keep open the lines of
2 6 rbid.
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communication, having witnessed the disaster which resulted
from the breakdown in negotiations in 1·922. 27

Moreover, the

timing of the crisis, closely following the conclusion of
the Civil War, in an atmosphere permeated with violence and
punctuated by a quick readiness to resort to the gun, must
have influenced Mulcahy's actions and reactions.

Understand-

ably, the Commander-in-Chief would have wanted to avoid a
showndown by stalling for time.

This strategy was also

designed to give the reorganisation plan itself an opportunity to smooth over the difficulties.

In stating in his

report that "if you have a cause you can stand over, the
time is always ripe to face problems in a direct and
forward manner,"28

straight~

Heredith displayed an acute lack of aware-

ness of the political and military realities of the situation.

Maintaining stability, the upcoming elections and

pressure from his Cabinet colleagues were all factors contributing to Mulcahy's attitude and actions towards the old
I.R.A.
Meredith's charge that Hulcahy was guilty of complicity with and gave his approval to the mutineers because
of his written assurance is unfair.

Mulcahy, not unlike

most other nationalists of the time, in all likelihood, did
27Tobin Mutiny File, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/195,
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
28"Chairrnan's Draft Report," Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/41,
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
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ultimately desire a totally free and independent Ireland.
To admit this, however, is not to say that he would have used
his position or person, in any way, to effect such a change.
He himself clearly stated that this was a personal and not
a Ministerial feeling.

Mulcahy's view that the army was a

non-political servant of the state not only was a constant
theme in his speeches and correspondence but was also certainly supported by his actions.

To suggest otherwise is at

best a gross misrepresentation of his position.
In examining the problem of demobilisation, the
Committee stated: "We believe that in all the circumstances
the Army Council honestly endeavoured to deal fairly with
the question of demobilisation.n29

In light of the testi-

mony presented, it concluded that the process of demobilisation was fraught with difficulties and complications.

The

large number of men who were to be released, the high rate
of unemployment, the claims of pre-Truce soldiers, the
problem of territorial rivalries, and the transition to a
peace-time force were all factors which were calculated to
increase the pressure and tension which normally accompanies
mass demobilisation.

In addition, the Committee cited "the

fact that the interval between the cessation of hostilities
and the promulgation of a demobilisation scheme gave opportunities for the development of a certain amount of organised
2 9Ireland, Executive Council, Army Inquiry Committee,
Report, 1924, p.S.
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opposition to demobilisation," and that sufficient time had
not been available to develop a "non-political and purely
soldier type of mind in the Army," as factors which helped
put a severe strain on Army administration. 30

The Committee

believed that the first overt act of mutiny was the refusal
of a group of officers at the Curragh to accept their
demobilisation papers.

Although not of the opinion that

this caused the later mutinous acts, the Committee felt ''it
may have influenced subsequent mutineers by producing the
impression that mutinous conduct would not be severely
punished."31
With respect to the retention of ex-British soldiers
in the army, one of the constant complaints of the old I.R.A.,
the consensus of the testimony was that this issue had been
used for propaganda purposes and had become a rallying point
for the dissidents, a common grievance around which otherwise disparate individuals could unite.32

General MacMahon

provided the Committee with some interesting statistics.
According to him, the number of ex-officers from other armies
who had been retained in the army was 155, 80 of whom had
3oibid.
31Ibid., p.s.
32costello, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/25, University College Dublin
Archives, Dublin, Ireland; Russell, Testimony before the
Army Inquiry Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/29, University
College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland; Professor Hogan,
Testimony before the Army Inquiry Committee, Hulcahy Papers,
P7/C/25, University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
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had pre-Truce service.

Of the remaining 75, 40 were tech-

nical officers with specialized skills, such as medical or
legal training.

Furthermore, Mad1ahon estimated that before

reorganisation, the army had been composed of approximately
25 per cent post-Truce and 75 per cent pre-Truce officers.
After reorganisation, approximately 90 per cent were preTruce officers and only 10 per cent post-Truce.33

Problems

seemingly existed with the type of individuals who were
being retained, some of whom may have been associated with
the British forces during the Anglo-Irish war.

The Corn...

rnittee concluded that the old I.R.A. Pregarded it as essential that the Army should be officered and controlled by
men of, or in sympathy with, their views and especially that
ex-British officers be elirninated." 34
With respect to the general issue of dernobilisation,
Meredith agreed with the finding of his colleagues.

However,

he strenuously objected to Mulcahy's dealings with the
Cabinet Committee on dernobilisation, which had been set up
following the trouble at the Curragh.

He felt that the

Minister had not given the applicants the special consideration they were promised, but rather, Mulcahy had dismissed
them as being "surplus," after having delayed discussion in
33 MacMahon, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/35, University College Dublin
Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
3 4 Ireland, Executive Council, Army Inquiry Committee,
Report, 1924, p.6.
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the Cabinet Committee by waiting until the final reorganisation scheme had been completed before sending the committee members the appropriate files.

Consequently, the

final lists of officers to be retained, demobilised or
placed on reserve was completed before any action could be
taken by the Cabinet Committee.

Although the Executive

Council had the power to prevent publication of the scheme,
any delay in dealing with this most pressing issue would
have been dangerous.

In effect, Mulcahy thwarted the in-

tentions of the Executive Council in setting up the
Committee. 35
Meredith disputed Mulcahy's claim that the mutiny
would never have developed in the manner in which it did but
for the interference and encouragement given the officers by
certain politicians.

The Chairman believed that both McGrath

and O'Higgins, as members of the Council of Defence and the
former as a participant in the demobilisation committee,
merely acted in accordance with their specified duties.
Meredith viewed Mulcahy's charge of interference as "unproved
and ungenerous" and exonerated McGrath as being a "wellintentioned peacemaker,"

editorializing that "well-intention-

ed peacemakers do not generally fare well in this country,
and Deputy McGrath seems only to have suffered the usual fate
3S"Chairman's Draft Report," Mulcahy Papers,
P7/C/41, University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
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of those who try to throw oil on the troubled waters."36
This was an extremely kind, if not naive, analysis of
McGrath's role.

Although an active peacemaker, McGrath was

also a spokesman for the mutineers, providing them with a
direct line to the Executive Council, and the political leader of a group which included the mutineers themselves and
their vocal supporters.

Meredith obviously chose to ignore

McGrath's healthy political ambitions.

Similar.ly, the Chair-

man does not condemn O'Higgins' relationship with a disgruntled officer which took place without the knowledge of the
~1inister

for Defence and certainly was outside the accepted

code of military conduct.37
The role of the Irish Republican Brotherhood and
its influence on the army was a particularly interesting and
illusive thread which the Committee attempted to untangle.
The role of the I.R.B. had been tangential to the events of
the army crisis.

The old I.R.A. had considered itself a

rival organization to the Brotherhood and had, in their original ultimatum, singled out the Army Council for dismissal
because they believed it was the center of a revitalized
I.R.B.

Moreover, one of the reasons the government decided

that the leaders of the army were no longer useful and not
able to deal with the mutineers was that its members were
associated with the I.R.B.
36 Ibid.
3 7 see below, p.232.

Given the origins of the army
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and the role the Brotherhood had played in the liberation
movement, it was natural that the officers would also have
been members of the I.R.B.

However, the Committee's judg-

ment was that, although there would have been no mutiny but
for the existence of the I.R.A. organisation, "its activities
were intensified by the revival or reorganisation of the
I.R.B. with the encouragement of certain members of the Army
Council, the lack of confidence and want of intercourse
between these two sections of Army officers, and the failure
of both to appreciate their position as servants of the
Sta·te. n38
The status of the Brotherhood was a central issue
for the Army Inquiry Committee.

The I.R.B., like the rest

of the country, had been divided over the Treaty and was
badly, if not, fatally, split during the Civil War.

Current

historical opinion is that "from February 1922 the I.R.B. as
a national organisation ceased to function."39

Because its

Supreme Council failed to act decisively during the crisis
period, the revolutionary movement began to disintegrate,
a process foreshadowed by the earlier action of the I.R.B.
in abdicating its traditional claims that its Supreme Council was the legitimate government of the Republic and its
head, the president of such a government.

Obviously, its new

38

Ireland, Executive Council, Army Inquiry Committee,
Report, 1924, p.6.
39John O'Beirne-Ranelagh, "The I.R.B. From the
Treaty to 1924," Irish Historical Studies, 20 (March 1976):
32.
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position reflected the changing political situation in
Ireland with the establishment of Dail Eireann.

However,

political initiative and hence political control had now
passed from the I.R.B. to the Dail.40
Meredith cited Sean O'Murthuile, QuartermasterGeneral, as the "prime mover" in reorganizing the Brotherhood.41

After Collins' death, O'Murthuile, as Secretary of

the supreme Council, called a meeting of the senior members
of the I.R.B.

In August of 1922, O'Murthuile was not yet

Quartermaster-General but rather Commandant of Kilmainham
jail.

In a letter to Mulcahy, he requested that the

cowmander-in-Chief meet him at the Adjutant-General's office,
Portobello Barracks, "to consider certain questions in connection with the organisation and the death of the late
com..rnander-in-Chief."42

O'Murthuile felt that certain doc-

uments which had been in Collins' possession should be
secured.

He explained to the Committee:

I felt that I was the person to move in the matter of
winding up General Collins' affairs in as far as they
were concerned with the matters that we had joint responsibility in, and on August the 31st, 1922. I asked
a few of his Colleagues to meet me to discuss the
4°Ibid., pp.31-32.
4l"chairman's Draft Report," Mulcahy Papers,
P7/C/41, University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
4 2Mulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/10, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
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situation, to take over his I.R.B. papers, etc. nothing
whatever was done except to secure that all documents
were preserved and the conditions of things noted for
reference later.43
The Inquiry discussed the propriety of an officer
sending this type of letter to his Commander-in-Chief.
Mulcahy defended such action by saying that it was merely a
circular form letter sent to all those who would attend the
meetings, implying no disrespect. 44

However, Meredith

believed that, regardless of the form and intent, such a
letter must, to a certain extent, have impaired authority.45
The Committee heard conflicting evidence on the reorganisation or resurrection of the I.R.B.

Those opposed to

the Army Council, in particular O'Higgins and Patrick Hogan,
the Minister for Agriculture, maintained that the Brotherhood had died after the conclusion of the Anglo-Irish war and
that it should have been left in its moribund state. 46

Hogan

went so far as to say that reviving the I.R.B. was mutiny
because

11

anything that weakens the allegiance that the

43o'Hurthuile, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/13, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
44Mulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/36 University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
45 "chairrnan's Draft Report," Hulcahy Papers,
P7/C/41, University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
46p. Hogan, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/24, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland; O'Higgins, Testimony
before the Army Inquiry Cowmittee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/23,
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
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soldier bears to the Government is mutiny, and all the more
seriously if done officially." 47

O'Higgins told the Com-

mittee that he heard of efforts to revive the Brotherhood
being made at meetings of officers from various parts of the
country held at Portobello Barracks under the chairmanship
of O'Murthuile.

However, when he confronted the Minister of

Defence with this information during a Cabinet meeting,
Mulcahy denied it and also disputed O'Higgins assertion that
the Headquarters•staff was practically the "inner" or "upper"
circles of the society.48

In addition,

O~Higgins

further

charged that the I.R.B. was revitalized to combat the old
I.R.A. 49
The Army Council emphatically denied that the I.R.B.
had ever ceased to function. 50 Admittedly, a reorganisation
of the Brotherhood had occurred sometime between the end of
1922 and the beginning of 1923, but this had been necessitated by the existing military situation.

When the Army

Council realized that the Irregulars were attempting to take
over the organisation and use the weight of its historic
47 P. Hogan, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/24, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
4Bo'Higgins, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/23, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
4 9Ibid.
50Mulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/10, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
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appeal and traditions for their own purposes,51 the senior
members of the Organisation agreed that steps had to be
taken to consolidate their position in order to insure that
the Brotherhood would remain in the hands of those loyal to
the State.52

Reorganisation thus took place not to exclude

the officers of the old I.R.A. nor as a counter-organisation,
but to safeguard it against Irregular control, to preserve
its tradition in the best interests of the Free State. 53
Recent historical research supports this view. 54

Moreover,

Mulcahy stated that there were never any I.R.B. meetings
attended only by army officers and that "no member ever at'"'
tended any meeting in his capacity as Army Officer. ,,55
Because of the delicate political situation, the
leaders of the Brotherhood chose not to involve, in their
Slo'Murthuile, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/32, University College Dublin
Archives, Dublin, Ireland; Mulcahy, Testimony before the
Army Inquiry Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/36, University
College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
52o'Murthuile, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/32, University College Dublin
Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
53o•sullivan, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/12, University College Dublin
Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
54see, for example, John O'Beirne-Ranelagh, "The
I.R.B. From the Treaty to 1924," Irish Historical Studies,
20 (March 1976); and Leon O'Broin, Revolut1onary Underground
(Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1976).
55Mulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/10, University College Dublin
Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
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plans for the reorganisation of the I.R.B., members who were
also in the government, in order not to put them in a compromising position and to avoid the possibility that "members
of the government might be inhibited in their relations with
the British if it could be said that the I.R.B. was functioning with their full knowledge and connivance."56

With re-

spect to the Minister for Defence, the Brotherhood attempted
to keep him informed yet not involved.

O'Murthuile explained:

General Mulcahy, himself, though he was informed, was
never placed in the position that he would have to stand
over everything we did. He was more of a free lance in
this matter.
It was not fair, we felt, that General
Mulcahy should be bound by any steps we proposed to take
and that he should be free in view of his position and
of the responsibilities he would have, but that he
would be in a position to know whether anything that
happened was a danger or otherwise to the Government. 57
The leaders of the I.R.B. were obviously sensitive to the
anomaly of perpetuating a secret revolutionary society in an
independent Irish Free State.

However, the Inquiry Committee

did not approve of its discretion, but felt that Mulcahy
should have taken "the earliest opportunity of informing the
Executive Council of the proposed reorganisation of the
I.R.B."58
56Leon O'Broin, Revolutionary Underground
New Jersey; Rowman and Littlefield, 1976), p.214.

(Totowa,

57 o'Murthuile, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/32, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
58 Ireland, Executive Council, Army Inquiry Committee,
Report, 1924, p.9.
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A meeting between members

o~

the Executive Council

and the Army Council took place on June 10, 1923.

The con-

ference was arranged to discuss a letter which Sean
O'Murthuile received from Sean O'Hegarty regarding the request of Tom Barry, an Irregular leader in Cork, to use the
I.R.B. as a medium to affect a reconciliation between the
National Forces and the Irregulars.

Although the Civil War

was officially over, violence continued to plague some areas,
especially in the South.

The letter stated:

T.B. Barry, an officer in the Organisation in Cork County
appeals to the I.R.B., to intervene with its influence
to stop the now unnecessary and therefore vindictive
pursuit of members of the Irish Republican Army (called
the 'Irregulars') all over the country by Free State
Troops, these members having now for the most part
dumped their arms and offering no resistance, for the
purpose of enabling him to create such a feeling as will
allow a fusion of the I.R.B. elements which now are
warring on both sides, so that the ideals of the Organisation may not be lost sight of, and for the purpose
of counteracting the sinister reactionary elements which
are rapidly gaining control of the life and Government
of the country.59
Mulcahy, interpreting O'Hegarty's letter in conjunction with
other reports he had received, concluded that Barry \"lanted
to release the Irregular army from its allegiance to the
De Valera government, in hiding and illegitimate, and hoped
to form a "National Organisation," secret, political and
containing the best men from both sides.

In return for

amnesty for those not arrested and parole for certain prisoners, Barry would agree to the open destruction of arms and
S9Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/42, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
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the disbandment

o~ his forces. 60

The

~inister for Defence

considered this to be an important development and discussed
the matter with MacNeill and O'Higgins.
In his conversation with MacNeill, Mulcahy pointed.
out that the recognition of the Supreme Council by Barry was
important since he was one of the leading figures of the
rebel movement.

The Minister for Defence believed that the

Supreme Council could be used a "a Body to whose wishes the
leaders of the Irregular side could acquiesce in matters of
disbandment and arms without feeling humiliated."61

Both

agreed that it was a politically delicate situation and that
a conference with other members of the government was
necessary.
Mulcahy's subsequent conversation with orHiggins is
instructive because it reveals the conflicting attitudes the
Ministers held with respect to the I.R.B.

Mulcahy reiterat-

ed what he said to MacNeill concerning the "pivotal" position
of the Supreme Council.

More importantly, however, he ac-

knowledged that "we#" probably meaning the Army Council and
its senior officers, fully controlled the policy of the
Brotherhood and then prophesied:
60 Mulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/10, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
61Ibid.
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That its ?olicy could bear the light of day. That it
was almost obvious that in two years' time perhaps that
it, as a political organisation with political ideals,
would be as open as ••• the Irish Volunteers.
That while, ultimatelyf persons connected with the
present Government might not, and from the point of view
of effective National development, should be asso'C..:.
ated with it, that it was essential they should control
its moulding and development at the present time.62
Mulcahy clearly envisioned the development of the I.R.B.
into a more open society and was cognizant of the problems
inherent in any attempt to involve the army intimately with
the Brotherhood.

However, he concluded that this \'las less

of a danger than allowing the society to slip from loyal
hands.
O'Higgins, on the other hand, argued that there was
a "very great danger" of men being appointed to key positions
solely on the basis of membership in the I.R.B., that this
would lead to "serious abuses and serious weaknesses," and
that, in fact, he believed that certain officers held their
positions only because they were members of the Brother-·
hood.6 3

Mulcahy denied this.

He claimed that I.R.B. member-

ship had never been a criterion for appointment and that it
was "absurd" to think it would happen in the future. 64
O'Higgins testified that he reiterated his disapproval of the
I.R.B. to the Minister for Defence and said:
62rbid.
63rbid.
64rbid.
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I replied tha,t I did not wish to leave him under any
misapprehension, that though I was a member of the I.R.A.
in pre-Truce days I had the stronge~t possible objection
to it or to any other Secret Society in the altered condition of things, that I believed that an organisation
of that nature would be bad for the Army and for the
country.65
Significantly, this conversation reveals the wide chasm which
separated the two :t-1inisters.
On June 10, 1923, President Cosgrave, MacNeill and
O'Higgins met with Mulcahy, MacMahon and O'Murthuile.

The

Committee heard conflicting testimony concerning the purpose
of the meeting and its final outcome.

O'Higgins claimed

that it was called primarily to deal with the reorganisation
of the I.R.B. 66 Both Mulcahy and O'Murthuile stated the
primary purpose was to discuss the letter the

Quartermaster~

General had received about Barry and that this led into a
general discussion of the Brotherhood. 67

The timing of the

meeting and Mulcahy's earlier conversations with his two
colleagues do indicate that the meeting was called to discuss
the O'Hegarty letter, but it is also likely that the greater
part of the meeting dealt with specific questions concerning
the I.R.B.
O'Higgins testified that both he and MacNeill
vigorously opposed the reorganisation of the I.R.B. and
pointed out to the generals the potential which existed for
65o'Higgins, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/21, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
66Ibid.
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unconstitutional beha,vi.ol;' and the deleterious effects it
would have on the army.

So energetic and emphatic was their

di6approval that, according to O'Higgins, "

finally the

President stated that it must not be allowed to develop into
a wrangle and dispersed the meeting."

68

However, the

Generals left the meeting feeling that they had explained
their position and were understood by the Ministers.

Mulcahy,

viewing the meeting optimistically, claimed that:
the other three members of the Government did not undertake to give any definite advice, nor to give any definite instructions and I was perfectly satisfied after the
meeting that they were satisfied that any Army Officer
who had any responsibility in respect of the I.R.B. was
doing what appeared to him to be the best and the most
wise thing in all our circumstances here, and that they
could not suggest better.
Apprised of the position, the three other Ministers
did see at least some reason for the position and they
did not forbid it.69
President Cosgrave, speaking in the Dail, said that none of
the three Ministers had been in favor of continuing the
Brot~erhood,

that they had not been asked for advice and that

"information as to the existence of this organisation was put
6 7Mulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/10, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland; O'Murthuile, Testimony
befo~e the Army Inquiry Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/32,
university College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
68o'Higgins, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/21, University College
Archives, Dublin, Ireland.

comm~ttee,

Dubl~n

69Mulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
committee, 11ulcahy Papers, P7 /C/10, University College
DubliP Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
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to them and not one o;t; them supported it in any way~"70
Obviously

~1ulcahy

felt that by not proscribing the I.R.B.,

his colleagues at least had come to some understanding with
him.

He was wrong.
One issue which received a great deal of attention

from those opposed to the I.R.B. was the question of
membership in the Brotherhood and its influence on
tions and advancement in the army.

promo~

No specific proof in

support of this claim surfaced, although this was not

sur~

prising given the secret nature of the organisation.

Most

of the witnesses were merely speculating and repeating
current rumors.

Patrick Hogan summed up such testimony when

he said: "I had sens.ed it was there, at least I had sensed
that there were things happening which I could not explain
by ordinary reasoning."71

The members of the Army Council

emphatically denied the charges that officers were either
retained or demobilized depending on their standing in the
I.R.B.

They demanded that their accusers produce evidence

and not merely groundless hearsay and gossip.72
Committee agreed with the Army Council.

The

The Report stated:

70 Ireland, Dail Eireann, Official Report

7 (1924):

3148.
71

P. Hogan, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/24, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
72o•sullivan, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/12, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
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"It has not been prayed to us that any appointments or promotions

t~re

made by reason of member of, or influence corrupt-

ly exercised by the I.R.B."73

Current literature supports

this interpretation, judging that

~Mulcahy

and others in-

valved in the I.R.B. reorganisation were not promoting members of the I.R.B. in the national army at the expense of
others." 74

However, the Inquiry did believed that the exist-

ence of a secret society created a "natural suspicion't among
non-members and "undermined confidence in the impartiality
of the Army Council and higher comrnands."75
The Army council was not unaware of nor insensitive
to the dangers of a secret society existing within the army.
Prior to 1924, the generals had believed that it was in the
best interests of the State that they and other senior
officers guide the I.R.B.

However, their testimony revealed

that all of them now felt that within the next few months,
by August, 1924, a clause should be inserted into the new
Defence Forces Act forbidding members of the army from also
being participants in any secret society.

They believed

without question that such an undertaking would be loyally
73 Irelartd, Executive Council, Army Inquiry Committee,
Report, 1924, p.7.
74John O'Beirne-Ranelagh, "The I.R.B. From the
Treaty to 1924," Irish Historical Studies, 20 (March 1976):
38.
75 Ireland, Executive Council, Army Inquiry Committee,
Report, 1924, p.7.
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obeyed.7 6

The position of the Army Council was that only

then, in 1924, had the danger sufficiently passed that they
could contemplate this step.

They now knew that the need

for a revolutionary society had passed and that it was time
to turn away from the gun to other more constructive
pursuits.

Sean O'Murthuile stated:

that the future activities of the I.R.B. should be
directed toward turning to the social and political
atmosphere with the programme of any Government working
towards the National and economic advancement of the
Irish geople without regard to parties or party influence.77
Clearly, the extreme suspicion and fear exhibited by some
members of the Executive Council was unfounded.

Had the

army crisis not precipitated the Cabinet's rash action, the
Army Council would have moved to eradicate the I.R.B. as a
secret revolutionary society within the army.

According to

Mulcahy, the I.R.B. was just used nas a stock to beat us.n78
The final judgment of the Inquiry Committee was,
overall, a stinging indictment of the Army Council.

The

76Mulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/10, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland; O'Murthuile, Testimony
before the Army Inquiry Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/32,
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland;
MacMahon, Testimony before the Army Inquiry Committee, Mulcahy
Papers, P7/C/36, University College Dublin Archives, Dublin,
Ireland.
77o'Murthuile, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/13, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
78Hulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/35, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
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report concluded;
We consider that the reorganisation of the I.R.B., carried out as it appears to have been by the actual heads
of the Army, was a disastrous error of. judgment, and
accentuated a mutiny which might not have occurred at
all, and which could have been more firmly suppressed
if those in authority had not weakened their position
by leaving themselves open to the charge of acting in
the interest of a hostile secret society.79
The final issue investigated by the Committee was
the general state of the army, in particular, the question
of discipline.

During the hearings, the Inquiry once again

was confronted with conflicting evidence.

l1ost of the wit-

nesses agreed that discipline in the army was not only good
80
.
.
.
1 y, was stea d.l
1 y 1mprov1ng.
b ut, more 1mportant

Professor

Hogan stated that there had been "an extraordinary improvement" in the army during the period from December, 1922 until
April, 1923, but with the cessation of hostilities, a slight
breakdown in control occurred.8l

The consensus was that

disciplinary problems had been primarily due to inexperience
and a lack of firm guidelines.

As the army administration

79Ireland, Executive Council, Army Inquiry Committee,
Report, 1924, p.6.
80 col. Henry, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, t.1ulcahy Papers, P7/C/25, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland; Davitt, Testimony before
the Army Inquiry Committee, t1ulcahy Papers, P7/C/24,
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland;
O'Sullivan, Testimony before the Army Inquiry Committee,
Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/32, University College Dublin Archives,
Dublin, Ireland.
81 Professor Hogan, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/25, University College Dublin
Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
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became more systematized and more formalized, conditions did
and would continue to improve.

There was some speculation

that the mutiny would have a deleterious effect on the army,
undoing all previous efforts to inculcate the soldiers with
a non-political frame of mind.

When General MacMahon was

sent during the crisis to stabilize the Cork command, his
message, in essence, was that the army must stay out of
politics and adhere to strict military obedience and discipline.82

Testifying before the Committee, the former Chief

of Staff expressed fear that the mutiny may have caused the
army to become repoliticized, that "men who had forgotten
all about politics had been brought back to them." 8 3
Not unexpectedly, the chief critic of the army was
Kevin O'Higgins.
made in the Dail.

The Minister reiterated the charges he had
Specifically, he said:

(a) ..• that the Army was breaking up into factions,
societies or combinations;
{b) That the personal equation was too much in evidence
in the Army, and was re-acting most unfavourably on
discipline;
(c) .•. that the Army was not unequivacably, unquestionably without reserve, simply the instrument of the
people's will ..•
(d) That the ex-Minister for Defence throughout the year
previous to his resignation did not stand for stern,
impersonal discipline in the Army and that the names of
82Tobin ~1utiny File, .l-1ulcahy Papers, P7/B/196,
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
83MacMahon, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/34, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
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certain officers were submitted to the Executive Council
for rank and position under the reorganisation scheme
against whom grave charges had been made without being
satisfactorily rebutted.84
In his testimony, O'Higgins revealed that he had
been in contact with Colonel Jephson O'Connell, a disgruntled
officer in charge of Inspection.

O'Connell had approached

the Minister in September of 1923, in a clear breach of discipline, because "the condition of the Army demanded the
immediate attention of the Government."85

O'Higgins did not

inform Mulcahy but instead used O'Connell as a source of
information throughout the next year.

O'Connell reinforced

O'Higgins' feelings about the shortcomings of the army.

In

his lugubrious testimony, O'Connell heartily condemned the
administration of the army, charging favouritism, financial
waste, ignorance, lack of discipline and respect, inefficiency
and lack of loyalty to the Government.86
Before the Coromittee, O'Higgins launched a devastating and vicious attack on Mulcahy.

He accused the Minister

for Defence of trying to "buy off" the mutineers by offering
them good positions in the reorganisation scheme but claimed
84o'Higgins, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/21, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.

as Ibid.
86Jephson O'Connell, Testimony before the Army
Inquiry Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/15, University
College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
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Mulcahy had failed because the Pprice was not big enough,P87
There is no evidence to support this position especially in
light of the mutineers' adverse feelings about their appointments.

In fact, according to government policy, their

pre-Truce service made these men eligible for special consideration.

O'Higgins attacked Mulcahy for meeting with the

Tobin-Dalton group and for not taking any action to "vindicate outraged discipline." 88

This is a difficult posture

for O'Higgins to assume considering that 1) when the Army
Council tried to "vindicate outraged discipline," they had
been dismissed by the Cabinet with O'Higgins leading the
attack; 2) the President had initiated the meetings, not
Mulcahy, and periodically had discussed the situation with
him; 3) the Minister for Industry and Commerce, McGrath, had
urged Mulcahy to participate in these meetings; and 4)
O'Higgins himself, as spokesman for the Executive Council,
did not uphold strict discipline but rather had excused the
mutineers and called a direct threat against the State a
"foolish action."
In his final criticism, O'Higgins accused Mulcahy
of not understanding and not fulfilling his role as Minister
for Defence and member of the Executive Council.

He told

the Committee:
8 7 o'Higgins, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/23, University College
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
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I could not get away from the impression that the Minister for Defence came to the Executive Council not so
much as a colleague to do business with colleagues as in
the capacity of a delegate ••• almost as a man coming to
the Executive Council to hold a watching brief for •.•
the Army in the Executive Council •••. There was a lack
of candor. There \vas a cloud bank between the Army and
the Executive Council . . • • It was if what went on within
the Army was no business of the other members of the
Executive Council.89
One of the reasons for O'Higgins' hostility to
Mulcahy was the unfortunate incident which occurred at
Kenmare, County Kerry in July of 1923.

This case is impor-

tant because it became a cause c'l~bre with Kevin O'Higgins,
proving to him that there was a lack of impersonal discipline
and impartiality in the army.

It is also interesting because

it highlights some of the social conditions then existing in
the Free State.

The Inquiry Committee spent a great deal of

time investigating the evidence of the incident.
The relevant facts of the occurrence are quite
simple.

On June 2, 1923, the McCarthy sisters allegedly

were assaulted by three men dressed in army uniform.

The

women claimed that they were dragged from their home, motor
grease rubbed in their hair, beaten with Sam Brown (army)
belts, kicked and stepped on.

Major-General o•oaly, G.O.C.

of the Kerry Command and Captains Flood and Clarke were all
implicated.

Inter-personal relations and prior history,

however, added other complications.
The McCarthy sisters, Flossie and Jessie, daughters
89Ibid.
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of Dr. McCarthy, had been particularly friendly with two
officers stationed in Kenmare, Captain Harrington and Lieutenant Higgins, a relative of Kevin O'Higgins.

These offi-

cers frequently had visited the McCarthy house, allegedly
returning to the barracks often at a very late hour and under
the influence of alcohol.

Horeover, Harrington and Higgins

had been suspected of involvement in the burning of the
furniture and the home of Mrs. Hartnett, a widow who had
sympathized with the Irregulars during the Civil war.
Captain Flood, one of the accused, had testified against the
two officers at the hearing following the fire.

Because of

Harrington's and Higgins' behaviour during their visits with
the sisters and because he believed that the plot to burn
Mrs. Hartnett's house was actually devised at the McCarthy's,
Major-General O'Daly had placed the house off limits, an
order ignored by both officers.

O'Daly himself had personal-

ly overheard, during a visit there, an exchange between
Harrington and Dr. McCarthy concerning the desirability of
taking retaliatory action against the widow.

In addition,

O'Daly's decision not to invite the two women to a Command
dance had caused further antagonism between the G.O.C. and
the McCarthy family.90
A Military Court of Inquiry, consisting of MajorGeneral Reynolds, G.O.C. of the Cork Command, President,
90"court of Inquiry Report," Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/42,
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
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Colonel James Shiels and Commandant John Aherne, was held
late in June. The two sisters stated that they had recognized one of their assailants as Captain Flood.

Further

testimony established that O'Daly, Clarke and Flood had
been out of the barracks together at the time of the assault,
admittedly within close proximity to the McCarthy house, and
that they had been drinking champagne that evening.

How-

ever, the three officers claimed that they had walked to
O'Sullivan's hotel and bar to make sure there were no

offi~

cers drinking after hours.91
The Court of Inquiry's findings were mixed.

All

three members agreed that the evidence had established that
Captain Flood was involved in the attack.

Major-General

Reynolds felt that the identity of the other two assailants
had not been established.

Colonel Shiels believed that

O'Daly and Clarke, although not actually participating, knew
about the crime and were in the vicinity.

Commandant Aherne

thought that Captains Flood and Clark and Major-General
O'Daly were all guilty.92
The Judge Advocate-General told the Adjutant-General
that the officers should be tried at a Court Martial.

He

recommended that they be recalled to G.H.Q. and O'Daly relieved of his command.

They should be informed of the

charges against them and given a week to write their expla9lrbid.
92rbid.
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nations.
~nd

If these proved unsatisfactory,

Capt~ins

Flood

Clarke were to be placed under close arrest and Hajor-

General O'Daly formally arrested but, if he agreed to stand
trial, allowed to remain at liberty.9 3

Davitt discussed the

possibility of allowing O'Daly the alternative of resigning
his commission but advised against it.

He counseled;

This ••• would savour of weakness and an attempt to cloak
matters and besides would not avert the scandal of the
McCarthys themselves instituting civil or criminal proceedings. Moreover, in view of the part played by the
Minister for Home Affairs this course would appear to
be impossible.94
The situation "YTas further complicated by the fact
that once the Defence Forces Bill became law, at the end of
August, nobody could be tried for an offence committed prior
to the passage of the Act.

The Judge Advocate-General ex-

plained that the military authorities "could not try any
military offence committed prior to the passing of the Act,
because these offences were not strictly offences before the
act passed."95

Before the Defence Forces Act, military

crimes had been dealt with on the basis that a state of war
was in existence.
93Davitt, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/7, University College Dublin
Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
94Davitt, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/24, University College Dublin
Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
95Davitt, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/7, University College Dublin
Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
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On August 3 1 1923, Davitt had an interview with the
Minister for Defence.

Mulcahy believed that the evidence

against Major-General O'Daly was not sufficient to order a
Court Martial and "that the scandal of trying a General
officer and the publicity following it would result in more
harm than good," especially since he felt O'Daly would not
be convicted.96

Although he agreed that O'Daly would prob-

ably be acquitted, Davitt argued that it would be in the
best interest of both the army and the officers involved to
hold a trial. Mulcahy ended the interview by deciding to
submit the matter to the Attorney-General for his consideration.97
Kevin O'Higgins brought the Kenmare case to the
attention of the Executive Council.

The Minister for Home

Affairs had received a letter from Dr. McCarthy and had in
turn written the President. 98

At a special meeting of the

Cabinet, on September 17, 1923, it was decided to seek the
advice of the Attorney-General.

O'Higgins dissented and

instead recommended "that the Officers, against whom in the
opinion of the Judge Advocate-General a prima facie case had
been made, be asked whether they or anyone on their behalf
would challenge the legality of a court martial in connection
96rbid.
97rbid.
98rreland, SPOD, Cabinet minutes, Cl/146 and Cl/148.
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with this matter."99

O'Higgins was suggesting that the

Officers voluntarily submit to a trial since the Defence
Forces Act had been passed.

His idea, however, found no

support among the members of the Cabinet.lOO
The Attorney-General submitted his opinion to the
Executive Council on 27 September 1923.

Essentially, he

upheld Mulcahy's decision not to institute court martial
proceedings against otoaly and his officers.

He not only

evaluated the evidence but also provided a social commentary
on the aspiring country Catholic bourgeoisie.
In reviewing the evidence on the Kenmare case,
Kennedy felt it necessary to reconstruct the atmosphere, the
social milieu in which the incident occurred, in order to
achieve a clearer and more complete understanding,

The

Attorney-General, describing, not entirely without bias or
prejudice, the type of people involved in the Kenmare incident, wrote:
In the first place, let us see who the complainants are.
They are not city people and their mentality as witnesses and generally must be considered in the light of their
own history and environment. We all know the type of
Catholic bourgeoisie which existed in Irish country towns
and villages under the British regime.
It formed a small
social group consisting of the doctor, the local district
inspector of the R.I.C., perhaps with luck the county
99Ireland, SPOD, Cabinet minutes, Cl/149
lOOibid.
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inspector and the bank clerks. This group had distinctly
Brttish leanings because of its social aspirations and
reached through the Protestant grocer to attain to an
occasional smile from the country family.lOl
Kennedy then went on to analysize the relationship between
this particular class and the British Army:
When during the war conditions following on 1916, British
Military were scattered through the country, their offi~
cers however temporary, were cultivated by the ladies of
this social type.
It is humiliating to have to confess
that when the 'Black and Tans' and the Auxilliaries
followed in the train, many of the girls of this social
stratum were easy associates - possibly intrigued by the
combination of uniform, southern English accent and reputed careers in the British Army.
It seems clear that the McCarthys were of this type and
this fact cannot be lost sight of in assessing the evidence offered in support of the story.l02
The Attorney-General contrasted this attitude with their
feelings toward the new Irish Army:
Officers of the National Army have been in many cases the
butt for people of this kind and especially the broad
doric of Dublin had seemed a vulgarity after the accents
of British Military and Auxilliaries. Occasionally
officers of the National Army are accepted into this
select circle,. as for instance, Captain Harrington, whose
father was a member of the British House of Commons and
a Barrister-at-law, or Lieut. Higgins, who had been a
Bank Clerk in Tralee.
One may assume that in the intimate relations that sprung
up between the McCarthys and these two elect officers,
the general status and character of the National Army was
often the subject for pitiful comment.l03
After having discussed the social characteristics of the
lOlopinion of Attorney-General Hugh Kennedy on
McCarthy Affair (Kenmare), Kennedy Papers 1 P4/A/16,
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
102Ibid.
103rbid.
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McCarthysf the Attorney-General finally examined the evidence.
He found that »there is not one shred or title of evidence in
all the papers put before me to justify a charge against
either Major-General O'Daly or against Captain Clark of
having taken part in such an outrage."l04

Kennedy felt that

the evidence against captain Flood primarily depended on the
statements of the two sisters which he thought to be contradictory.

Each of the women had identified a different

assailant as the Captain·

Moreover, Kennedy was skeptical

of the women's charge that they had been beaten and kicked
since there was no evidence that they had required medical
attention and had not been in any noticeable physical distress when visited by the military authorities immediately
after the incident.

The Attorney-General decided that not

only was there no direct evidence against Captain Flood but
what evidence did exist was not only of the "flimsiest character but .•. quite contradictory."lOS
a conviction could ever be obtained.

He did not believe
Kennedy recommended,

if the McCarthy family were not satisfied, that they institute civil or criminal proceedings.l06
Kevin O'Higgins had not been satisfied with the
outcome of the Kenmare investigation and, in his testimony
before the Committee, charged favoritism and cover-up.
104 Ibid.
lOSrbid.
106 rbid.
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believed that the failure to prosecute had been the "death
knell of either discipline or efficiency in the Army."l07
O'Higgins felt that the officers should have been relieved
of their commissions if there was proof, even though not
necessarily legally conclusive, that they had not met the
standards which the government expected.

The Minister had

been distressed by the fact that Captains Clarke and Flood
were to be retained in the reorganisation scheme and that
Mulcahy had offered Major-General O'Daly the position of
Vice G.O.C. of the Western Command with the rank of Colonel.
O'Higgins had blocked the nominations of Clarke and Flood in
the Executive Council.

O'Daly chose to resign.

Addressing criticism over his decision not to prosecute O'Daly and his selection of him as one of the officers
on the G.O.C. Officers Demobilisation Board,

~1ulcahy

claimed

O'Daly had special knowledge of the Dublin command, a
troublesome section as the events of the mutiny demonstrated.lOS

He dismissed the accusations of those who held that

the Kenmare incident had a negative effect on the armyl09
1° 7o'Higgins, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/23, University College Dublin
Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
1° 8Mulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/37, University College Dublin
Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
109o'Higgins, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/23, University College Dublin
Archives, Dublin, Ireland; Russell, Testimony before the Army
Inquiry Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/20; Professor Hogan,
Testimony before the Army Inquiry Committee, Mulcahy Papers,
P7/C/25, University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
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and defended his

position~

Generally, in the case of any Officer who has given
distinguished service of lasting benefit to his Country,
and shown himself in difficult and varying circumstances
to have been a thoughtful and a bold soldier, I was not
prepared lightly, and on no evidence, to place him in ·
the degrading position of answering to a low charge.llO
Meredith's report cited the Kenmare case as proof
of the necessity for having a civilian as Minister for Defence.

He believed that, as a military man, Mulcahy was

reluctant to bring charges against a high ranking officer and
was loathe to bring discredit on the army.

The Chairman

thought Mulcahy had been wrong in not acting as soon as the
Kenmare incident occurred.lll

The Inquiry Report stated that

the decision to drop the Kenmare case was
judgment" on the part of General Mulcahy.

~a

grave error of

The Committee

believed that, although it did not contribute to the mutiny,
"it did militate against discipline generally by encouraging
suspicion in the minds of officers and others that the Army
Authorities were disposed to hush up charges against persons
high in authority."ll2
llOMulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/10, University College Dublin
Archives, Dublin, Ireland. It is interesting to note that
four years after the event, Dr. McCarthy was still writing to
O'Higgins demanding monetary compensation for their expenses
in the matter and for their sufferings, loss of health and
mental torture. Ireland, SPOD, Kenmare File, 83341.
lll"chairman's Draft Report, .. Mulcahy Papers,
P7/C/41, University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland.
112rreland, Executive Council, Army Inquiry
Committee, Report, 1924, p.9.
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The Report concluded that no evidence existed to
support the charges of muddling, mismanagement and incompetence on the part of the Chief of Staff; that the Quartermaster-General, although committing a disastrous error of
judgment in reorganising the I.R.B., had no other charges
relevant to the Inquiry made against him; that the AdjutantGeneral had not been negligent nor trying to shield offenders
in handling cases involving high ranking officers; and, in
the Kenmare case, he strictly followed the advice of his
adviser, the Judge Advocate-General.ll3

In spite of these

findings, only MacMahon was reissued his commission.
The Army Inquiry Committee Report was presented to
the Dail in June of 1924.

General Mulcahy branded it a

"national humiliation" and announced his intention to intraduce in the Dail a motion to reinstate the three generals,
in effect, a motion of censure of the Executive Council.ll4
It was to be a futile gesture.
On June 26, 1923, Mulcahy moved that the Dail condemn "as contrary to the best interests of the State the illconsidered action of the Executive Council" in removing the
Army Council and the "subsequent failure of the Executive
Council to act upon the Report of the Army Inquiry Com113 Ibid.
114Ireland, Dail Eireann, Official Report 7 (1924) :
24 9 o-.2so2.
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mittee~Pll5

The ensuing debate was unimpressive~

Because

the Executive Council refused to publish either the evidence
presented to the Committee or the Chairman's reservations,
the deputies were being asked to vote on a motion about which
they had very incomplete information.

For this very reason,

the Labour Party, for example, decided to abstain completely
from voting on Mulcahy's motion.
Most of the debate consisted of a reiteration of
positions previously stated during earlier discussions on the
army.

Mulcahy asked the Dail to reinstate the generals

because, however grudgingly, the Report did not uphold the
charges against them.

He detailed the herculean service the

three men had performed for the Free State and charged that
"these officers were swept away to satisfy the personal
wishes of certain members of the Executive Council and to
satisfy the demands of certain mutinous officers for their
removal.nllG

Mulcahy claimed that he introduced the motion

with regret but that he had to because these former members
of the Army Council were being unfairly victimised by personal prejudices and his sense of public duty demanded it.
In rebuttal, O'Higgins restated his position concerning the
problems and inadequacies of the administration of the army
and stated that the Army Council had been dismissed because
of "a lack of confidence and that lack of confidence was
11 5 rbid.:3110.
116rbid.:3113
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proved and justified by the Pa~nell Street incident."ll7
However, it was the President who set the to:ne of the Government's position when he said:
That particular incident which occurred three months ago
is an incident which in my opinion, ought to be dead and
buried and ought not to be resurrected, no matter what
its influence was either at that time or now.ll8
The motion to censure the Executive Council was subsequently
defeated.
Despite the cost, the Cosgrave government had survived both the military and political crisis caused by the
mutiny.

Its victims were Mulcahy, MacMahon, O'Murthuile,

and O'Sullivan, four of the men most responsible for winning
the Civil War and preserving the Irish Free State.

Their

resignations, and the army's passive acceptance of the government's decision, was a tribute to their success in creating
an obedient, non-political fighting force.

Out of the crisis

of mutiny came the affirmation that Ireland was to be governed by the will of the people and not by the dictates of her
generals.

ll?Ibid. :3159-3160.
11 8 Ibid.:3150.

CONCLUSION
The Irish Army Mutiny of 1924 directly influenced
the development and formation of the Irish Free State, having
a significant impact on both its immediate and ultimate
political structure.

It was instrumental not only in deter-

mining the direction post-colonial Ireland would take but
also in shaping its leadership, furnishing valuable clues to
the puzzle of the Cosgrave government.

The Mutiny provides

an insight into the workings of the Executive Council, highlighting both the relationship between the government and
the Dail and the particular characteristics of the individual
Cabinet members.

During the crisis, the Cosgrave govern-

ment continually treated the legislature in a dictatorial
manner, using it as a rubber-stamp rather than as a body to
whom it was ultimately responsible.

Cumann na nGaedheal

party meetings had more influence on government and state
policy than Dail sessions.

Although the Cosgrave government

had shown itself to be weak, vascillating and compromising
when dealing with the mutineers, when threatened, it displayed a remarkable ability to maintain itself in power,
despite numerous challenges and inner conflicts.
The Army crisis exacerbated the tension already
existing in the Cabinet between O'Higgins and Mulcahy,
247
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culminating in the latter's resignation.

Mulcahy was the

"army man," insensitive to the feelings of his civilian
colleagues, intensely protective of the army and his prerogatives as Minister of Defence, but loyal to his staff,
party and government.

Mulcahy, in the tradition of Michael

Collins, incorporated unto himself both political and military power.

However, he did not have the force of character,

the heroic stature necessary to fulfill Collins' legacy.
Moreover, the advent of peace made his colleagues more
critical of the army and more concerned with vindicating
civil supremacy.

Although Mulcahy was himself totally ded-

icated to the formation and development of an Irish army
which would be loyal to any Irish government and above political involvement, he unfortunately provided his nemesis,
O'Higgins, with sufficient ammunition to force his removal.
Always the loyal soldier, despite his resignation and motion
of censure, he patiently waited until his party and government recalled him into the Cabinet as Minister for Local
Government in 1927.
Throughout the crisis, O'Higgins, ambitious, strong
and single-minded, was almost fanatical in his determination
to cleanse the army of its leadership and involvement with
secret societies, so much so that he seemed to have lost his
perspective.

Frequently, interfering with the administration

of the army, he violated, by meeting and communicating with
an Army officer without the knowledge and consent of the
Minister for Defence, not only the standards of military
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conduct but also the norms imposed by the concept of
collective responsibility.

He did not ·trust H.ulcahy or the

Army Council and had no appreciation for the very real difficulties that they had to labor under and try to surmount.
However, O'Higgins was clearly dedicated to restoring law
and order in Ireland and seems, in his dealings with the
army, to have been motivated and influenced by this objective.
~lcGrath'

s position remains shadowed and unclear.

He seemed to have exerted ·influence over Cosgrave and the
Cumann na nGaedheal party and was obviously persuasive,
motivated both by his desire to help the mutineers and by
his mvn personal political ambitions.

However, his exact

relationship with the mutineers was and is not clear.

Al-

though he repeatedly stated that he did not condone mutiny,
he probably had never quite accepted the concept of a nonpolitical army.

Whether he would ever have used the army

or its discontented factions to attain power, if given the
opportunity, is debatable.

Clearly, he overestimated the

influence of Tobin and Dalton on the army and his own ability
to maintain a political party.
President Cosgrave, as the leader of a government
which tenaciously clung to power and maintained its control
over the Dail, was able to survive political challenges and
misfortunes to remain President until 1932.

He managed to

keep in check the ambitions of his subordinates and assert
himself as leader in a determined but unobtrusive manner,
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while holding together a Cabinet often filled with dissension.
A strong impression remains that Cosgrave was always in

control, allowing nothing to happen of which he_did not
approve.
While Cumann na nGaedheal successfully surmounted
any immediate challenge to its supremacy, the crisis inflicted
long term damage.

Both Mulcahy and McGrath represented a

particular type of nationalist, both of which were now lost
to the Party.

Coupled with failure to effect a successful

change in the boundary with Northern Ireland, the events of
the army mutiny left the impression that the party was now
outside the nationalist tradition, depriving it of some of
its vital centers of political organisation throughout the
country.

Many of the people associated with the mutiny

eventually joined Fianna Fail.

The government's handling of

the crisis managed to alienate both those who supported the
mutineers and those who supported the Army Council.

The

Irish Army Mutiny of 1924 thus contributed to the decay and
stagnation which would beset Cumann na nGaedheal and hence
unwittingly aided the coming ascendancy of de Valera and
Fianna Fail.
The Army Crisis of 1924 also proved fatal for the
Irish Republican Brotherhood.

The mutiny provided the

government with an opportunity to ruthlessly abandon the men
and the machinery which had made the Free State possible.
The Executive Council openly and defiantly announced that
the leaders of the army, the men most responsible for winning
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the Civil War, and the

I.R~B.,

the bulwark of the revolu-

tionary movement, were no longer useful or necessary to
Ireland.

Obviously, the position of a secret society within

a liberal democratic state had become increasingly ambiguous.
However, the Cosgrave government did not seem to recognize
the contributions which the I.R.B. had made to the liberation
struggle and overestimated its influence and power after the
Civil War.

The Brotherhood had ceased, by 1924, to be an

active revolutionary organization and did not pose a threat
to the government.

In any event, the crisis marked the

official demise of the I.R.B. as a significant and powerful
force within the army.

From 1924 on, all members of the

army had to swear that they did not belong to any secret
society.
The crisis clearly demonstrated the change which
had taken place within the army.

The independent spirit

which had characterized the Volunteers and the early forces
had basically disappeared.

By accepting the dismissal of its

leaders without recourse to violence, the army showed it had
made the transition from a politically involved and independent guerrilla force to a professional and disciplined national
Army.

Most significantly, however, the Irish Army Mutiny of

1924 upheld and affirmed the supremacy of constitutional
rule in Ireland.

The early years of independence were years

of precedent setting decisions which shaped and molded the
new state.

As a country just emerging both from a successful

struggle for liberation and a devastating civil war, imbued
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with a strong

t~adition

of revolutionary nationalism and a

chronic addiction to violence, one of its most important
institutions was the army.

Consequently, the relationship

between the military and the duly elected civilian government became crucial.

The Civil War had been the first test

of the new state's authority, but it was tinged with too
many peripheral issues to provide a clear and unequivocal
answer.

The Mutiny of 1924 clarified and strengthened the

position of the army as the unquestioning and obedient
servant of the state.
Since the beginnings of the revolutionary movement,
the power of the military vis-~,_vis civilian authority had
never been clearly delineated.

The Mutiny clarified the

ambiguous relationship which existed between the army and
the government.

At a time when the government was preoccu-

pied with the process and problems of state-building, and a
substantial and influential segment of Irishmen had not
yet accepted the legitimacy of the new state, this crisis
could have precipitated a military coup d'etat.

By submit-

ting their resignations on the demand of the government,
regardless of the validity of the decision, and by appearing
before the Inquiry Committee, when those who had caused the
crisis and those who had levelled the charges against the
army, refused to testify, the Army Council clearly and
unequivocally upheld the principle that the Irish army was
subordinate to the Irish Government.

Its action established

an important precedent with respect to the balance of power
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within the state.

It demonstrated that peaceful change in

the leadership of the army was not only possible but desirable, and helped free Ireland from the reoccurring threat of
military intervention in the political structure, a
situation not uncommon in countries emerging from colonialism.
Moreover, by peacefully resigning the Army Council demonstrated the strength of the parliamentary tradition in Irish
politics and its impact on the leaders of the liberation
struggle.

The actions of the four generals, men who embodied

the doctrine of physical force nationalism and who could
legitimately have claimed to be the heirs of 1916, clearly
reflected the inter-dependence between these two strands
of Irish nationalism.

Thus, the legacy which the future

political leaders of Ireland inherited is a blend of Parnell
and Pearse, of the Irish Parliamentary Party and the Irish
Republican Brotherhood, a fact which helps to explain the
high degree of stability which the Irish Free State was
able to achieve.
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